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ABSTRACT
Diffusion or Dissent:
Examining International Family Planning Frames and Domestic Policy Divergence
Gillian C. Beach
This dissertation explores how issue framing within an international advocacy movement influences
and is influenced by the framing of the same issue within politically differentiated regimes, and
examines this question through an analysis of the international family planning movement. Existing
work on both policy diffusion and international advocacy presents strong evidence that the
international community has a powerful effect on the framing and development of domestic policy.
However, there is room for refinement of the literature in addressing how international actors affect
policy trajectories within dissenting regimes—that is, regimes that espouse explicitly anti-Western
ideologies, but which are nevertheless active in the international community. To examine this
relationship, I employ a comparative case study of the Cuban and Iranian family planning movements,
using content analysis of archival data and process tracing methods. While both Cuba and Iran have
developed strong family planning programs and have actively sought international support in the
process, they have also promoted family planning frames consistent with their own national
ideologies. Thus, these movements offer the opportunity to explore the dynamics of dissenting regime
policy framing and its interactions with the international arena, and to enhance understanding of the
relationship between international activism and domestic policy development.

For Joe,
My love and support in all of life’s adventures.
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Chapter One
Introduction: International Advocacy and
Dissenting Regimes
In 1974, representatives from 135 nations met at the 3rd UN World Population Conference in
Bucharest to discuss global family planning advocacy, policies, and programs. An international social
movement promoting family planning—financially and ideologically led predominantly by US-based
actors—had been gaining momentum since the 1960s, and by 1974 the ideas that framed the
international family planning dialog were firmly established. Family planning was widely viewed as a
means for limiting population growth and promoting economic development (Blanc and Tsui 2005;
Seltzer 2002), and the 1974 UN Plan of Action reiterated the belief “that population policies and
objectives are an integral part of socio-economic development policies”.1 Although this statement
reflects majority opinion about the role of family planning, not every nation was comfortable with the
focus on population control and development. Among these nations, Cuba stands out for its open
dissent to UN framing of family planning at Bucharest. Cuban conference delegates vocally rejected
the conference’s dominant neo-Malthusian ideology, asserting that population growth did not cause
poverty and was merely being used as a distraction from the true causes of underdevelopment—that
is, neocolonialism (Sanders 1974, 5). However, despite its objection to the UN’s approach to family
planning, at the close of the conference, Cuba negotiated a $3.8 million grant agreement with the
United Nation Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), which was used to help establish an industry
for the local manufacture of oral contraceptives and provided equipment and personnel training for
maternal healthcare facilities (IPPF 1980).

1

See the World Population Plan of Action, http://www.un.org/en/development/devagenda/population.shtml
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PURPOSE OF RESEARCH
Cuba's activity at the 1974 Bucharest conference poses an interesting challenge to current
theories on advocacy, aid-seeking, and domestic policymaking. Existing work argues that international
advocates seeking to influence domestic policies must frame policy goals in a way that increases their
compatibility with domestic belief systems (Benford and Snow 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Noaks
and Johnston 2005; Tarrow 2005). The literature also predicts that, in order to engage the international
community and receive support for local programs, domestic advocates must portray their
movements as compatible with international agendas (Bob 2005). Over time, interaction between
domestic and international actors promotes the further convergence of policy frames and similarities
across resulting policies (Bennett 1991; Harsin 2010, 165; James and Lodge 2003, 182; Koopmans
1999, 67; Newmark 2002, 164). Thus, a lack of congruence between domestic frames and the frames
forwarded by transnational activists—which does not impede international support, collaboration,
and successful, internationally-endorsed policy programs—requires further explanation.
In more general terms, existing literature fails to account for the policy and advocacy trajectories
of dissenting regimes—that is, regimes that espouse non-Western ideologies, but which are nevertheless
active in the global community.2 Rather than isolating themselves from the international community,
dissenting regimes choose to actively participate in international social movements even when
domestic priorities diverge from the issue frames being promoted by international policy
advocacy—when these frames conflict with stated domestic ideologies or cultural values.
Furthermore, this discord does not always negatively impact the ability of dissenting regimes to draw
international support and to construct progressive policies. Thus, a revised understanding of these
dynamics of participation and dissent is critical to increasing our ability to successfully include
dissenting regimes in policy advocacy efforts and to build better policy programs.
Here, I intentionally make a distinction between these dissenting regimes and closed regimes, such as North Korea,
which more fully isolate themselves from the international community.
2
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Within the context of the international family planning movement, Iran and Cuba are examples
of dissenting regimes. Both the Republic of Cuba and the Islamic Republic of Iran actively participated
in this international movement, attending UN meetings and seeking international aid and legitimacy
for their eventually-successful and robust programs. However, narrative accounts of this participation
suggest a conscious refusal to re-frame their domestic family planning movements to match
international framing strategies. Through an analysis of these cases, my research investigates how
dissenting regimes participate in international movements, affirming overall movement policy goals
while simultaneously promoting these goals through seemingly irreconcilable frames. Specifically,
through this dissertation, I examine the following research questions: How do international and
domestic actors negotiate the tension between divergent framing tactics in both domestic
and international venues? Does the international movement shift to accommodate these
divergent frames, or do the dissenting regimes themselves conform? Does prolonged
engagement eventually lead to frame convergence?
In answering these questions and working to increase understanding of how US-based advocacy
and policymaking directly impacts public policy development across different domestic contexts, my
research specifically focuses on policy and advocacy frames. In their comprehensive review of policy
diffusion studies within political science, Graham et al. (2012) note that while much research has been
conducted on the diffusion of actual policy adoption, there is a paucity of studies that examine the
spread of policy ideas (689). By shifting the focus from the programmatic content of family planning
policies to the diffusion of framing messages underpinning those policies, my dissertation directly
addresses this deficiency. In order to analyze the framing strategies used in various contexts, I rely on
the following sources of data: UN conference reports; US, Iranian, and Cuban media reports;
international and domestic NGO reports; domestic public policy documents; and government and
advocate interviews and statements regarding family planning. These form the core of three distinct
-3-

case studies that examine frame development and change in the international family planning
movement, in the Cuban movement, and the Iranian movement.
Through analysis of these three cases, this dissertation helps to demonstrate where and when
domestic frame matching is required in order to garner international support, and whether prolonged
engagement with the international community eventually leads to frame convergence. Moreover, this
research offers an explanation of how dissent from international norms and progressive policy change
can coexist. As a result, we will be more fully prepared to enable groups with diverse values to work
together to bring about positive social change in an increasingly globalized world, and to develop
advocacy strategies and policy programs that more consciously and effectively account for the impacts
of these underlying differences.

THE WAY FORWARD
In order to establish a foundation based in the current understanding of relevant theories,
Chapter Two examines two larger bodies of literature on issue framing and diffusion as they relate to
both social movement mobilization and public policy. Discussions of frame narratives and the framing
process are integral to both social movement and policy theories; however, these literatures have
largely developed independently of one another. Although there are some specific distinctions in how
framing influences mobilization and policy processes, this chapter takes the opportunity to begin to
unify these two fields of thought. Similarly, diffusion mechanisms have been a central topic of concern
to policy and social movement scholars alike, and this is another area where there is room for the
integration of two often-distinct literatures. Here again, this chapter draws upon the contributions of
both fields in order to construct a more comprehensive understanding of diffusion processes.
Chapter Three builds on the work reviewed in Chapter Two and proposes an extension of these
theories that may be applied to the behavior of dissenting regimes and international activists. From
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this theoretical development follows a set of hypotheses to be tested in the empirical portion of the
dissertation. This chapter concludes with a broad overview of the methods employed in each case
study.
Chapter Four provides an empirical analysis of the framing strategies pursued by the international
family planning movement between 1960 and 2010. Specifically, this chapter traces the levels of use of
6 frames employed to promote family planning—population, development, environment, women’s
welfare, health, and human rights—in media, NGO, and United Nations venues. This analysis of
frame use establishes the baseline for understanding where and how international movement framing
tactics have shifted over time. In order to identify processes of convergence or divergence among
dissenting regimes, it is first necessary to develop a firm understanding of the frames that dominated
the international arena in each decade. Thus, this analysis of the international movement provides the
critical measures of international frame use that form the basis for comparison in later chapters.
In Chapter Five, I develop an in depth case study of family planning frame use in Cuba between
1960 and 2010. Using archival resources and participant interviews, this chapter first documents
trends in frame use across multiple domestic and international venues. In the second part of the
chapter, I examine the theoretical implications of these frame use strategies with regard to the
processes of dissent to and convergence with international movement norms.
Similarly, Chapter Six contains a detailed case study of Iranian family planning framing from 1979
to 2010, and also relies on both archival materials and participant interviews to construct an analysis of
framing tactics employed in both domestic and international venues. Again, this analysis is followed by
an examination of the lessons that can be draw from this case with regard to the ways in which
dissenting regimes express objection while building collaborative partnerships, and what this means
for diffusion processes.
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Finally, in Chapter Seven, I conclude with a summary of the theoretical insights offered by this
dissertation with regard to the ways in which dissenting regimes engage in a strategic balancing of
dissent and conciliation in their relationships with international activists, who in turn shift to
accommodate divergent frames. Here, I also take the opportunity to reflect on several methodological
points of interest, and to suggest possible avenues of future work on this topic.
In sum, the theory and analysis presented within these chapters establishes a fuller understanding of
the behavior of dissenting regimes and their interactions with the international activist community.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review: The Intersection of Framing,
Diffusion, Social Movements and Public Policy
With a focus on the nexus between international advocacy and domestic public policy
development, this dissertation draws heavily on literature from both comparative politics and public
policy. Specifically, this dissertation is built on the literature concerning two broad theoretical concepts
that are equally relevant to studies of both social movements and policy processes, but which are not
frequently applied to both areas within the context of a single study. The first of these is the vast
literature on the subject of framing. Framing is a critical concept in a range of disciplines, and it is a key
component of both social movement and policy development literature alike. The first section of this
review gives a brief overview of the concept of framing in its most general form, and then details how
framing has been centrally employed to explain both the nature of social movements and the
formation of public policy. The second core theoretical concept is diffusion. Both social movement and
policy research have focused extensively on the spread of movements and policies from one area to
another, and the second half of this review examines the literature pertaining to each similar but
distinct body of diffusion theory.
The purpose of this review is not only to establish the theoretical foundation for the development
of this dissertation, but also to demonstrate the compatibility of policy and social movement literature
on framing and diffusion. Although these two framing and diffusion literatures have evolved
separately within the field of comparative politics and public policy, my dissertation will draw on their
similarities and work to integrate their ideas more seamlessly in the formation of my own theoretical
and empirical contributions.
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FRAMING: A GENERAL CONCEPTION
In his central work on frame theory, Entman (1993) states that “to frame is to select some aspects
of a perceived reality and make them more salient” (52). Gamson and Modigliani (1989) define frames
themselves as an ideational ‘package’ or “a central organizing idea” (3). Thus, framing is the
construction of a specific interpretation of reality around a core idea—making frames narrower in
focus than either discourses or ideologies (Polletta and Ho 2006, 8). At the most basic level, frames
work to organize information and make the world more intelligible (Chong and Druckman 2007, 106;
Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 3; Polletta and Ho 2006, 2; Scheufele and Iyengar forthcoming, 13).
However, the effect of framing is much more powerful that this simple understanding suggests. As
Entman (1993) elaborates, by organizing a particular vision of reality, frames critically work to identify
and define social problems, diagnose the causes of those problems, make moral evaluations of both
causes and effects, and prescribe appropriate remedies (52). Thus, framing tells us ‘what is at issue’ and
what ought to be done about it (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 3). As new information becomes
available, frames evolve to accommodate it (Chong and Druckman 2007, 108). Thus, framing should
be conceptualized as a dynamic process, and frames themselves have somewhat fuzzy boundaries
(Chong and Druckman 2007, 108; Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 4; Polleta and Ho 2006, 5).
In the effort to ‘diagnose, evaluate and prescribe’, not all frames have equal authority, and the
strength of a frame is largely determined by its resonance. Resonance, as articulated by Scheufele and
Iyengar (forthcoming), is produced when a frame interprets reality in a way that is consistent with an
individual’s preexisting cognitive schema (13). These schema, in turn, are heavily conditioned by
cultural contexts, which contain a range of shared symbols and meanings that can be incorporated in
the construction of frames (Entman 1989, 53; Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 5; Scheufele and Iyengar
forthcoming, 15). Framing efforts that capitalize on shared cultural experiences make frames seem
“natural and familiar” (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 5). However, frames that are culturally
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inconsistent are less likely to produce resonance. More narrowly, ideology, individual values, and
personal experiences influence individual-level frame resonance, and frames that cannot be reconciled
with personal values, knowledge, or ideological leanings will have difficulty in generating acceptance
and credibility (Chong and Druckman 2007, 111-112; Polletta and Ho 2006, 23).
Strong frames elevate the ideas they promote to a position of social or political salience, making
them “more noticeable, meaningful and memorable to audiences” (Entman 1993, 53). Eventually,
such frames may become dominant—that is, the problem definitions, evaluations and remedies they
prescribe have “the highest probability of being noticed, processed and accepted by the most people”
(Entman 1993, 56). In other words, certain frames become widely accepted as the ‘best rationale’
concerning a given issue (Chong and Druckman 2007, 116). While these dominant frames are not
immune to opposition and may be challenged by ‘counterframes’, alternative interpretations will have
a hard time gaining traction (Entman 1993, 56). Critically, once strong frames become accepted, they
have a profound effect on opinions, attitudes, and behavior around an issue (Chong and Druckman
2007, 104, 109). That is to say, frames direct thought and beliefs in a particular direction, and are thus
a powerful tool. As a result, a wide range of actors have an interest in creating and disseminating
frames, and framing efforts play a pivotal role in social and political processes. The role of framing in
two such processes—social movement activism and policymaking—is the subject of the sections that
follow.

FRAMING IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
While the concept of framing was developed in the 1950s, frames did not become an integral part
of social movement theory until several decades later, and were first introduced to the field in Todd
Gitlin’s 1980 study of media and activism, The Whole World is Watching (Noakes and Johnston 2005, 3).
The application of frame theory to social movement research was further developed throughout the
1980s, most notably by sociologists William Gamson, Robert Benford, and David Snow (Noakes and
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Johnston 2005, 3). By the end of 1990s, framing had “come to be regarded, alongside resource
mobilization and political opportunity processes, as a central dynamic in understanding the character
and course of social movements” (Benford and Snow 2000, 612; see also McAdam et al. 1996).
Although the framing processes studied within social movement research serve the same
interpretive function as other frames, collective action frames are distinct in that they are explicitly and
fundamentally ‘action-oriented’ (Benford and Snow 2000, 614). These frames diagnose problems and
prescribe solutions, but the key to their importance lies in their ability to mobilize a collective response
that serves as the foundation for generating social movement activity (Benford and Snow 2000, 615).
Thus, social movement actors are critical frames-developers, and frames themselves act as the “call to
arms” that helps to explain the role of human agency in mobilization (Benford and Snow 2000, 617).
Clearly, not all collective action frames are successful in mobilizing collective action, and as with
other types of frames, the variation in frame success can be explained by the level of frame resonance.
Within social movement research, the concept of resonance has been more precisely developed as a
measure of both frame credibility and frame salience (Benford and Snow 2000, 619). Credibility
depends upon the consistency of the frame with a movement’s beliefs and actions, the frame’s
empirical credibility or correspondence with ‘real’ external indicators, and the credibility of the
claimsmakers or movement entrepreneurs (Benford and Snow 2000, 619; Noakes and Johnston 2005,
7). Salience, by contrast, captures the elements of centrality, or the importance of the issue to would-be
participants, the commensurability or relatability of the issue as it is framed, and the ‘narrative fidelity’
or ‘cultural resonance’ of the frame (Benford and Snow 2000, 621-622). However, because collective
action frames, by definition, seek to alter some aspect of the society in which they are developed,
frames must reach a “balance between resonating with the existing cultural repertoire and challenging
the status quo” (Hewitt and McCammon 2005, 34). That is, they must be simultaneously resonant and
radical (Hewitt and McCammon 2005, 48). In part, framing efforts can achieve this balance by
-11-

pointing out and emphasizing longstanding cultural contradictions that have lain “dormant” in a
society—the language of freedom in the US constitution versus the practice of holding slaves, for
example (Zald 1996, 266).
In the effort to uses frames specifically as a mobilizing tool, cultural compatibility is especially
important. Movements make claims within “extant, culturally legitimate, boundaries” (Noakes and
Johnston 2005, 10). Frames “amplify” beliefs associated with existing ideologies, and thus “ideology
[serves] as a cultural resource for framing activity” (Benford and Snow 2005, 209). Cultural resonance
increases issue salience, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of mobilization (Benford and Snow
2000, 622). Thus, cultural compatibility and the essential action-oriented component of collective
action frames are tightly linked. As movements grow and spread, movement actors engage in the
“strategic selection” and “fitting” of frames for new audiences, which allows for the “cross-cultural
promotion” of ideas (Benford and Snow 2000, 627). Finally, movement framing adds to culture as “the
frames of winning movements get translated into public policy and into the slogans and symbols of the
general culture” (Zald 1996, 271).
Movements do not operate in a vacuum and it is critical to note that as movements work to
mobilize support with resonant frames, they face challenges from counter-claimants. This may or may
not include opposition movements, who engage in parallel framing activities; however, for many
movements, the state is a powerful oppositional force (Noakes and Johnston 2005, 17). In their bid
to maintain ‘cultural supremacy’, states forward what Noakes (2005) labels official frames—the
state-sanctioned interpretations of social movement grievances (91). Attention to state framing activity
is important because an “understanding of official frames is central to understanding the context in
which social movements rise, prosper and decline” (Noakes 2005, 101). In other words, in addition to
producing resonant collective action frames that mobilize support, a successful movement must also
develop frames that override the state’s competing frames. Additionally, although the state does not
-12-

always fiercely oppose movement goals, and movements may merely be seeking to get their issue on
the government’s limited agenda, appealing to official frame narratives is critical to this process
(McAdam et al. 1996). The importance of framing to agenda setting will be discussed in greater detail
below.
In this competition between official and collective action frames, movements are often at a
disadvantage because the organs of the states are generally more organized and possess greater cultural
and material resources (Noakes 2005, 102; Tarrow 2005, 62). Although ‘the state’ is not (and does not
operate as) a perfectly unified entity—and may, as a result, struggle internally to develop a coherent
frame narrative—states are generally better positioned to ensure that their official frames are
efficiently and accurately disseminated through culturally legitimate sources, such as respected media
venues (Noakes 2005, 105). In addition, states and their official frames usually start from a position of
greater political legitimacy, and movements must work to both credibly challenge this legitimacy while
promoting their own frames (Noakes 2005, 104). Because the relative resonance of collective action
frames vis-à-vis official frames is an important factor in determining social movement success, the role
of official frames in movement development cannot be ignored.
As “privileged providers of information”, the media also plays a key role in development of
collective action frames (Walgrave and Manssens 2005, 117). Media framing and public frame
interpretations are tightly bound in a mutually influential relationship where “media discourse is part
of the process by which individuals construct meaning, and public opinion is part of the process by
which journalists and other cultural entrepreneurs develop and crystallize meaning in public
discourse” (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 2). Thus, social movements rely on the media to promote
collective action frames among the general public, as well as to attract the attention of political and
social elites, and to boost movement morale (Klandermans and Goslinga 1996, 319). As movements
work both to access the media and to forward their framing of an issue through media channels,
-13-

several distinct challenges emerge. First, accessing the media agenda is difficult, as the media has
limited time and space and nearly infinite possible stories (McAdam et al. 1996, 296). As a result,
whether the media picks up a story depends on the news-gathering routines of reporters, whether the
story is deemed ‘interesting’ or ‘newsworthy’, and whether the story is in line with the news agency’s
commercial (consumer and advertiser) interests (McAdam et al. 1996, 296-297). Movements with
limited resources have a particularly difficult time getting on the media agenda, and many movements
are never able achieve media access (McAdam et al. 1996, 306).
Even if media access is achieved, there is no guarantee that the media interpretations of events
will favor movement goals, since the media will promote its own transformed version of the story
(Klandermans and Goslinga 1996, 320). The media uses its own frames to “convey information, evoke
emotional response, dramatize events, and focus attention” (Zald 1996, 270; see also Walgrave and
Manssens 2005, 117). These frames may coincide with the frames the movement wishes to forward, or
it may clash with movement frames. Consequently, movements try to influence the media discourse by
carefully, explicitly, and strategically conveying their frames in news venues (Klandermans and
Goslinga 1996, 324). Nevertheless, the media often serves as another competitor in a movement’s
quest to take control of issue framing (Walgrave and Manssens 2005, 116).
In addition to using collective action frames to target the general public, the media, and the state,
social movements also use framing techniques to draw domestic and international NGO support (Bob
2005). NGO support can be very valuable for social movements, as it provides resources—such as
monetary funding, supplies, and expertise—visibility, and legitimacy (Bob 2005, 15). In addition,
NGO backing gives the movement leverage against opponents, and helps boost a movement’s morale.
However, the number of movements far exceeds the number of potential NGO partners, which
creates a market with low supply and high demand, and results in a fierce competition for movement
funding and support (Bob 2005, 15).
-14-

Although not all movements seek such support, movements that do follow “two simultaneous
but discrete steps” (Bob 2005, 179). One step is to raise awareness about the movement itself—or
simply getting their movement on an NGO’s agenda. Movements go about this in two ways: lobbying
for support and enacting displays to draw media attention. Depending on the structure of the
movement, either or both tactics may be employed with varying levels of success. Once agenda access
has been achieved, the second critical step involves “framing their causes to match key NGO
characteristics” (Bob 2005, 22). In determining which causes to support, NGOs balance altruistic
goals and pragmatic strategizing to select among causes for the most promising ones that most closely
match their interests (Bob 2005 14, 21). Therefore, a movement’s ability to frame their cause as
compatible with the goals and interests of the NGO from which support is desired is essential. Like
other interpretive framing activities, this movement framing activity can involve simply highlighting
certain appealing substantive or cultural angles of a movement, or also shifting movement tactical,
organizational or ethical strategies to align with NGO principles. That is, a movement forwards
particular interpretations that “blend realistic and opportunistic elements” in a rationally calculated
effort to better market itself for support (Bob 2005, 27).
Because the effort to draw support from NGOs generally crosses international boundaries,
movements also use the previously mentioned ‘cross-cultural fitting’ techniques, and domestic
movements are incentivized to adopt internationally salient, NGO-endorsed frames (Bob 2005). Thus,
domestic movements are encouraged to ‘buy in’ to the frames and messages of the international
community as they market themselves for international financial aid or support. Overall, participation
by domestic actors in the international arena is likely to be most successful (in terms of generating
support) when domestic frames ‘match’ international ones, and it is possible for marketing efforts to
“hijack” the movement’s original trajectory and force it to change its goals and frames to win support
(Bob 2005, 185). Thus, the dynamics of framing efforts hold a critical influence over a movement’s
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overall development and success.

FRAMING AND PUBLIC POLICY
Within the policymaking process, issue framing is an important element of problem
identification and definition, agenda setting, policy development and change, and policy
implementation strategies. Additionally, there are similarities and overlap between framing processes
in social movement activities and in policymaking—particularly in the problem definition and agenda
setting stages—as a SMO activists are one of many groups who strive to influence the policy process
through framing activities. However, a policy-specific discussion of the importance of framing extends
beyond collective action frames to include other elements of political activity across the policy stages.
In the problem identification and definition stages, claims-makers use frames that emphasize “a
particular version of reality” in order to both locate new issues and characterize them as problems
(Rochefort and Cobb 1994, 11). In this process Stone (1989) describes the importance of causal stories,
which redefine simple events or situations as issues or problems—moving them from a fact of fate to
a place of agency—by assigning blame and locating causal mechanisms. ‘The question of culpability’ is
critical to setting up an issue as an actionable problem, as it establishes the cause that a particular policy
solution may address (Rochefort and Cobb 1994, 15). The framing of these causes and solutions is
reflective of the “interests and assumptions” of the claims-makers, as well as the culture, norms, and
institutional constraints in which they are developed (Rochefort and Cobb 1994, 8; Bosso 1994, 192).
Thus, problem definition and its related framing efforts are “time, place and context bound” (Seidman
and Rappaport 1986, cited by Rochefort and Cobb 1994, 6).
As with other types of framing, producing resonant frames is necessary for drawing public
support and media attention, but here the policy-specific goal of problem identification and definition
is to access the formal policy agenda. Simply put, the way in which problems are framed affects the
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probability of agenda access (Rochefort and Cobb 1994, 9). Although other factors, such as resource
allocation and political power, certainly help to determine agenda access, these alone are inadequate
for explaining whether an issue reaches the formal agenda (Cobb and Ross 1997, 3). Rather, the
“cultural and symbolic forces” that serve as the foundation for frame activity also help to determine
whether an issue can be ignored by policymakers (Cobb and Ross 1997, 4). Problems with solutions
that are framed (or counter-framed) as culturally incompatible, or politically or economically infeasible
are more likely to be denied a place on the formal agenda (Bosso 1994, 187; see also Cobb and Ross
1997). By contrast, issues that are successfully promoted through resonant frames are more likely to
find a place on the formal agenda.
Agenda access does not ensure policy change, as many agenda items do not become translated into
policy, but framing efforts also help to determine whether policy change does occur. In understanding
why policy formation may not result from formal agenda consideration, it is important to recognize
that routine, predictable and nondiscretionary activities make up the majority of the policy process,
and most policy change occurs in a predictable, incremental, equilibrium-inducing fashion (Jones
1994, 172). Although a range of forces work to maintain equilibrium, Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition
Framework (ACF) of the policymaking process helps to explain how ideas and beliefs—and their
resulting frames—reinforce the rule of incremental change. Briefly, his framework describes the
organization of policy subsystems according to coalitions with similar beliefs. These beliefs sort
hierarchically from the most fundamental and entrenched ‘deep core beliefs’, which are nearly
impossible to change, to ‘policy core preferences’ that form the salient and stable base of coalition
formation, to ‘secondary beliefs’ which deal with program-specific implementation preferences and
are limited in scope and most changeable (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 2007, 194-196). According to
the ACF, most policy change must be incremental because coalition beliefs—the shared
interpretations of reality—and the alliances formed around them are difficult to alter (Sabatier and
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Jenkins-Smith 2007, 192, 194). Thus, “when advocates, public officials, journalists, and researchers
chose an issue frame, they are intentionally or not aligning themselves with a particular coalition in a
contest for political support ”(Gormley 2012, 146). Within these coalitions, beliefs and ideology, as
well as a notion of sunk costs and the desire to maintain credibility, discourage radical reframing
efforts that could spur substantial policy change (Gormley 2012, 41).
Nevertheless, framing tactics can also be used in “an effort to restructure political alliances,” and
the success of new frames is essential to moving from agenda setting to real policy change (Gormley
2012, 146).

In order for dramatic policy change to occur, equilibrium must be upset and there are

many forces—both exogenous and endogenous to the policymaking process—that can work to upset
equilibrium. In the exogenous category, equilibrium can be disrupted by issue expansion, or a crisis
or ‘shock’ to the system (Baumgartner and Jones 2009, 88-89). From within the policymaking system,
both tipping points and policy entrepreneurs and their efforts at issue framing can work to break
equilibria.
According to Schattschneider (1960), a new pattern of alignment is created by expanding the
scope of conflict (17). In this process, conflict is publicized and new players are brought into the
debate, creating a “mobilization of bias” that tips the scales of power away from their previous balance
(30, 37, 39). In this process of mobilization, it is the inclusion of new people—and their ideas and
interests—which upset equilibrium. As Cobb and Ross (1997) note, the ability to win over these new
‘hearts and minds’ depends not only on “money, access and experience,” but also “the skill to package
an issue in cultural terms that will appeal to large numbers of people” (15). Thus, the ability to expand
the scope of conflict, ‘restructures political alliances,’ upset equilibrium and enact dramatic policy
change is dependent on effective framing.
Beyond intentional efforts to disrupt an existing equilibrium, sudden, unexpected “shocks” or
exogenous crises can also destabilize a system. Anthony Downs (1972) describes these as part of an
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“issue-attention cycle”, where “some dramatic series of events”—for example, a catastrophic oil spill
or grave economic depression—catapults a previously ignored issue into the limelight (39). Crises do
not possess inherent meaning on their own, but present an excellent opportunity for framers to
strategically forward their interpretations of a highly visible, salient event. As these frames gain traction
and attention in policymaking shifts to rapidly address this “new” issue, old configurations of power
break down and equilibrium is disrupted by the formation of new policies and the implementation of
new programs (Baumgartner and Jones 2009, 88).
In the category of endogenous change, entrepreneurial activity and tipping points may also play a
role in upsetting equilibrium. Entrepreneurs are actors who devote themselves to locating policy
solutions for particular problems, and toward that end “the development and refinement of policy
frames” is one of their principal activities (Fischer 2003, 145). Specifically, entrepreneurs actively use
framing to define issues, push their own pet solutions, and set the overall terms of the debate
(Sheingate 2003, 188). As entrepreneurs promote their preferred frames, they form coalitions around
their policy goals, and frame selection and resonance also help to determine the type and number of
members an entrepreneur’s coalition is likely to attract. Additionally, entrepreneurs are critical frame
diffusers, as even the most well-crafted, resonant framing strategy still needs an actor to help spread it
to relevant populations (Wood 2006, 224). Thus, entrepreneurs can work not only to creatively
develop frames, but to also make sure they reach their intended audiences.
Even without the occurrence of a dramatic event, these seemingly small framing activities
undertaken by the entrepreneur can have a powerful snowballing effect that eventually leads to an
issue ‘tipping point’ (Wood 2006). Tipping points occur when the accumulation of small changes
suddenly produce a shift that results in non-incremental policy change. For example, Wood (2006)
describes the processes through which many small framing efforts in tobacco policy changed how the
issue was understood and eventually lead to a shift in balance and non-incremental policy change
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without the occurrence of a crisis. Thus, persistent, strategic framing efforts can result in sudden
changes in how policymakers interpret an issue, and can provide a powerful source of equilibrium
disruption and dramatic new policy outcomes.
Finally, with regard to policy formulation and resulting implementation strategies, framing also
matters in the social construction of the population targeted by proposed policy (Schneider and
Ingram 1993). Specifically strong populations that are framed in a positive light are more likely to be
on the receiving end of beneficial policy formulation and effective implementation strategies, while
weak, negatively framed populations are likely to bear the undesirable costs of policy decisions
(Schneider and Ingram 1993). Additionally, the effectiveness of framing strategies determines
whether policy outcomes are “favorable to advocates of the issue” (who are not necessarily program
targets), or whether entrepreneurial messages and goals are co-opted in later stages of the policy
process (Rochefort and Cobb 1994, 9). Thus, the successful translation of policy problems into
desired policy outcomes requires a strong framing tactics that help to steer policy through each policy
stage toward the desired goals.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT DIFFUSION
The term diffusion describes the “spread of some innovation through direct or indirect channels
across members of a social system” (Givan et al. 2010, 1). Within the study of social movements,
diffusion research examines the ways in which collective action spreads across space and time. The
tendency of movements in one area to come to resemble movements in another is a long-recognized
phenomenon, but was originally theorized as a nonstrategic process of “contagion” that omitted
human agency or complex causal relationships (Stobaugh and Snow 2010, 35). However, since the
1990s, scholars have moved beyond this perspective to understand social movement diffusion as a
largely intentional processes driven by the interaction of various concrete causal mechanisms, and
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which requires the participation of many levels of socio-political actors (Givan et al. 2010, 3; Stobaugh
and Snow 2010, 35). The dynamics of this process and its outcomes will be the focus of the following
section.
In the discussion of diffusion, it is helpful to first locate what precisely is being diffused. With
regard to social movements, the diffused elements fall into two broad categories: ideas and the
collective action frames into which they are packaged, and collective action repertoires (Givan el al.
2010, 5, 7). While the latter category deals more precisely with mobilization tactics—both what
movements do and “what they know how to do” (Tarrow 2011, 39)—the former reflects the goals and
grievances of a movement. Thus, either or both of these characteristics of a given movement can be
subject to diffusion, but given the topic of my research, this section will focus primarily on the
diffusion of ideas and frames.
Not all movements are prone to diffusion, and for diffusion to occur, there are several necessary
preconditions (Givan et al. 2010, 3; Snow and Benford 1999, 24). Specifically, the diffusers and
receivers must see value in the elements that are being diffused; the diffusers and receivers must have
enough shared cultural and structural reference points to be able to identify the meaning and use of the
diffused elements; and, importantly, a channel or pathway for diffusion must exist (Snow and Benford
1999, 24). These pathways can be divided into three categories—relational, non-relational, and
mediated—and are each associated with a particular set of diffusion mechanisms (Chabot 2010, 101;
Givan et al. 2010, 9; Tarrow 2010, 211). Briefly, relational pathways rely on the direct interaction
between individuals and organizations, where the diffusion occurs in the overt contact and exchange
between two (or more) parties (Givan et al. 2010, 2). Here, the mechanisms that promote diffusion
include network ties, trust, communication, and attribution of similarity (Chabot 2010, 101; Tarrow
2010, 211). By contrast, non-relational diffusion occurs without explicit interaction as the result of
media coverage or other indirect global communication and cross-cultural linkages (della Porta and
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Kriesi 1999, 6; Givan et al 2010, 2, 11). In this case theorization—“rational mimicking” or “the
simplified interpretations of protest by unfamiliar people in another country”—is the mechanism that
promotes social movement diffusion (Chabot 2010, 102; Givan et al. 2010, 11). Finally, mediated
diffusion occurs when two parties are connected only through a third party, such as an NGO or
international organization, which “brokers the spread of tactics or frames” (Givan et al. 2010, 2, 12).
As suggested, brokerage or mediation is the primary mechanism for this pathway (Chabot 2010, 102;
Givan et al. 2010, 12). In each pathway, these mechanisms lead to emulation, and although “each
adopter will modify these protest ideas and practices ‘at the margins’ to suit its specific social
context,…[diffusion] primarily involves imitation of the innovator” (Chabot 2010, 103). Thus, the
extent to which each pathway leads to emulation determines the extent of diffusion.
Diffusion along these pathways can result in both horizontal diffusion, or diffusion among actors
at the same analytical level of conflict, or in vertical diffusion, also referred to as scale shift (Roggeband
2010, 20; Tarrow 2010, 214-215). Tarrow (2005) defines scale shift as “a change in the number and
level of coordinated contentious actions to a different focal point, involving a new range of actors,
different objects, and broadened claims” (121). In this case, social movements diffuse either when
local or domestic movements shift claims upward, in order to engage new audiences at the national or
international level, or when larger (trans)national movements shift downward to target actors at the
local level (Tarrow 2011, 193). In addition, movements that have shifted upward can later be shifted
downward to different local areas, thus spreading movements to other domestic contexts (Tarrow 2005,
128).
This change in venues—and particularly upward scale shift—can be very advantageous to
movements, as it allows groups to bypass resistant domestic targets and provides new allies, resources,
visibility, political opportunity structures and leverage, which in turn changes domestic government
perceptions about the costs and benefits of making concessions (Marks and McAdam 1999;
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Roggeband 2010, 34; Smith 1999, 183; Tarrow 2011, 193, 254). Thus, international diffusion through
upward scale shift is an intentional strategy employed by movements and is “one of the most
significant processes in contentious politics” (Tarrow 2010, 215). Keck and Sikkink (1998) describe
how this process leads to a cyclical pattern of advocacy, or ‘boomerang effect’, wherein transnational
advocacy networks (TANs) work through external states and international organizations to pressure
the target regime for change. According to their theory, this process is particularly successful when
TANs effectively: 1. generate and spread credible information about a problem, 2. frame problems to
appeal to relevant audiences, 3. provide international leverage against domestic elites, and 4. monitor
compliance with agreements and policies (16). However, while movements seek to place their claims
within an international frameworks, they also continue to seek the support of domestic constituents.
As a result, movements are often engaged in a “two-level game”, wherein different strategies, frames
and repertoires are employed simultaneously in order to engage both the international community and
local actors (della Porta and Kriesi 1999, Passy 1999, 152).
While international actors and organizations provide movements with certain advantages, foreign
governments, international organizations, and NGOs also depend on domestic movements to meet
their own altruistic or strategic goals. Specifically, these transnational actors rely on local movement
actors to provide them with the ‘practical’ or local and specialized knowledge required to meet their
own particular objectives (Passy 1999, 155; Smith 1999, 183). In addition, local movements act as
efficient disseminators of information and provide “channels for the diffusion of UN [or other
international] norms” (Passy 1999, 156; Smith 1999, 183). Therefore, domestic social movements and
international actors are mutually beneficial allies, and as a result, international diffusion through scale
shift is encouraged by both international actors and movements alike.
As scale shifting strategies lead to international diffusion of social movements, the diffusion of
collective action frames is affected in two opposite directions, in processes Tarrow (2011) labels global
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framing and domestication ( 251, 252). Global framing translates or re-frames domestic messages for the
global arena by using “external symbols to orient local or national claims” (Tarrow 2005, 60). Through
this process, “challengers try to frame their protest in global terms, through a series of discursive
actions, with the aim of finding a compromise or even consensus that allows them to speak with a
common voice” (Passy 1999, 161). Thus, strategic re-framing allows international actors to identify
with local claims, harmonizes domestic and international goals, and encourages international support
(Tarrow 2005, 76; see also Bob 2005). Although the compromises required to re-frame a movement
for a global audience can potentially result in fundamental changes to movement goals, it also gives
movements access to those valuable benefits of scale shift (Tarrow 2005, 76; see also Bob 2005).
Therefore, global framing remains a central element of social movement strategy.
By contrast, domestication involves the transformation of international norms and their
accompanying frames for use in domestic contexts (Tarrow 2005, 251). Because both domestic culture
and structure constrain the creation of resonate frames, not all international frames can be directly
imported to domestic contexts (della Porta and Kriesi 1999, 9; Stobaugh and Snow 2010, 54; Snow and
Benford 1999, 36). Instead, activists strategically and selectively fit outside ideas to domestic claims by
demonstrating the compatibility and utility of foreign frames to a local cause (Benford and Snow 1999,
34, 36). While activists may be aware of internationally salient frames, they may reject them for more
domestically compatible messages that produce more resonance (Ferree and Gamson 1999, 55) As a
result, local frames for global issues may vary widely as activists “work within the power structures and
political cultures of their own countries” to balance international frames with domestic claims (Tarrow
2005, 75-76). Therefore, as issues are translated back and forth between international and domestic
contexts and movements diffuse from one region or level to the next, the most effective framing of
the same issue may be expected to take many different forms.
In light of increased globalization, the importance of monitoring these diffusion processes cannot
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be overstated. Some researchers argue that through enhanced communications and mobility, the
world is moving toward a more globally homogenized ‘convergence culture’ where supranational
structures exert more power (Koopmans 1999, 67; Harsin 2010, 165). Transnational social movement
organizations are on the rise, with the number of groups increasing at a growth rate of 80 to 90 percent
in the 1980s and 1990s (Rucht 1999, 211; see also Tarrow 2011, 239). Thus, the networks that support
transnational mobilization and social movement diffusion are strengthening as well. Although social
movement diffusion and eventual frame convergence cannot be taken as a given (see Ferree and
Gamson 1999), the dynamics of diffusion are likely to continue to have a powerful impact on the
future of mobilization.

POLICY DIFFUSION
When applied to theories of policymaking, diffusion can be defined as the “process by which
‘knowledge about…policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting
(past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and
ideas in another political setting’” (Stone 2004, 2, citing Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 5). Thus, policy
diffusion should not be imagined as a simple binary—the adoption or non-adoption of external policy
models (Marsh and Sharman 2009, 278). Rather, comprehensive policy diffusion studies must focus
on a broader conception of diffusion that captures a fuller range of the processes at work. For
example, the object of diffusion may be actual policy content, but may also extend to incorporate
specific institutions that shape policy development and policy outcomes; the ideologies, justifications
and frames that bolster certain policy decisions; the attitudes, ideas and norms that characterize certain
policy choices and policy targets; and the negative lessons that cause certain policy options to be avoided
(Stone 2004, 2, see also Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Grossback et al 2004; Schneider and Ingram
1988).
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As with other types of diffusion, policy diffusion is a strategic and boundedly rational process that
is shaped by both individual initiative and structural and cultural constraints (Marsh and Sharman
2009, 274; Stone 2004, 4). Individuals may also work to shift these constraints, and as Marsh and
Sharman note (2009), “agents are faced with a structural context which may privilege certain decisions.
However, they interpret that structural context and in acting change it” (275). Thus, while diffusion
may be more likely or common among countries that are geographically, ideologically, culturally,
politically, or economically ‘proximate’ (see Newmark 2002, 158-159; Stone 2004, 12), these
contextual characteristics do not necessarily predict where diffusion will or can occur. This then begs
the question, what are the motivations and mechanisms of diffusion? Although terminology differs
slightly, the literature identifies four central mechanisms of diffusion: learning, competition, coercion,
and socialization (Graham et al. 2012, 690). A discussion of each follows below.
As Dolowitz (1997) asserts, a primary cause of policy diffusion is “dissatisfaction with the status
quo” (26; see also Rose 2007, 2). Once a problem’s identification and definition has transformed an
issue into an actionable problem and agenda access is achieved, the search for a solution begins.
However, innovation of new policy solutions can be both costly and unpredictable, both in terms of
policy outcomes and public and elite reactions to policy (Berry and Berry 2007, 236; Grossback et al.
2004, 525). Thus, policymakers may rely on policy learning—or looking to the successfully
implemented policy solutions for a similar problem employed in other political contexts—to
formulate new policy (Shipan and Volden 2008, 841). This can be a particularly useful strategy, as it
allows policymakers to more accurately anticipate not only how a policy solution will function, but also
what political implications a policy may have (Graham et al. 2012, 691). Although not all external
contexts provide equally applicable lessons, and learning from ideologically, culturally, economically
and politically similar systems is often preferred (see Grossback et al. 2004, 525; Rose 2007, 9, 47),
effective learning still requires the significant adaptation of foreign policies to domestic contexts (Rose
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2007, 121). Thus, the learning mechanism results in the diffusion of similar policies that have been
slightly and strategically altered for each unique setting.
Similarly, competition can cause governments and policymakers to look outward for new policy
solutions, but the motivation behind this mechanism is somewhat different from learning. Rather than
focusing on effectively solving specific problems and predicting political effects, competition results in
the emulation of external policies in order to “achieve an economic advantage over other states or
avoid being disadvantaged” (Berry and Berry 2007, 225). On one hand, states may strive to imitate
policies that have led to strong economic growth and economic investment. On the other hand, the
costs of policy divergence from would-be international trade alliances or supranational structures like
the European Union can be economically costly (Stone 2004, 13). Finally, it should be noted that while
researchers have largely focused on the economic component of this mechanism, competition could
also be at work in other policy areas, such as national security policy, for example. In either case, the
determination not to lag behind other areas or nations motivates competition, and subsequent
emulation and policy diffusion.
As the term suggests, coercion involves outside pressure or intervention in the externally
compelled application of policy solutions (Graham et al. 2012, 692). Coercion can be applied both
vertically (from supranational organizations) or horizontally (from one government to another), and
commonly takes forms such as “aid conditions, pre-emptive laws, sanctions regimes, or use of military
force” (Graham et al. 2012, 692-693). As Stone (2004) notes, coercive diffusion processes bear several
unique characteristics that help to distinguish it from the other types of diffusion (14). Specifically,
coerced regimes are induced to adopt policies that they would have otherwise avoided; they are
selectively chosen as targets of outside pressure based on externally designated criteria; they are often
shaped by a paternalist allocation of goods; they are restrained from reversing externally imposed
policy decisions; and they are directly incentivized to perform in accordance with external expectations
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(Stone 2004, 15). Thus, this diffusion mechanism promotes a version of policy diffusion that is
involuntary on the part of the adopter and that may more often result in negative policy and political
consequences.
Similarly, socialization does not involve the active or direct pursuit of policy diffusion by the
adopting regime, but is somewhat “softer” than coercion (Graham et al 2012, 692). Whereas coercion
explicitly imposes external policy choices, socialization refers to the incremental and less overt process
of externally shifting the domestic norms and preferences that underpin domestic policy decisions
(Graham et al. 2012, 693). As domestic regimes become more involved with the international
community, attitudes and ideologies tend to converge, and domestic policy choices reflect this deeper
level harmonization. Some level of socialization is required for diffused policy to really take root, as a
lack of compatible local knowledge and norms will cause the effects of new policy to remain
‘superficial’ (Stone 2004, 12). Thus, the diffusion of policy-related norms, frames and knowledge
through socialization generally precedes the diffusion of actual policy programs (Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998, 896; Graham et al. 2012, 683; Stone 2004, 7). Finally, although the line between coercion
and socialization may be fuzzy at times—and in the real world we would likely find multiple
mechanisms simultaneously at work—understanding how these mechanisms function within varying
contexts and constraints is critical to analyzing policy diffusion and convergence.
A focus on mechanisms should not cause us to lose sight of the fact that “policies are chosen by
real people who have varying preferences, goals and capabilities” (Graham et al. 2012, 684). These
actors fall into three categories: internal actors who work within the government to which policies are
being diffused, external actors who work within the diffusing government, and ‘go-betweens’ who act
across multiple governments (Graham et al. 2012, 684). While external and internal government actors
may be more frequently identified in the workings of the learning, competition and coercion
mechanisms, go-betweens are particularly critical to socialization processes. Go-betweens include a
-28-

wide range of actors—from government elites and policy entrepreneurs active in the international
community, to the media, NGO and international organization activists, or migrants and international
students who move back and forth over international borders—and may facilitate diffusion from the
bottom-up or the top-down (Dolowitz 1997, 127; Graham et al. 2012, 687; Perez-Armendariz and
Crow 2010, 121; Newmark 2002, 157; Stone 2004, 9). These are the actors that not only form the
transnational networks that promote awareness of outside solutions and serve as transmitters of the
attitudes, ideas, frames and knowledge that underpin policy choices, but who also work to “synthesize
and tailor such knowledge into products and ‘best practices’ that is then marketed and advocated”
even within contexts that seem unlikely to be sites of diffusion (Stone 2004, 16; see also Dolowitz
1997, 31; True and Mintrom 2001, 28, 38). In many cases, this has resulted in the “rapid, global
diffusion” of controversial policy changes that have occurred without coercion (True and Mintrom
2001, 33). Often times, this ‘rapid, global diffusion’ is the result of reaching a tipping point or threshold,
wherein a few ‘pioneer’ nations first adopt a new policy and then a wave of global adoption follows
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 901; Marsh and Sharman 2009, 273). Thus, the socializing activities of
go-betweens can have a dramatic and profound effect on global policy diffusion.
Within the study of diffusion, researchers should be attentive not only to the spread of certain
policies, but also to the question of possible policy convergence (Graham et al. 2012, 680). As defined
by Bennett (1991), convergence is “the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities
in structures, processes, and performances” (215). With regard to policy, the focus lies more
specifically on the convergence of policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, policy outcomes,
and policy styles (Bennett 1991, 218). Additionally, Bennett (1991) notes that policy convergence
should be conceptualized not as a discrete status, but as a continuous process (219). As policies are
individually adapted for domestic contexts, the degree to which these elements converge will vary, and
Axelrod (1997) argues that the greatest degree to which convergence occurs depends on how similar
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societies are at the outset (222). Bennett (1991) adds that policy convergence is particularly likely to
occur when domestic governments and transnational actors and supranational institutions recognize
their interdependence in the effort to achieve certain policy goals (225). Nevertheless, as some nations
converge together, they may become more distinct from other nations, and thus global policy
convergence is neither uniform nor absolute (Axelrod 1997, 223). Therefore, diffusion studies should
not take the convergence of diffused policies as a given, but rather study diffusion and convergence as
two closely interrelated but distinct processes.
Like social movement diffusion, policy diffusion is potentially on the rise, as globalization
further increases the opportunities for diffusion to occur (Newmark 2002, 164; see also James and Lodge
2003, 182). Thus, attention to the effects of diffusion on policy development is essential and, moving
forward, researchers have identified specific areas within diffusion studies that could benefit from
further development. First, Marsh and Sharman (2009) advise that too much focus in policy diffusion
research has been placed on diffusion among Western nations (270). Thus, more work focusing on the
characteristics and processes of diffusion in both non-Western and developing nations—where the
influence of supranational structures and international organizations is particularly powerful—is
needed (Marsh and Sharman 2009, 270, 280; see also Ogden et al. 2003, 179). Second, in their
comprehensive review of policy diffusion studies within political science, Graham et al. (2012) note
that while much research has been conducted on the diffusion of actual policy adoption, there is a
scarcity of studies that examine the spread of policy ideas (689). Marsh and Sharman (2009) echo this
critique in their assertion that the multitude of research that studies diffusion as a discrete
“adopt/don’t adopt” policy outcome oversimplifies the nuanced and multi-leveled process (278).
Thus, additional research that moves the focus from the mere adoption policies to the diffusion of
ideas, norms and framing messages underpinning those policies is necessary.

-30-

CONCLUSION
Taken together, the literature reviewed here describes a political system in which ideas and the
frames in which they are packaged hold a profound influence over social movement development and
policymaking processes. Although frames function somewhat differently in each area, the literature on
framing is characterized by many similarities and unifying ideas. Principal among these are the ideas
that 1. framing strategies help to determine whether issues become translated into actionable
problems—addressed either by social movements or policy proposals—and, 2. the selection of salient,
resonant frames is critical to the success of either policy or advocacy. With regard to diffusion,
although the mechanisms of diffusion differ, the translation of frames for various contexts by a range
of actors plays a similarly central role in determining how both social movements and policy spread.
Thus, there is ample overlap to aid in the integration of these two literatures, through which the power
of both bodies of theory may be magnified.
Moreover, through the integration and expansion of these theories, we can develop a clearer
understanding of the ways in which regimes with anti-Western orientations but non-isolationist
tendencies engage with international social movements and use them as a catalyst of domestic policy
development. This is an area of research that has not been well-developed in the existing literature, but
which bears a clear relationship to theories of framing and diffusion. The following chapter outlines
the theoretical propositions forwarded in this dissertation, which seek to account for the behavior of
dissenting regimes in both social movement and policy framing and diffusion.
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Chapter Three
Theory and Methods: Toward Explaining the
Behavior of Dissenting Regimes
As review of the literature demonstrates, existing theories of activist framing and diffusion are
focused on the need for domestic actors to frame their movement goals in ways that resonate with
external targets in order to generate support and recognition. However, this pattern of engagement
fails to account for the policy trajectories of dissenting regimes. Rather than isolating themselves from the
international community, dissenting regimes choose to actively participate in international social
movements even when they openly object to the issue frames being promoted by international policy
advocacy, or when these frames conflict with stated domestic ideologies or cultural values. The
behavior of dissenting regimes is exemplified by Cuba and Iran’s engagement with the international
community on the issue of family planning. In particular, it appears that Cuba and Iran both
consciously—and perhaps even confrontationally—promoted their own, non-resonate frames while
simultaneously seeking international support. Thus, a reconceptualization of existing theory is
required to accommodate and explain the behavior of these dissenting regimes. Toward that end, I
propose an adjustment to current theories, which maintains that the relative importance of
maintaining a cohesive and resonant frame narrative varies as social movements progress through
distinct stages of development. The details of this theory will be elaborated in the following section.
From this follows a series of hypotheses that predict the nature of framing strategies during different
movement phases and contexts and their impacts on policy diffusion. I conclude with a general
description of the methods and cases that will be employed to test these hypotheses.
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THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Theories of social movement development commonly recognize several conceptually distinct
stages of a movement’s lifecycle, which can be generally categorized as incipiency, coalescence,
institutionalization, fragmentation and demise, illustrated in Figure 3.1 (Mauss 1975, 61; see also della Porta
and Diani 1999; Gamson 1975, 30-32; Tilly 1978, 216-217). During incipiency, the movement first
emerges as an uncoordinated interest in a particular issue, and lacks a formal structure or leadership
(Mauss 1975, 61). In this stage, the construction of a common identity around a well-defined problem
is critical to the advancement of the movement, since co-optation by society-at-large through
“conciliation, compromise and absorption” is a particular threat (Mauss 1975, 62). By using targeted
efforts at problem definition to create strong movement boundaries, the movement is better equipped
to overcome co-optation and progress to the next stage (Mauss 1975, 62). In the next stage,
coalescence, the movement begins to formalize its structure and leadership, form far-reaching
alliances, and generate “sustained activity” (Mauss 1975, 62-63). Here, organized movement interests
around a particular problem definition become more entrenched and effective repression of the
movement requires a highly concerted effort (Mauss 1975, 63). After coalescence, a movement may
progress to institutionalization, when elite venues are compelled to address the issue-at-hand, and they
begin to respect and accommodate the movement (Mauss 1975, 63). In this stage, both the media and
political elites take the movement seriously and take real action on its behalf, publishing favorable
reports and formulating legislation to address movement issues (Mauss 1975, 63). According to
Mauss (1975), this is when a movement enjoys its greatest power and prestige (64). The final phases,
fragmentation and demise, may occur when uneven achievement of goals leads to leadership
in-fighting and movement radicalization, which may alienate the general public and cause a movement
to die out (Mauss 1975, 64-65). Additionally, ‘buying off’ movement leaders or more overtly repressing
the movement may also cause its demise (Mauss 1975, 65). However, in other instances, fragmentation
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and demise may occur when movement demands are met, and individuals begin to drop out of the
movement. Thus, a certain measure of ‘success’ in terms of achieving movement goals and shifting
popular norms is often a reason for social movement demise, and movements may end because their
reform programs have been satisfactorily incorporated into formal political structures and public
dialogs.
Figure 3.1

Although these social movement stages have been broadly theorized and well-defined, this
literature does not specifically theorize variation in the role of framing strategies during each stage, nor
is it attentive to how frame matching between domestic and international movements may vary
depending on which stage of development each movement occupies. Nevertheless, it is clear from a
description of these stages that while the incipiency and coalescence stages are visibly characterized by
targeted efforts at strategic issue framing as a mobilization and agenda setting tactic, during the
institutionalization stage, the movement “enjoys a large base of supporters, has plentiful resources, is
organized and coordinated with a well-developed division of labor, and has gained respectability”
(Blanc and Tsui 2005, 264). Therefore, I proposed that while the development and implementation of
a unified framing strategy would be critical during incipiency and coalescence, once an international
movement has become broadly institutionalized and its demands are being consistently and favorably
addressed, the divergent framing tactics of dissenting regimes would prove less threatening to a stable
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and established movement. Moreover, once a movement has successfully utilized a targeted framing
strategy to mobilize broad-based support and legitimacy for movement goals, and social norms have
shifted to more readily accept the importance of these goals, the frames themselves become less
relevant. As a result, institutionalized movements would be more likely to incorporate groups with
diverging frame strategies, and a commitment to the movement’s now-solidified programmatic
goals—such as the desire to implement a family planning program—should take precedence over the
framing tactics used to promote them. Thus, a movement that demonstrates commitment to these
goals would be more readily accepted, regardless of the framing strategies it uses. Domestically, this
same pattern should be observed. As domestic activists work to promote both individual behavioral
shifts and effective policy development and implementation, the use of frames with a high degree of
resonance would be essential. However, after the messages, frames and norms promoted by a
movement become institutionalized, a frame’s ‘mobilizing potency’ is less important.
In extending this theory to the relationship between framing in international and domestic
movements, it is essential to recognize that related movements do not often progress through these
stages simultaneously. Rather, as the literature notes, movements diffuse from one area to another in
a way that causes them to initiate and progress through the varying stages at different times. For
example, in the case of the international family planning movement, Blanc and Tsui (2005) argue that
family planning moved from incipiency to coalescence in the 1960’s, and then to broad
institutionalization in the 1970s and 1980s. In Cuba, narrative histories suggest that public action on
family planning only arose several years after the 1959 revolution. Although Iran was an early
participator in the international movement, the 1979 revolution marked a sharp turning point in family
planning development, and the Islamist family planning movement did not emerge until the 1980s.
Thus, it appears that each movement moved through the social movement stages of development
during different periods. Consequently, if the importance of maintaining a cohesive and resonate
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frame narrative varies according to movement stage, then frame matching between domestic and
international movements would be critical during incipiency and coalescence. However, diverging
framing tactics may not hinder collaboration between movements with similar goals during
institutionalization (see Figure 3.2). In other words, although earlier phases of the international social
movement would limit inclusion and support to those domestic movements with compatible framing
strategies, the institutionalization of the international movement allows space for the inclusion of
divergent framing tactics from dissenting regimes as their own domestic movements are emerging.
Thus, in contrast to theories which argue that frame matching between domestic groups and the
international community is unilaterally expected when domestic movements seek international
support, I argue that the stage of social movement development will help determine how rigidly a
movement adheres to its own framing messages, and how likely frame matching is to occur between
international and domestic contexts.
Figure 3.2
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Applying this theory specifically to the relationship between international movements and dissenting
regimes, I predict that:
H1: During the international movement’s incipiency and coalescence, when the movement is working
to focus, coordinate, and develop its messages and strategies, dissenting framing tactics will not be
recognized or supported by the international movement. Funding and technical support will not be
granted and collaborative partnerships will not develop. Thus, any international recognition and
support of dissenting regimes that does occur during this phase requires frame matching by the
dissenting regime. However, given the need for dissenting regimes to market themselves through
ideologically inconsistent frames to draw international support, it is more likely that no relationship of
support will develop during this phase.
H2: As the international movement institutionalizes, support will be extended to dissenting regimes
despite divergent framing tactics. This is both because the institutionalized movement—having
achieved high levels of support, resources, and legitimacy—is less threatened by dissenting framing
tactics, and because domestic adherence to domestically salient (and ideologically divergent) frames is
critical as the dissenting regimes themselves move through movement incipiency and coalescence.

Despite the prediction of divergent framing tactics during the early phases of the Cuban and
Iranian movement, both theories of policy and social movement diffusion predict that mechanisms
such as brokerage, cooperation, socialization and persuasion eventually lead to harmonization
between domestic and international strategies (see for example, Checkel 2005; Tarrow 2010).
Additionally, after institutionalization, adherence to a single, particular framing strategy becomes less
critical. Finally, then, I predict:
H3: As dissenting regimes continue to interact with the international movement and its related
organizations, and their own movements become institutionalized, both activist and policy frames will
converge with those employed by the international community.

A fuller description of the cases employed to test this theory and resulting hypotheses follows in the
next section.

CASE SELECTION: IRAN, CUBA, AND FAMILY PLANNING
In order to test these hypotheses, I proceed with a qualitative analysis of family planning policy
and activism in Iran and Cuba, and compare these to the development of the international family
planning movement. For qualitative case studies, Bradshaw and Stratford (2010) suggest the selection
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of cases that are “practical and appropriate” through a strategy of purposive sampling (74). For the
study of social movement frame diffusion across varying international and domestic contexts, the
family planning movement fits these criteria very well. First, the dramatic impact of this social
movement has been felt in nearly every corner of the world. In describing what they term the ‘quiet
revolution’, Robinson and Ross (2007) note that in the course of less than two decades, both the use of
contraceptives and the norms and ideas surrounding their use were globally transformed in a variety of
domestic contexts by a powerful international movement (421). Second, analyzing the ways
movements problematize issues is critical to my study, and the family planning movement provides an
excellent opportunity to examine how coordinated framing strategies converged with scientific
developments to move the inability to determine human fertility—which for millennia was just a fact
of the human condition—to the position of a problem that needed to be solved. Additionally, varied
framing approaches across different historical periods problematize unmanaged fertility in different
ways, and despite broad scale implementation of domestic family planning programs, the international
movement has been largely responsible for developing and disseminating the frames through which
family planning is discussed (Blanc and Tsui 2005). Therefore, the family planning movement allows
for an examination of both shifting international framing tactics and the domestic responses to these
frames. Finally, from a practical perspective, the historical trajectory of this movement has been
well-documented and there is a wealth of archival material available for empirical analysis.
In order to explore the effect of international movement framing on domestic frames within
dissenting regimes, it is both necessary and appropriate to select country cases with both active
domestic family planning movements and a degree of political, social, and economic contention based
on their promotion of non-Western ideologies. The list of non- or anti-Western regimes that support
popular, successful3 and voluntary family planning programs is not long. However, both Cuba and
3

Where success is measured in terms of contraceptive prevalence rates and levels of access to high quality reproductive
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Iran collaborated with the international movement in the development strong family planning
programs, while simultaneously espousing a commitment to Communist and Islamic nationalist
values, respectively. Importantly—and most relevantly—ideological dissent is particularly evident in
the development of their family planning initiatives. In Cuba, family planning advocates decried the
international movement’s focus on population control and development. They argued that the
promotion population frames was being used as a distraction from the true neocolonial and imperialist
causes of underdevelopment. In Iran, activists noted that family planning should be used as a tool to
promote a more Islamic society and to keep Iran free from Western dominance.
With regard to the development of family planning policy and programs, these nations took an
outwardly anti-Western approach. At the same time, this approach is complicated by the fact that these
nations are not fully rejecting the international arena in which Western family planning norms are
being developed and disseminated. Both nations have relied on international aid in the development of
their family planning programs; both Iran and Cuba regularly attended UN population and
development conferences and accepted international money and technical support for their family
planning programs. In sum, both nations actively pursued productive, collaborative partnerships with
the international movement in the construction of domestic programs that were based on frames that
often conflicted with those employed in the international arena. Thus, both of these cases offer a
‘practical and appropriate’ opportunity to empirically examine whether non-Western regimes are
forced to amend their framing tactics as they enter the international community, and whether the
messages and values of these regimes remain intact as they develop their domestic policies and
programs.
Manifestations of dissent, coupled with the ability to maintain control of domestic frame
strategies while developing international partnerships, contrasts with the experience of other nations
health care.
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with distinct cultural, political, and socioeconomic contexts that have yielded to the frame narratives
and tactics promoted by the international movement. Bangladesh provides a good example of the
experience of non-dissenting, non-Western regimes. In Bangladesh, the first demands for family
planning policy came from a domestic NGO, the Family Planning Association of Pakistan (FPAP).
This NGO was founded in 1953, before Bangladesh gained its independence from Pakistan, by a
coalition of wealthy, well-connected Pakistani women who wanted a family planning policy to improve
women’s health and well-being (Khan, 1996). However, Western-led NGOs were beginning to take an
interest in family planning policy from the perspective of population and development, and it was this
latter perspective that drew the attention of Pakistan’s president, who realized that international
pressures to curb population dovetailed with his own political platform for development and would
also satisfy FPAP’s demands for access to family planning services. Thus, a domestic movement that
was initially framed by a concern for women’s rights and health was soon overtaken by the
internationally dominant population and development frame. Given the receptive political
environment, international NGOs took a lead role in Pakistani development projects. Although
government rhetoric supported family planning, the actual family planning program——including
research, and financial and logistical support for family planning services—rested almost exclusively
on a slowly growing coalition of international NGOs. After the 1971 civil war, the new Bangladeshi
government briefly resisted some NGO innovations, disapproving of new contraceptive methods and
contraceptive delivery structures. In the mid-1980’s, the government called for the nationalization of
all NGO family planning programs. However, by the 1980s, a network of about four hundred NGOs
was directly active in the family planning program, and NGOs had powerful influence. The NGOs
resisted and won, as “ministry officials came to see that cooperating and building on the approaches
and structures that were leading to such irrefutable results were in everyone’s best interests” (Robinson
2007, 336).
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In the example from Bangladesh, there are many features that are common to family planning
movements in other non-Western, non-dissenting regimes. Specifically, we see early acquiescence to
international framing and program strategies, and domination of domestic family planning by a
powerful network of international organizations that form the backbone of domestic program
structures. The contrast here with dissenting regimes like Cuba and Iran—which both intentionally
maintain control over both the divergent frames used to promote family planning and the programs
that result, while at the same time receiving international support and recognition—is evident.

METHODOLOGY
To analyze these cases, I employ process tracing methodologies, and specifically
‘explaining-outcome’ process tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 18). Process tracing methods and an
emphasis on causal mechanisms have proven fruitful in advancing an understanding of both policy
diffusion and social movement development (see for example, Checkel 2005; Kollman 2007; Tarrow
2010; Tilly 2003; Wood 2003). Additionally, the goal of explaining-outcome process tracing is to
produce a “minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 3),
which is my objective in the case of explaining the relationship between dissenting regimes and
transnational activist networks. As detailed by Beach and Pedersen (2013), this type of case-centric
process tracing relies on the identification of often nonsystematic causal mechanisms to supplement
existing theories that are, on their own, insufficient to explaining case outcomes (19). In practice, these
mechanistic explanations are developed by synthesizing eclectic ideas and existing mechanisms in an
iterative process that produces a fuller account of a particular outcome (64). Bennett and Checkel
(2014) describe the resulting analysis as closely resembling a legal case, wherein evidence within a case
is assembled piece by piece in order to construct a compelling explanatory narrative.
The effort to explain ‘puzzling outcomes’ necessitates an ability to account for the motivations
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and rationales of the actors guiding these outcomes. To that end, an empirical focus on framing and
frame analysis provides a useful method for “penetrating the ‘black box’ of mental life” (Johnston
1995, 219). As Johnston (1995) asserts:
It has been shown that there is a fundamental relationship between the structures of mental
life and the production of written or verbal discourse (Bartlett 1932; Kintsch and van Dijk
1978; Thorndyke 1977; Rumelhart 1975; Buschke and Schaier 1979), and because social
movement frames are cognitive structures, a window of access exists through the spoken
words of participants and written texts of social movement organizations ( 221).

Thus, the frames that various actors use can be employed as fairly reliable measures of the ways in
which these actors understand social or policy problems, and can give us insight into the cognitive
interpretations they may rely on to both internally and externally justify action on these problems.
However, this approach does not advocate a simplified understanding that the intent behind framing
language can be taken at face value. Rather, attention to the context in which frames are
used—specifically, to the role of the actor employing the frame, to the venue in which is it forwarded,
to the structure and intent of the document in which it is located, and to the broader culture in which
it was constructed—is critical to correctly interpreting the intent behind framing choices (Johnston
1995). Attentiveness to these shifts in actors, venues, and intent are therefore critical to my efforts to
accurately explain advocacy and policy outcomes. Overall, tracing the use of frames over space and
time allows me to “approximate the underlying cognitive organization that structures experience and
influences behavior,” in order to construct an explanation of movement and policy outcomes
(Johnston 1995, 235).
From a practical perspective, Kollman’s (2007) work on the diffusion of the human rights
frame from the international LGBT movement to varying domestic contexts serves as a guide to the
application of these process tracing techniques in frame analysis. Through both interviews with key
activists and content analysis of relevant documents, Kollman identifies the use of movement frames.
To capture the sequencing of frames adoption, Kollman then uses a timeline to trace a “norm
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cascade”. This process codes each frame according to the group who forwarded it and places it on the
timeline, visually organizing an analysis that traces where frames originate, in which venues and by
which actors they are used, and where evidence of diffusion emerges over time. My dissertation utilizes
this process in the study of family planning movements.

DATA SOURCES
Applying this technique to the study of family planning frames in order to address the questions
proposed in my dissertation requires an analysis of documents from both domestic and international
sources. Because of variation between cases in the types of data sources employed and the methods
used to analyze them, detailed methods sections are included within each case study chapter. However,
each the case study analyses are centered on the examination of data sources that reflect framing tactics
within several critical venues, described below.
Public Discourse and Media Framing. Bob (2005) emphasizes the importance of the public
discourse is in shaping the trajectory of NGO activity, and, in turn, social movement activity.
Specifically, Bob argues that successful NGOs must remain extremely attentive to how the general
public—their potential support base—characterizes the issues the NGO seeks to address (Bob 2005,
41). In addition, public discourse helps to determine whether issues appear on the policy agenda and
how those agenda items are translated into policy (Cobb and Ross 1997). For this reason, attention to
shifts in the public framing of family planning is a critical first step to tracing frame development over
time. As Gamson and Modigliani (1989) argue, public discourse framing and media framing are tightly
intertwined, as the public frames are shaped by the media, and the media, in turn, utilizes frames that
resonate with the public. In the absence of longitudinal survey data, an analysis of media framing is
perhaps the best means of capturing changes in public discourse framing over time. Thus, each case
study includes an analysis of family planning frames in the media.
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Civil Society Frames. NGOs are a cornerstone of activist networks, and analysis of the framing
strategies forwarded by this sector is important to understanding the frames development in family
planning. NGOs have been integral to the operations of the international movement, and have also
been used to promote family planning in Cuba; NGO sources are included in both of these cases. In
Iran, NGO sector guidance has been more absent from family planning, but religious leaders have
been responsible for shaping civil society discourses on the topic. Thus, this chapter instead utilizes an
analysis of Iran’s Friday Prayers.
Framing at the United Nations. The UN has been a critical agenda setting venue throughout the
history of the family planning movement, and UN population and women’s conference Plans of
Action and summary reports are written for the purpose of transmitting the details of proceedings,
goals, strategies and priorities of the UN conference to an international audience, and setting the
international family planning policymaking agenda. Importantly, these reports dedicate a substantial
section to recording the specific reservations of individual nations to UN goals, and contain entries
from both Cuba and Iran. These reservations are written largely to communicate contrasting national
perspectives to the international forum, and to make divergences in domestic strategy a matter of
public record. Therefore, I utilize the summary reports and Plans of Action from UN conferences to
trace international movement frames, and employ the statements from Cuba and Iran to document
domestic responses to international framing in this central international venue.
Official State Frames. To understand how movement frames are reflected in policy outcomes,
state-level documents must be analyzed for frame content, and for domestic movements, official
policy frames give key insight into how the government is constructing family planning. Thus, for both
Cuba and Iran, I include a measure of government frames. The reports from Cuba’s Communist Party
Congresses do not mention family planning, but Fidel Castro gives attention to family planning in his
formal addresses. These speeches are utilized to represent top-down state framing of family planning.
-50-

In the Iranian case, both official family planning policy documents and Ministry of Health and Medical
Education (MOHME) reports are employed to capture government frames.
Street-level Frames. Within domestic programming, an accurate depiction of each movement
requires some understanding of how family planning frames are constructed and translated in
programmatic outcomes. Thus, I incorporate insights from interviews with Cuban and Iranian
patients and service providers in order to get a sense of on-the-ground operations.
Table 3.1 provides a list of the sources selected for analysis for each case and venue.
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Table 3.1

Venue
Category

Case

UN
Media

International

NGO
UN

Data Source
UN conference reports
NYT articles
Population Council annual
reports
IPPF annual reports
Cuba's statements to the UN
FMC reports

NGO

Cuba
Media

Government
Street-level
UN
Media
Iran

Religious
Leaders
Government
Government
Street-level

Mujeres magazine (FMC
Publication)
Mujeres magazine

Purpose
Determine international movement framing at
each conference
Track media frames influencing the international
movement
Determine INGO frames
Determine INGO frames
Determine domestic framing in international
venues
Determine domestic NGO framing used within
Cuba
Determine domestic NGO framing within Cuba
Determine domestic media framing within Cuba

Bohemia magazine

Determine domestic media framing within Cuba

Somos Jovenes magazine

Determine domestic media framing within Cuba

Granma newspaper

Determine domestic media framing within Cuba

Castro’s addresses

Determine state-propagated frames in Cuba

Interviews with Cuban
women and doctors
Iran's statements to the UN

Determine patient and provider frames in Cuba

FBIS articles

Determine domestic framing in international
venues
Determine media framing in Iran

Tehran Times articles

Determine media framing in Iran

Friday Prayers

Determine frames forwarded by religious
authorities
Determine official policy framing in Iran

Iran’s 5 Year Plans
MOHME family planning
reports
Interviews with Iranian
women and doctors

Determine state-propagated frames in Iran
Determine patient and provider frames in Iran

CONCLUSION
By identifying and tracing the development of family planning frames across domestic and
international contexts, this dissertation produces a richly detailed picture of the relationship between
the framing tactics of dissenting regimes and international advocates. In so doing, I seek to augment
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existing theory in order to explain the puzzling dynamics of dissenting regimes’ simultaneous rejection
of and participation in the global community, and to reconcile the implications of this behavior with
existing theories of international engagement and policy and social movement diffusion. Specifically,
the following chapters will help to demonstrate where and when domestic frame matching is required
in order to garner international support, and whether prolonged engagement with the international
community eventually leads to frame convergence.
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Chapter Four
The International Movement: Tracing Family
Planning Frames Across Time and Venue
The international family planning movement provides an example of the sweeping global change
that can be wrought by a relatively ‘quiet’ social movement. While the finer points of the movement’s
influence have been much debated, the broader impact of the movement in ‘revolutionizing
reproduction’ is generally uncontested. Under the influence of an international family planning
advocacy coalition, global contraceptive use among couples increased from 10% to 60% between the
1960s and 2000s, and—although low-access areas remain—access to reproductive health services has
spread extensively throughout the developed and developing world (Sinding 2008). Moreover, “the
idea of family planning” has become deeply and irrevocably entrenched in a wide range of cultural,
economic and political contexts (Sinding 2008, S5). In order to understand how this dramatic global
norms shift occurred, we must first understand how the family planning message was framed and
diffused.
Within the circle of researchers who study international family planning, there is some debate over
the historical trajectory of family planning framing. Mainstream historical accounts traditionally break
family planning into two phases—or, as I term them, generations—of framing tactics. In the first
generation, family planning was framed as a solution to overpopulation, underdevelopment, and the
environmental concerns related to population growth. By contrast, second generation framing casts
family planning as a critical tool for improving women’s welfare, health, and human rights. However,
a minority of scholars claim that the first generation of family planning frames has not actually been
replaced by these second generation frames, and that population and development framing still
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pervades family planning policy and activism. Although these researchers cite select instances of
continued first generation frame use, no broader empirical analyses exist to help confirm or reject
these claims on a more global level.
Thus, one central goal of this chapter is to provide an empirical account of the shifts in framing
strategies as they occurred in several critical venues. Specifically, by employing a content analysis of
archival sources reflecting the framing strategies employed in international, NGO, and public forums
between 1960 and 2010, I establish an annual measure of frame use in each venue. Through an analysis
of this data, I am able to track the rise and fall of various frames in a systematic way, and to contribute
to a more exacting historical account of frame use. More critically, however, I then use this data to
evaluate my theoretical prediction that social movement issue framing is unified and focused during
periods of movement incipiency and coalescence, but more tolerant of the incorporation of diverse
framing strategies as the movement enters the phase of institutionalization. Finally, the findings from
this chapter will serve as the base of comparison for the framing tactics of dissenting regimes. In order
to determine how dissenting regimes interact with or deviate from internationally established issue
framing norms, the historical trajectory of these norms themselves must first be firmly established.
This chapter provides the outline of that international trajectory.
To establish the foundation for exploring the framing dynamics of family planning, this chapter
first proceeds with a review of the mainstream historical accounts of international family planning
history, followed by an overview of the opposing alternative historical interpretation. After outlining
the specific sources selected for analysis and the methods employed for data collection and coding, the
bulk of this chapter is then dedicated to an analysis of the findings and a discussion of their
implications for both historical interpretations of international family planning and my theoretical
expectations regarding framing strategies during the various social movement stages of development.
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HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL FAMILY PLANNING MOVEMENT: A MAINSTREAM
INTERPRETATION.
Although family planning activism certainly predates the 1960s (see e.g. Blanc and Tsui 2005),
the emergence of a broad international family planning movement can be traced to this decade, and
the rise of the movement in the 1960’s is attributable to the confluence of several factors. First, and
perhaps most critically, in 1965, the landmark Supreme Court ruling in Griswold v. Connecticut
overturned state laws banning contraception, citing their existence as a violation of the right to privacy.
Before this 1965 ruling, 31 US states banned the dissemination of information about
contraception—effectively rendering illegal any sort of family planning advocacy—and the sale of
contraception itself was illegal in 24 states (Bailey 2010, 106). Thus, Griswold helped to pave the way
for increased public dialog about contraception and lead to the rise of the pill and IUD on the US
public market (Seltzer 2002, 10). Second, after World War II, more complete and accurate census data
was becoming available from developing nations for the first time (Seltzer 2002, 11; Blanc and Tsui
2005). This data showed that while modern healthcare improvements were successfully reducing
mortality rates in these nations, fertility rates remained high, leading to rapid population growth—as
much as 3 percent annually in some nations (Seltzer 2002, 11). Such findings reawakened Malthusian
fears about planetary overpopulation and led to what can be termed the demographic rationale for family
planning policy (Seltzer 2002, 11). Within this demographic rationale, family planning policy was
framed as an integral part of population, economic and environmental policy (Seltzer 2002, 11).
Of the three demographic components, the link between family planning and population policy is
the most straightforward. In an effort to govern national growth, 75 nations worldwide eventually
enacted specific policies establishing desired demographic targets for reducing population growth
(Seltzer 2002, 16). Generally, these demographic targets focused exclusively on fertility decline,
although there were policies that also mentioned a need to reduce infant and maternal mortality as well
(Seltzer 2002, 15). Although there are notorious examples of coercive fertility regulation, most nations
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sought to achieve their population policy goals through the simple provision of access to family
planning services. Thus, family planning policies structuring the development and delivery of services
became critical. Like population policy itself, most family planning policy formulated under this frame
was quite straightforward and focused narrowly on the means of increasing contraceptive availability
through nationwide distribution systems, and on the social marketing of these services (Helzner 2002,
49). Thus, within this frame, family planning policy was constructed as a fairly basic solution to a
specifically identified problem of population growth.
Of course, examining it in isolation from the other demographic policy areas may give a falsely
narrow sense of the motivations driving population policy. Although population policies themselves
were concerned with hitting demographic targets, they were certainly motivated by population’s
perceived relationship with economic and environmental policy. On the environmental front, work by
policy entrepreneurs like Lester Brown, Garrett Hardin and Paul Ehrlich helped to emphasize
connections between family planning, population growth, natural resources and environmental
degradation. Following closely on the heels of Silent Spring, Rachel Carson’s 1962 work that helped to
launch the environmental movement, Ehrlich published The Population Bomb (1968) to highlight “the
fundamental issue of the Earth’s finite capacity to sustain human civilization” (Ehrlich and Ehrlich
2009, 63). Although it has been marked by controversy, The Population Bomb started a global dialog
about the ecological need to limit population growth and intentionally moved to openly link fertility
concerns to growing environmental concerns (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2009). It also cast family planning
as the central solution to these problems, stating: “basically, there are only two kinds of solutions to
the population problem. One is a ‘birthrate solution,’ in which we find ways to lower the birthrate. The
other is a ‘death rate solution,’’ in which ways to raise the death rate – war, famine, pestilence –find us”
(cited by Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2009, 68). Similarly, in his paper “The Tragedy of the Commons”,
Hardin (1968) links environmental degradation of the global commons to family planning and
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population, and concludes: “perhaps the simplest summary of this analysis of man’s population
problems is this: the commons, if justifiable at all, is justifiable only under conditions of
low-population density. As the human population has increased, the commons has had to be
abandoned in one aspect after another” (Hardin 1968, 1248). Thus, particularly on the environmental
advocacy front, family planning programs and services became an important component of ideas
about environmental policy.
Finally, because of the correlation between high fertility rates and low economic development
in many areas of the world, the relationships between family planning, fertility and underdevelopment
became an accepted tenet of mainstream 1960s development theory (Blanc and Tsui 2005).
Specifically, many economists argued that rapid population growth would “serve as a break” on
economic development, as governments would be forced to thin resources over exponentially
increasing populations, and individuals would continue to devote their own time and resources to
childrearing (Bloom et al. 2003, 2). Rather than using the gains of new innovative technologies to
invest in future development, rapid population growth would require that all marginal gains would be
consumed merely maintaining a subsistence level of development (Bloom et al. 2003, 14). Overall,
1960’s economic policymakers largely agreed that increasing population growth would suppress living
standards even as nations modernized. Thus, family planning policy was seen as a critical element in
economic planning.
As can be seen in this discussion of the early days of the family planning movement, family
planning was framed as integral to population, environmental, and economic initiatives. However, as
successfully implemented family planning programs began to achieve noticeable demographic change
“the demographic rationale for family planning began to lose strength” (Blanc and Tsui 2005, 265).
Fertility rates were dropping and population no longer appeared to be such a pressing problem.
Additionally, in the wake of the global recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the promised
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economic gains from successful family planning policy were not widely evident, and the belief that
lowering fertility would directly increase economic development was shaken (Blanc and Tsui 2005;
Bloom et al. 2003, 14).
Instead, once again, various forces were converging to reframe family planning policy—this time
in terms of health, women’s welfare, and human rights. First, family planning advocacy drew the
attention of the growing international women’s movement, which claimed “the exclusive focus on
population control was destructive of women’s health and health services” (Turshen 2007, 156). In its
place, the movement called for a more ‘woman-centered’ focus to family planning, which would give
priority to improving women’s health and wellbeing (Freedman and Isaacs 1993, 19; Gillespie 2004,
34). Second, global attention to the protection and promotion of human rights, which had been
growing since the aftermath of World War II, began to seep into family planning politics (Freedman
and Isaacs 1993, 20). Importantly, this attention to individual rights was in direct conflict with
population policy, because population planning implies some measure of governmental authority over
individual childbearing decisions (Isaacs 1995, 363).
While conceptually it is easier to separate the health and human rights treatment of family
planning, in practice it is a bit more difficult. This is because health—and by virtue, health policy—has
itself often been framed in terms of human rights (Blank and Burau 2007, 3). Therefore, it is not
uncommon to see reference to ‘the human right’ to basic healthcare provisions. Additionally, while
human rights and women’s welfare frames emerged separately——with early UN declarations using
gender neutral language to declare that for parents “the opportunity to decide the number and spacing
of their children is a basic human right”—a right to reproductive choice also soon became integral to
the women’s movement (Freedman and Isaacs 1993, 19; Seltzer 2002, 13). Of course, health is also an
important component of women’s welfare, but health framing is also used in the context of men’s
sexual health (particularly with regard to vasectomies) and in the context of children’s development,
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and the women’s welfare frame is additionally used to refer to a woman’s social and economic
development or human capital. Thus, the rights, women’s welfare, and health frame are often
collectively bundled, and careful attention should be paid to teasing out their varying implications for
the formation and implementation of family planning policy.
While this second generation of family planning framing grew in strength throughout the 1980s,
the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development at Cairo is widely viewed as the
watershed moment that marked the turning point of decisive shift away from the previously used
demographic rationales for family planning (Blanc and Tsui 2005; DeJong 2000; Finkle and McIntosh
2002; Gillespie 2004; Helzner 2002; Lush 2002; McIntosh and Finkle 1995; Seltzer 2002). The Cairo
conference continued the broad mission of the 1974 conference at Bucharest and the 1984 conference
at Mexico city, but while those UN Population and Development Conferences focused on building a
relatively simple ‘World Population Plan of Action’, Cairo explicitly sought to place that plan within a
framework of sustainable development (McIntosh and Finkle 1995, 228). Beyond this difference in
goals, the structure of the Cairo conference differed substantially. Both Bucharest and Mexico City
were characterized by significant political and ideological tension over population-related issues
(McIntosh and Finkle 1995). In order to mitigate this tension and build what they hoped would be a
“Cairo Consensus” on population and development, the UN organized an elaborate series of
preparatory meetings that intended to resolve significant tensions in advance of the conference
(McIntosh and Finkle 1995, 229). For the first time, the UN proactively sought to include NGOs in
these planning meetings, and in the conference itself (McIntosh and Finkle 1995, 229, 236). This
decision opened the door for the participation of a much wider and more diverse collection of
perspectives—especially those from the international women’s movement—and was fundamental to
the eventual incorporation of a women’s welfare, health, and rights agenda in the program at Cairo
(McIntosh and Finkle 1995, 236). As a result, it is often noted that Cairo marked a significant
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departure in both which voices were included in family planning dialogs and in how those dialogs were
framed. Significantly, “the words ‘population problem’ do not even appear in the Programme of
Action adopted at the conference” (Blanc and Tsui 2005, 265). Instead, the plan of action called for a
transformation in family planning programs in order to offer a full range of reproductive and sexual
health services and improve quality of care (Helzner 2002, 49). According to one conference observer,
“Cairo effectively signaled the end of the family planning movement and replaced it with what we
know today as the reproductive health and rights movement…what effectively ended at Cairo was the
strong linkage between family planning services and efforts to reduce high birth rates” (Sinding 2008,
S4). This new agenda was met with overwhelming support at the Cairo conference, and the conference
ended with over 180 countries endorsing the new program of action and the feeling that a historically
momentous shift had been realized (McIntosh and Finkle 1995, 224).
Achieving this transformation is the task that domestic governments, advocates and
policymakers have been working toward with varying levels of commitment and success over the past
two decades. In many nations, there have been significant achievements made in expanding existing
family planning policy to develop comprehensive reproductive health programs (Helzner 2002, 56).
However, overall, both governmental and NGO financial and political commitment to family
planning programs seems to have wavered in the years since Cairo (Blanc and Tsui 2005; Sinding
2008).

It has been argued that the shift in family planning from a central tenet of demographic

planning to just one of many health and human rights goals has led to a decrease in its prioritization
among many governments and advocacy networks (Blanc and Tsui 2005; Gillespie 2004; Routh et al.
2001, 82; Sinding 2008). Furthermore, despite a high unmet demand for access to family planning
services in many regions of the world, family planning policy is often viewed as a relative success story
that will continue under its own momentum and that does not require significant further advocacy or
investment. Nevertheless, a global norm endorsing family planning as an essential component of
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reproductive health and rights has been widely established, and family planning’s integration into
broader public health movements could help to facilitate its continued support (Blanc and Tsui 2004;
Sinding 2008, S6).

FAMILY PLANNING HISTORY: AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION
While most observers and researchers laud the 1994 Cairo conference’s progressive shift away
from the demographic rationale for family planning, a minority of individuals maintain that the
conference was not the watershed moment that most claimed it to be. First, these counter-claimants
argue that although the conference’s Programme of Action did not include any direct references to a
population problem, the document still has a strong “neo-Malthusian subtext”, where the goals of
empowering women and providing health services are expressly understood as contributing to
population-reduction (Sexton and Nair 2010, 43). Second, they argue that the shift to women’s
welfare, health, and rights promised at Cairo has not actually been realized in domestic advocacy or
policymaking. Rao (2010) suggests that the population and development frames first developed in and
disseminated by the Western world have now been ‘deeply internalized’ in the developing world; as a
result, elites in the developing world still attribute development problems to population growth (103,
105). Despite near-universal drops in fertility rates, population anxiety continues—as these fears are
now rooted cultural beliefs rather than scientific ones—and actual policy decisions still reflect that
anxiety (Rao and Sexton 2010, 6). In addition, population targets continued to find their way into
international development initiatives, such as the structural adjustment policies formulated by the IMF
and the World Bank (Richey 2010, 267). Meanwhile, the ideas advocated at Cairo have not been widely
diffused. Cairo’s support for family planning (under a new women-centered banner) legitimated
existing but flawed family planning policies by lending a new “politically correct rational to discredited
programs”, which allowed these programs continue, largely unchanged (Rao and Sexton 2010, 12). As
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a result, women’s health and rights continue to be ‘undermined’ by the ongoing implementation of
coercive population policies and by lack of access to high quality reproductive health care (Rao and
Sexton 2010, 6). Simultaneously, important measures of women’s health care, such as maternal and
infant mortality rates, remain virtually unchanged (Rao and Sexton 2010, 6). Although women’s
reproductive rights have been expanded, much of this expansion is in theory only, as women lack the
means to actually exercise these rights (Rosenberg 2010, 158).
Looking at Cairo, the proponents of this alternative interpretation cite the dominance of a
US-based white feminist perspective as one of the primary reasons that other voices from the South
were excluded, and the measures for real change were not implemented (Rao and Sexton 2010, 12).
Within this dominant perspective, women’s health and rights were constrained within the context of
neo-liberal economic policy and the real needs of the majority of women (living in the developing
world) were glossed over (Rao and Sexton 2010, 17). Thus, the depth of understanding and
commitment that would be required to realize a true shift in approach to family planning has been
absent. In accordance with the more mainstream history, these researchers argue that the drive for
empowering family planning programs has faltered and note that, tellingly, the UN’s Millennium
Development Goals do not emphasize access to reproductive health services (Sexton and Nair 2010,
41). As a result, they argue that the changes heralded at Cairo are more fiction than fact.

METHODS
Determining the exact historical dynamics of family planning frames requires an empirical
examination of the framing tactics employed in international forums, as well as those employed by
family planning NGOs and the general public. My analysis of framing in each of these venues begins in
1960. As mentioned, the legalization of nation-wide public discussion of family planning by Griswold
in 1965 made way for the full-scale launch of the international family planning movement. By starting
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my analysis several years prior, I will also capture elements of framing strategies leading up to this
launch. My investigation ends in 2010, so as to avoid obscuring the analysis with coverage of the
Affordable Care Act. Additionally, as the movement history suggests, family planning as an
international movement has been relatively dormant in the new millennium.
Because of the marked differences in the type and characteristics of data sources used to trace
framing in different venues, the precise methods employed to trace framing strategies also varies by
venue. In each case, measurement strategies appropriate for each venue’s unique data source were
selected. For example, contextually rich qualitative content analysis captures the most nuanced
framing language, is well-suited for analyzing mid-length documents, and is particularly useful in cases
where author attention to exact phrasing is heightened, such as in UN Plans of Action. 4 However,
such analysis is less feasible for a sample of 5,000 news articles, where word counts are more
appropriate. In keeping with the strategy of explaining-outcome process tracing, the analysis of each
venue within each case serves to provide an additional (but distinct) piece of evidence for explaining
overall movement frames shifts. However, in order to maximize cross-case comparability, I employ
the same methods for each venue-type in each of the three empirical case studies. The methods used
are described in detail below.

Frames in the Public Discourse: The New York Times
The international family planning movement has been dominated by US funding and US-based
actors, resulting in the widespread impression in narrative histories that “the USA has taken the lead”
on global family planning (Cleland et al. 2006, 1910). More concretely, the US government donated
the money to launch the United Nations Population Fund, over half of all donor funds addressing
reproductive issues worldwide come from the United States, and US federal funding for reproductive
health represents about 8% of official development aid spending, compared to the average donor rate
The lengthy process of multi-party negotiations over the exact phrasing to be used in these documents is part of UN
record.
4
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of 3% (Finkle and McIntosh 2002, 12; Gillespie 2004, 34). Given the high level of US influence in family
planning, the movement’s support base of interest is the US public. In keeping with predominant
measures of public issue-attention and frame salience (see for example, Baumgartner and Jones 2009), I
employ a content analysis of frame usage in New York Times articles as a measure of frame usage in the
public discourse. In a comparison of various media sources, Baumgartner and Jones (2009) do not find
significant differences in coverage trends between the New York Times and other major news outlets
(50). Thus, like prior work, I use this source as a sole measure of publicly salient frames.
To establish the measure of framing in the public discourse, I first used LexisNexis and ProQuest
to locate NYT articles on family planning topics. Specifically, I searched all NYT headlines and lead
paragraphs for mention of family planning, using the following search terms and their variants: family
planning, birth control, contraception, birth prevention, reproductive, pregnancy prevention, birth
limitation, child spacing, IUD, condom, diaphragm, vasectomy.5 This created a sample of about 5,000
articles on family planning. Then, within each article, I searched for the following keywords related to
each frame:
Frame

Keywords
(This includes all variants of the word.)

Population
Development
Environment
Women
Health
Rights

Population, Overpopulation, Demography
Economy, Development, Poverty, Standard of Living
Environment, Resource, Ecosystem, Ecology
Women
Health, AIDS
Right

Both the search terms and keywords used for this analysis were developed through a pilot analysis of a smaller
sample of New York Times articles. Specifically, I started with the small sample of articles on family planning in
the New York Times Index of the Comparative Agendas Project, and used the content of these to generate search
terms and expand my search to the full New York Times archives in 1969, 1981-1983 and 2001-2003. Although I
include the more exhaustive list of search terms in every search, in practice, terms such as “birth limitation”
rarely (if ever) appear in isolation from one of the other more common terms. Searching headline and lead
paragraphs only, I generated a sample of articles (n=~130), and from examination of these, I generated the list
of keywords associated with each frame. Finally, in a full text search (rather than headline and lead paragraph
search) I used the search terms to locate family planning articles that omitted any reference to the keywords. I
then examined the few resulting articles in order to ascertain what alternative frame keywords they might
contain, and revised my list accordingly.
5
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I then briefly screened all hits to be sure that the keyword is used in the proper context (eg.
“rights” specifically as a right to family planning, and not an unrelated use of the word) and recorded
the relevant frame coding. All articles and their coding are preserved in Word documents in order to
maintain a record of how each article’s frames were coded.
Then, I recorded the total number of articles within each year that used each frame at least one
time.6 This was repeated for every year from 1960 to 2010. As a result, I obtain an annual measure of
the total number of articles that employ each frame over a 50 year period.

International Forum Frames: The United Nations
Since 1960, the UN has held five International Conferences on Population and Development
(ICPD), six international conferences on women’s issues, and one international conference on
HIV/AIDS. Broadly speaking, the purpose of these conferences is to transmit the goals, strategies and
priorities of the UN to an international audience, to set the international policymaking agenda, and to
coordinate domestic policymaking efforts. Thus, understanding how family planning is framed in
these meetings is critical to charting the framing of the international movement.
The summary reports7 from each of these conferences were analyzed for family planning frame
use. Specifically, frames were identified and coded using Nvivo qualitative analysis software, which
aids in the identification of broad trends in frame usage and allows exploration of the texts in a more
organized manner. By employing a qualitative approach to the coding of each conference report, more
overt frame usage of in phrases like ‘population and development strategies’ as well as the more subtle
usages in phrases like “[Governments should] use demographic data to promote sustainable resource
management, especially of ecologically fragile systems” (ICPD 1995, np) are both captured. Working
Because articles vary significantly in length, the low threshold for frame use ensures shorter articles are not discounted.
Family planning is a central topic at the ICPDs, and these conferences are widely regarded as critical venues a for setting
the international agenda on family planning policy. Thus, for these conferences, the entire summary report was coded.
However, UN women’s and HIV/AIDS conferences cover a much broader range of issues. So as not to skew the analysis
by coding material unrelated to family planning, for each of these conferences, only the chapters and sections related to
family planning topics were coded.
6

7
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from my list of frames, I read through each report, manually coding each individual phrase according
to its frame usage. Individual phrases can be multi-coded to reflect multiple frame use with a single
phrase. Phrases that contain only procedural language or recommendations (e.g. “The profit-oriented
sector should consider how it might better assist non-profit NGOs in playing a wider role in society by
enhancing or creating mechanisms to channel financial and other support to NGOs and their
associations” ICPD 1995, np) were left uncoded. A record of the exact coding of each text is preserved
in Nvivo.
Nvivo was then used to generate a report detailing the percentage of document coverage
commanded by each individual frame. For example, Nvivo calculates that phrases that have been
coded as employing a population frame cover X% of the entire document. Because each conference
report varies in the amount of (uncoded) procedural text, this can skew comparisons of conference
coding, as conferences with large proportions of procedural text will have a comparatively smaller
percentage of document coverage dedicated to any given frame. For that reason, I eliminated the uncoded
procedural text from the final measurement. Thus, the resulting measure is the proportion of each
frame’s percentage of coverage.

NGO Framing: Population Council and International Planned Parenthood
To capture NGO framing, I perform a content analysis of the annual reports of both the
Population Council and the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). These are selected
both for their high level of international influence and prestige and for their direct involvement in
Cuba and Iran. The Population Council began work in Iran in 1966 and was active in the development
of their earliest family planning strategies. IPPF began work in Cuba in the 1970s and still provides
support for the country’s family planning program. IPPF began work in Iran in the mid-1990s and is
still active in the country today. Therefore, attention to these two NGOs will give insight into both the
framing strategies guiding the international movement and the possible frame insertion by NGOs into
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domestic contexts.
Although they vary in length and format, annual reports from the Population Council were
published every year8 from 1960 to 2010. For each year, the general report9 was scanned, converted
from image to text, and read into Nvivo. These were then coded by first running a word frequency
query on all reports. This query generates a word frequency matrix of all words (grouped by stem
words and synonyms). I used the results of this query to generate my list of keywords to search and
code. This customized process ensures that any major terms that relate to a given frame are not
omitted from the keyword list. In addition, the word “population” was removed when used in
reference to the organization name, so as to not skew the coding of this frame by repeated reference to
the Population Council.
Using Nvivo’s text search function, instances of the following keywords and their variants were
coded to the appropriate frame:
Frame

Keywords
(This includes all variants of the word.)

Population
Development
Environment
Women
Health
Rights

Population, Demography, Birth Rate, Fertility Rate
Development, Quality of Life, Standard of Living, Poverty,
Economic
Environment, Natural Resources
Women, Female, Maternal
Health, Medical
Right

I used Nvivo to generate a report detailing the number of coded references to each frame for each
annual report, and recorded these to create an annual measure of frame use.
The same process was used for the annual reports from the International Planned Parenthood
Federation. However, in the case of this NGO, annual reports vary considerably more in format and
availability.10 There are eleven years for which no annual report is available for circulation in the US.

8

although1962 and 1963 share an annual report.
Financial, region-specific and divisional reports were not coded.
10 For a full description of the documents available for coding, see Appendix 1.
9
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However, available reports follow a fairly even distribution across my decades of interest, and there is
no reason to suspect that there is any systematic bias in the content in the reports that are available.
Thus, the small, periodic gaps in the data are not overly detrimental to my analysis.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
From Incipiency to Coalescence: Family Planning in the 1960s
My analysis of frame usages in the 1960s largely matches my theoretical expectation that, as social
movements seek to establish themselves as a coherent mobilizing force, they will pursue a more
limited and focused framing strategy. At the 1965 UN conference, Figure 4.1 shows that population
and development frames dominated the dialog, while only marginal attention was granted to health
and rights, and women are not mentioned at all in the summary report. The characteristics of
conference participants also reflects this closed-circle mentality. Rather than individuals representing a
wide range of political or social interests, the 1965 conference was led by over 700 scientific experts in
population and demography who had been nominated for attendance by UN member nations (Finkle
and McIntosh 2002, 12; New York Times 1965). This finding also matches the mainstream historical
accounts that family planning in the 1960s was framed almost exclusively as a population and
development issue.
Similarly, the data from the NGO sector also show a heavy use of population and development
frames throughout the 1960s. While the Population Council measures in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3
show more variation in framing tactics than the UN, and the organization does occasionally frame
family planning as a women’s, health, or rights issue, a focus on population and development is the
overwhelming framing strategy of the decade. 1960 is a notable exception to this trend, with over 50%
of the report relying on second generation frame use. Closer examination shows that in this year the
Population Council began a long-term collaboration with Johns Hopkins University, and much of the
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report’s discussion was dedicated to how the new alliance “will generate a rapid increase in our
knowledge of the ways in which work in the field of maternal and child health can be extended to the
area of family planning” (Population Council 1961, 6). Therefore, it is clear that early on, the
Population Council did view family planning as a health issue. Nevertheless, the Council largely drops
this framing strategy in favor of first generation frames. Although talk about the medical development
and health effects of emerging contraceptive technologies somewhat revived health framing in 1964
and 1965, population and development framing dominates the rest of the decade and accounts for
between 80% to 90% of frame usage in most years.
There is a similar trend in the framing of family planning by the International Planned
Parenthood Federation, illustrated in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. Like the Population Council, IPPF starts the
decade with a heavier reliance on women and health framing—with health frames alone accounting
for over 50% of frame usage until 1964. Again, we then see a sharp spike in population and
development framing, with first generation frame use reaching nearly 90% by 1966. However, unlike
the Population Council, IPPF’s use of the first generation frame strategy is less sticky. Although
population and development are more often the dominant frames, beginning in the late 1960s, IPPF
bounces between higher and lower levels of use. Examination of the reports shows that much of the
emphasis on women and health framing during these early years revolves around IPPF efforts to aid
nations in “integrating family planning with maternal and child health services” (IPPF 1969, 1).
Additionally, in 1967, IPPF convened an international conference with the motto, “Planned
Parenthood—a Duty and Human Right” (IPPF 1968, np). From that point forward, IPPF fairly
consistently puts more emphasis on human rights than any other venue, reflecting a particular focus of
their organization. Thus, IPPF demonstrates an early understanding of family planning as a health and
women’s and human rights issue in their activities on-the-ground, but does more frequently discuss
family planning in terms of first generation frames in their general reports.
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The initial switch from more diversified framing tactics to an emphasis on population and
development framing by both NGOs in the early 1960s supports my theoretical predictions that
framing efforts become more focused and unified during social movement incipiency and coalescence.
However, while the Population Council’s switch is more decisive, IPPF’s variation in framing from
year to year shows that this commitment may be incomplete—especially if it is at odds with how
programs are working to integrate themselves in actual practice. Although there is an undeniable
movement to put more emphasis on first generation frames—which syncs NGO framing efforts with
broad international UN framing trends—there is some variation strength of this emphasis. Therefore,
focused framing efforts by NGOs and the UN during this period are evident, but are not
overwhelmingly rigid.
Analysis of frames in the public discourse, shown in Figures 4.6 and 4.7, adds another level of
nuance to 1960s framing trends. Although population, development and the environment—the first
generation frames—are the more prominent in the 1960s, combined, they account for only slightly
more than half of frame usage. Meanwhile, I find that in between 20-35% of news articles, family
planning is framed as a health issue, that the women’s welfare frame grows in usage from less than
10% to over 20% in the 1960s, and that human rights frames account for a small but persistent
proportion of framing. Thus, while historical accounts of the family planning movement have more
accurately described family planning framing at the international and NGO level, they seem to have
overlooked and important trend in the public discourse—that is, that while first generation frames
were certainly central to early public dialogs, the second generation frames were far from absent or
insignificant. Rather, while more formal venues may have been moving to focus the discussion of
family planning around more limited frame narratives, the public discussion employed a much broader
(and increasingly expanding) set of frames.

This is a critical insight, given our theoretical

understanding of the public’s influence over NGO and governmental agenda setting processes (e.g.
-73-

Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Bob 2005).
Therefore, overall, during the 1960s period of movement incipiency and coalescence, NGOs
and the UN—the more coordinated and formal venues—behaved as expected in that they largely
moved to focus on a narrower range of framing strategies and created a more unified family planning
dialog. However, attention to the public discourse, as well as imperfect commitment by the IPPF to
first generation frames, demonstrates that alternative frames were already vying for a place in the
discussion. Moving forward—especially as the movement institutionalizes—we should see efforts to
incorporate these varied framing tactics into more formal dialogs, both because firmly established
movements can afford to employ more disparate framing tactics and because it would seem critical to
retaining public support.

Movement Institutionalization: the 1970s and 1980s
As the international family planning movement institutionalized in the 1970s and 1980s, I find
the theoretically predicted shift in UN framing tactics. At the 1974 ICPD, framing strategies diversify
to include both women’s and environmental frames. At the same time, framing of family planning as a
health issue increases, while population and development framing decreases. This same trend
continues at the 1984 ICPD, with health, women’s and rights frames all expanding in usage, while
population and development framing decreases slightly. However, at both of these conferences, first
generation framing still accounts for well over 70% of total frame usage. Thus, although this period
sees both greater variation in framing tactics and a decrease in population and development framing
that corroborates historical accounts of the movement, these conferences are still relying firmly on
first generation framing of family planning.
Meanwhile, in 1975, the UN held its first quinquennial conference on women’s issues, which was
attended by family planning stakeholders and dedicated substantial discussion to family planning
topics. My content analysis of this discussion, and those at the 1980 and 1985 conferences, also
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demonstrates a shift in family planning framing. While venue clearly matters to how the discussion is
framed—the women’s conferences use an unsurprisingly large proportion of women’s welfare
framing—over time, these conferences also follow a similar pattern of decreasing emphasis on
population and development frames, and an increasing emphasis on health and rights frames. Despite
the strong emphasis on women, at the 1975 conference, population and development account for over
30% of framing; by 1985, this share has decreased to less than 10%. Therefore, although the ICPDs
still give priority to population and development during these decades, this women’s forum leads a
more decisive UN shift to second generation frames.
On the NGO front, similar trends in frame usage are less immediately apparent. With regard to
the Population Council, there is little to no diversification of framing tactics, and overall, population
and development framing actually appears to increase slightly in the 1970s and 1980s. There are,
however, a few outliers in this subtle trend. In 1977, we see a sharp spike in the use of second
generation frames, which is largely attributable to a dramatic increase in women’s frames and a
decrease in population frames. An examination of the 1977 report shows that the Population Council’s
organizational theme for 1977 was “including women in development efforts” (Population Council
1978, 15). Thus, the Council demonstrates an awareness of the shifting ideas surrounding women’s
welfare and family planning and gives it full attention in 1977. However, rather than maintaining this
focus, the Council reverts back to its usual population and development heavy framing in 1978. This
framing focus is interrupted by another spike in second generation frames in 1988, when an increase in
both women and health framing account for the change. For this year, the Population Council’s theme
was “facing critical issues in reproductive health” (Population Council 1989, 6). Thus, once again, the
Council acknowledges the growth of family planning as a women’s and health issue in its focus for the
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year.11 However, this time, the dramatic shift in frames does precipitates a small but noticeable
change in the NGOs framing. Although population and development frames continue to dominate,
after 1988, the Population Council does not return to previously used levels of second generation
frames. Therefore, while the Council lags behind other venues in making any shift, and while this
change is relatively small and appears suddenly, rather than slowly over time, it is not completely at
odds with the overall trajectory of framing in the 1970s and 1980s.
Similarly, the analysis of the IPPF reports does not show a departure from the pattern of frame
usage employed in the 1960s. Although use of first generation frames never quite matches the peak
level from 1966, IPPF population and development framing across the two decades continues to reach
between 60% and 80% of total frame usage, and is occasionally punctuated by years with high use of
second generation frames. Despite the fact that in these punctuating years, the use of second
generation frames exceeds 50-60% of total frame usages, this usage follows the same pattern from the
1960s, and overall there is no sustained decline in the use of first generation frames. Even the period’s
lowest peak of first generation frame use, at 1989, exceeds similar peaks in the 1960s. Thus, unlike the
findings from the Population Council, if we cut off the analysis at 1989, there is no compelling
evidence to suggest that IPPF is shifting subtly away from first generation frames.
Meanwhile, frames in the public discourse show a fairly steady continuation of their 1960s trends
during the 1970s and 1980s. As use of first generation frames declines from about 50% in 1970, to
about 40% in 1980, and about 20% in 1989, the use of women’s and health frames grow dramatically.
Health framing nearly doubles during this time period, from about 25% in 1970, to almost 50% in
1989, and women’s welfare frame moves from about 20% to about 30%. Additionally, use of the
human rights frame increases slightly overall, although it appears stronger in some years than in others.
11

It should be noted that few years in the 1970s and 1980s have any stated theme. When they do, they are usually more
general ideas, such as “reflections on a decade” (1986) or “a year of exploration and change” (1976). The use of more
programmatic themes, like those in the 2 outlying years, does not appear regularly until the 1990s.
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While there are two spikes in first generation framing during this time—one in 1974 and another in
1984—these correspond exactly with periods of news coverage around the 1974 and 1984 UN
International Conferences on Population and Development. Given the comparatively high focus on
first generation frames in these ICPDs, it is not surprising that discussion in the public forum would
briefly reflect this population and development frame usage. Framing then continues its previous
trends in the years immediately following these outlying observations. These findings support both
historical accounts of the movement, as well as theoretical predictions about frame diversification
during the period of institutionalization. Once again, however, it appears as though the public
discourse is leading this shift in framing, while the more formal NGO and international venues
experience a bit of lag time before they follow suit.

The 1990s: A Watershed Moment?
The 1994 ICPD marks the moment when the majority of historical accounts claim that the
international arena broke with first generation framing strategies, and analysis of the 1994 summary
report does show a marked decline in population and development framing. However, this shift
appears to be more closely a continuation of prior framing trends, rather than a dramatic break.
Moreover, although the proportion of environmental frames remains relatively small, environmental
framing increases in 1994, and first generation frames still account for nearly 50% of total frames. A
closer examination of the text suggests that although the UN is signaling an intentional shift to the
inclusion of second-generation frames, it is also reluctant to give up the old frames. For example,
consider the following excerpt:
[The UN] endorses a new strategy which emphasizes the numerous linkages between population and
development and focuses on meeting the needs of individual women and men rather than on achieving
demographic targets. Key to this new approach is empowering women and providing them with more
choices through expanded access to education and health services and promoting skill development
and employment. (UN 1995, np)

Here, there is a clear attempt to promote the importance of second generation frames. However, the
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text remains silent on how the ‘numerous population and development linkages’ fit into this goal,
given that demographic targets are no longer favored. This pattern of promoting new frames, while
somewhat disconnectedly paying lip service to population and development is repeated throughout
the text—and, in fact, in the name of the conference itself. Thus, more than marking the decisive shift
to second-generation frames, it seems that the report from the 1994 conference is somewhat
awkwardly attempting to reconcile the two groups of frames. The 1999 ICPD framing continues the
trend of increasing attention to women, health, and rights and decreasing use of first generation
frames. Again, however, there is no dramatic break with the previous frame use trajectory, and first
generation framing still accounts for over 30% of frames.
Meanwhile, the 1995 UN women’s conference does all but eliminate the discussion of family
planning as a population issue. However, once again, this is not exactly a bold new framing strategy, as
first generation frames accounted for less than 10% of frame usage at the previous 1985 meeting.
Interestingly, this is the first women’s conference where health replaces women as the dominant
frame; this trend is also reflected in the ICPDs, where framing family planning as a health issue
becomes more pronounced in the 1990s.
Taken together, these findings more closely support the alternative historical interpretations that
refute the notion that the 1994 conference marked a ‘paradigm shift’ in family planning framing.
Rather, it seems that the ICPDs reflected greater diversification of frames, and a continued slow
progression away from population and development. This diversification of frames occurs in
conjunction with an explicit decision to include of a wide range of participants in the organization of
the ICPD. Movement histories discuss this decision, but a closer examination of the ICPD reports
give an even clearer picture of the magnitude of change. At the 1984 ICPD, 131 NGOs were
represented at the conference (UN 1984, 89-93). Of these organizations, 30 reference population or
development directly in their organizational title, while only 16 reference women or health. By
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contrast, over 1,500 NGOs were represented at Cairo in 1994, and women’ interests groups made up
the majority of participants (UN 1994, np). This diversification in both participants and frames
supports my theory that a broadly institutionalized movement can afford to incorporate varying
perspectives without jeopardizing the movement’s integrity. However, even a shift in
participants—while likely to have impacted framing language—did not cause an abrupt upheaval in
ICPD frames. Moreover, barring some crisis event, it seems improbable that a deeply institutionalized
movement could switch its framing tactics dramatically within the scope of a single conference.12
Instead, the accommodation of alternative perspectives may slowly lead to a shift a movement’s
framing tactics over time—as we see with the slowly increasing reliance on health framing.
As noted in the discussion of the previous decade, changes in NGO framing in the 1990s are more
subtle. Although the Population Council does move to greater use of second generation frames and
begins to favor development framing over population framing, these first generation frames remain
dominant in the 1990s. Additionally, from year to year, there is quite a bit of variation in levels of first
versus second generation frames, but nothing in the reports themselves (such as a theme or new
program introduction) seems to explain this oscillation. Rather, the pattern reflects the same level of
variation from year to year that is present in most of the Council’s reports. The small and subtle shift in
framing that occurred in the 1980s was not followed by more dramatic change in the 1990s—and thus,
the only noteworthy change in Population Council framing was realized before the 1990’s ‘watershed
moment’.13
By contrast, the IPPF does exhibit significant change in its framing strategies during the 1990s.
Between 1989 and 1992, use of second generation frames rises from about 35% to around 75%—the

Suggesting that policymaking theories of rapid change that discuss focusing events and tipping points (e.g. see
Baumgartner and Jones 2009, 88; Birkland 1998; Downs 1972; Kingdon 1995; Wood 2006) may also apply to social
movement framing strategies.
13 Given the subtly of the change and the lack of continued change, it is also unlikely that the Population Council
contributed to any larger order framing shifts.
12
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highest level recorded thus far. However, this trend is briefly interrupted again in 1997 and 1998, when
population and development frames resurface in both reports’ discussion of the “International
Conference on Population and Development+ 5 review” (IPPF 1999, np). Although this discussion
reflects on the early decade’s stronger focus on population and development, this framing subsides
again in 1999, with women, rights, and health framing returning to over 70%, marking the final
departure from the preponderance first generation frames use. Therefore, although the change is not
initially as dramatic or resolute as mainstream movement histories would suggest, I do find a definite
shift in IPPF framing in the 1990s.
In the 1990s, public framing of family planning continues its general shift away from first
generation frames. Again, the highest spike in population and development framing occurs during
coverage the 1994 ICPD, and then declines again after that. As in the other venues, there is no decisive
break with first generation frames during this decade, but rather a continuation of previous trends.
With the exception of the UN women’s conference, the public discourse uses the largest proportion of
second generation frames, with health, followed by women, gaining the largest share of frame usage.
Thus, in the public sphere, we see more consolidation around the framing of family planning as a
women’s and health issue, as the mainstream movement history suggests. This consolidation
suggests that the diverse group of stakeholders noted for advocating a change framing at the 1994
ICPD were in reality simply reflecting changes in framing in the public discourse, which had been
incrementally moving toward second generation frames for decades.

Family Planning Frames in the New Millennium: 2000-2010.
There has been no UN ICPD since the 1990s. It is possible that, in a continuation of framing
trends, the UN’s era of ‘population and development’ has ended, and the lack of new conferences
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reflects that.14 It is also possible that a general decline in attention to family planning has made way for
other conference priorities—like the meeting on HIV/AIDS in 2001. Both the 2000 UN conference
on women and the 2001 HIV/AIDS conference still include discussions of family planning. In 2000,
the women’s conference report relies exclusively on second generation framing of family planning. As
in 1995, health frames are the most prevalent, but women’s frames have increased again to over 30%,
while rights framing remains present but marginal. At the HIV/AIDS conference, unsurprisingly, the
discussion of family planning is confined exclusively to these programs’ positive health impact in the
fight against the epidemic. Again, we see that venue matters in how family planning is framed, but this
reliance on health framing is also congruent with broader trends in the discussion of family planning.
Overall, although the 1994 conference at Cairo did not mark a dramatic change in how family planning
is discussed in UN forums, it does seem to mark the beginning of the end of first generation framing.
Thus, in noting the decline and eventual elimination of population, development, and environmental
framing, the mainstream movement history correctly characterizes framing in this venue.
By contrast, population and development framing has not disappeared from the NGO world.
While Population Council framing may have experienced a slight decline in first generation frames in
the 2000s, use of these frames generally ranges between 30% to 70%. Nevertheless, while use of
development frames often remains high, there is a drop in the use of population frames. This suggests
an effort to uncouple population and development—and perhaps to recast development efforts in
terms of women’s welfare, health, and rights. Thus, although they still bear ‘population’ in their name,
the Population Council has slowly begun to deemphasize population concerns. The Population
Council explicitly recognizes this shift , and the 2004 report asks, “does the world still need the
Population Council?” (Population Council 2005, 1). In answer, the report quotes the Population
Council’s founder, John D. Rockefeller III, stating “‘there is only one reason for concerning ourselves
Narrative histories similarly point to the end of this era. See, for example, Blanc and Tsui 2005; Finkle and McIntosh
2002; Gillespie 2004; Sinding 2008.
14
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about population—to improve the quality of people’s lives, to help make it possible for individuals
everywhere to develop their full potential’” (Population Council 2005, 1). The report goes on to stress
that ‘improving the quality of people’s lives’ is still the organization’s mission, but that programs now
focus more heavily on stopping HIV/AIDS,15 improving maternal mortality rates, and guaranteeing
better access to a broader range of reproductive health services (Population Council 2005, 1-2).
Therefore, although population consciously remains a part of the Population Council dialog,
programmatic goals increasingly emphasize second generation frames through the lens of economic
development. Nevertheless, even if this trend continues, it is impossible to claim that first generation
frames have not been carried forward into this century. When examining this venue, the alternative
movement history more accurately characterizes frame development.
The shift in IPPF frame use is more absolute, and in the 2000s, first generation framing follows the
same downward trend initiated in the 1990s. By 2010, population framing has all but disappeared, and
combined first generation framing accounts for less than 20% of total frame use. Meanwhile, health
has become the predominant frame—covering over 40% of total frame use—while women’s and
rights framing also each account for nearly 20% of frames. Interestingly, environmental framing
remains most persistent in this venue, and although its presence is marginal, its continued use makes
IPPF the most diversified in terms of framing tactics. Finally, it is evident that although development
framing has decreased substantially, it generally continues to hover between 10% and 15% throughout
the 2000s. Thus, like the Population Council, IPPF appears to be de-linking a concern for
development issues from population concerns. Thus, while population and development decrease
more simultaneously in other venues, the same is not true in the case of the NGOs, and this facet of
first generation framing persists.
The focus on HIV/AIDS is largely responsible for the spikes in second generation framing in 2000 and 2003, where
reports describe how “the Council’s expertise in operations research on reproductive health programs is being applied to
develop ways of promoting use of condoms, preventing mother-to-child transmission, engaging youth in HIV/AIDS
prevention, and improving the prospects for children orphaned by AIDS” (Population Council 2001, 9).
15
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Perhaps more surprisingly, given the strength of prior trends, first generation framing also has
not disappeared from the public discourse. In fact, although usage does not exceed 20%, first
generation framing actually appears to experience a small resurgence in the late 2000s. Use of first
generation frames is marginal—but not negligible—in this venue, and because they continue to
resonate with the public, NGOs’ continued use of these frames stands to reason as well. Health
frames, followed by women’s frames, experience the highest proportion of usage, but once again,
alternative interpretations of the movement history stand correct in noting that they have not entirely
won out. Therefore, although the broad trend is toward consolidation around women’s and health
framing, analysis of this venue shows that mainstream histories have again overlooked framing
strategies in the public discourse.

CONCLUSIONS
This chapter supports the overall existence of two generations of family planning framing, but it
also adds a new level of nuance and additional insights to the discussion of the history of international
family planning frames. Outlined below are the key points that this more comprehensive empirical
analysis of international family planning frames has provided.
Framing tactics vary by venue.
Frame variation across venue is not a novel theoretical concept, but it is one that has been ignored
in the discussion of family planning. At best, there is acknowledgment of the variation in how family
planning is addressed within different national contexts. However, neither the mainstream nor the
alternative historical accounts of the movement discuss the possibility that different actors in the
international arena have varying framing strategies. Rather, ‘the movement’ is treated as a
homogeneous entity that moves with perfect coordination. By contrast, this analysis has demonstrated
that precisely how family planning is framed depends on the particular type of venue where it is being
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discussed. Family planning framing by the UN differs depending on the type of conference that is
being convened. Framing in the NGO arena varies between organizations with otherwise similar goals
and capacities, while the public discourse follows its own balance of framing tactics. Although the
broadest trends in each of these venues are roughly alike, taken together they show a more diverse
range of framing tactics than a simple historical overview would suggest.
Movement histories are wrong on two accounts.
First, mainstream histories are incorrect in their claim that the ICPD at Cairo marked a watershed
moment in the shift of family planning framing strategies. As my analysis demonstrates, changes in the
discussion of family planning were already underway—particularly in the public sphere and in the UN
women’s conferences. Additionally, as the frame analysis of the Cairo conference shows, first
generation frames were still heavily employed at that meeting, and the diminishing of first generation
frames post-Cairo was also not rapid or dramatic; rather, analysis shows a slow and steady
continuation of previous trends. Moreover, population and development frames have not disappeared
from either the public or NGO sphere. In this regard, my findings align with alternative historical
interpretations that note the continued presence of first generation frames—albeit at a reduced level.
Second, both mainstream and alternative movement histories overlook the fact that second
generation frames were not absent from the earliest discussions about family planning. On the
contrary, second generation frames account for a substantial proportion of the earliest frame use in the
public discourse, and increase fairly steadily over time. Meanwhile, although NGOs drop their earliest
constructions of family planning around second generation frames, their use points to an NGO
acknowledgment of their appropriateness and utility in the discussion of family planning. Thus, it is
incorrect to conclude that family planning was exclusively constructed as a solution to population and
development problems during the 1960s.
Overall, it seems that the mainstream movement histories most closely reflect framing tactics at the
-84-

UN ICPDs. This is not particularly surprising, as these conferences were a highly visible and powerful
venue in the formation of international family planning strategies. However, by overlooking framing
tactics in other venues, movement histories have mischaracterized the extent to which first generation
frames dominated early dialogs, and have (in the case of the mainstream movement) been too quick to
pronounce them extinct in more recent years. This more nuanced history serves as an important
foundation for future analysis.
In formal venues, framing tactics are less diverse during periods of movement incipiency and
coalescence than during institutionalization.
The analysis shows that the UN and NGOs move to a greater focus around first generation
frames during the 1960s, and then very slowly diversify framing tactics across the 1970s to 1990s.
Additionally, the field of actors who were permitted to participate in UN discussions increased
substantially over this time period. These findings correspond to my theoretical prediction that
movements will seek to create more unified discussions during incipiency and coalescence, but can
afford to be more inclusive of a range of perspectives once a movement becomes institutionalized.
This conclusion is further supported by my finding that use of these second generation frames did
exist during the 1960s. As analysis of the public discourse shows, it is not possible to claim either that
second generation frames were not yet dreamed up or that they were wildly unpopular during this time
period. Rather, although they had a heavy presence in public discussions, they were simply not
incorporated into the formal dialog—a fact that points to an intentional limitation of framing in formal
venues. Nevertheless, the existence of these second generation frames in the public discourse is
important. As the literature argues, advocacy coalitions will not adopt framing strategies that lack
salience among the general public, but will model their framing strategies around ideas that produce
resonance. Thus, the growing public use of second generation frames demonstrates the existence of
alternative framing perspectives and suggests an eventual need to incorporate them in order for the
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movement to continue to resonate with the public. NGOs behavior, then, follows as theory would
predict—first abandoning previously used first generation frames in order to align with focused
movement goals during incipiency and coalescences, and then returning to second generation frame
use as second generation frame salience increases and movement institutionalization occurs.
Meanwhile, UN framing also expands to incorporate these tactics.
In conclusion, this chapter provides a refined account of historical framing trajectories within the
international family planning movement, which provide a sound basis for comparison with
movements from dissenting political contexts. Moreover, the analysis also provides evidence in
support of both existing theoretical claims regarding social movement behavior and the new
theoretical propositions offered within my dissertation. Further analysis in the following chapters will
help to more thoroughly evaluate these claims.
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Chapter 4 Tables
Figure 4.1
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Figure 4.3

Population Council: First vs. Second Generation
Framing
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Figure 4.5

IPPF: First vs. Second Generation Framing
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Framing in the New York Times
100%
90%

70%
Rights

60%

Health

50%

Women

40%

Environment

30%

Development

20%

Population

10%
0%
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010

Percentage of Frame Use

80%

Year

-89-

1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010

Percentage of Frame Use

Figure 4.7

NYT: First vs. Second Generation Framing

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%
Second Gen

30%
First Gen

20%

10%

0%

Year

-90-

References
—. 1965. “U.N. Belgrade Conference to Study Family Planning.” The New York Times, June 26.
Bailey, Martha J. 2010. ""Momma's Got the Pill": How Anthony Comstock and Griswold v.
Connecticut Shaped US Childbearing". The American Economic Review. 100 (1): 98-129.
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Jones, Bryan D. 2009. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Blanc, Ann, and Amy Tsui. 2005. "The Dilemma of Past Success: Insiders' views on the future of the
international family planning movement". Studies in Family Planning, 36(4), 263-276.
Blank, Robert H., and Viola Desideria Burau. 2007. Comparative health policy. Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire [England]: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bloom, David E., David Canning, and Jaypee Sevilla. 2003. The Demographic Dividend a New Perspective on
the Economic Consequences of Population Change. Santa Monica, Calif: Rand.
Bob, Clifford. 2005. The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism.
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cleland, John, Stan Bernstein, Alex Ezeh, Anibal Faundes, Anna Glasier, and Jolene Innis. 2006.
“Family Planning: The Unfinished Agenda.” The Lancet 368 (9549): 1810–27.
DeJong, Jocelyn. 2000. “The role and limitations of the cairo international conference on population
and development”. Social science & medicine, 51 (6): 941-953
Ehrlich, Paul and Anne Ehrlich. 2009. “The Population Bomb Revisited”. The Electronic Journal of
Sustainable Development, 1(3), 63-71.
Finkle, Jason L., and C. Alison McIntosh. 2002. "United nations population conferences: shaping the
policy agenda for the twenty-first century". Studies in Family Planning. 33 (1): 11-23.
Freedman, L. P., and S. L. Isaacs. 1993. "Human Rights and Reproductive Choice". Studies in Family
Planning. 24 (1): 18.
Gillespie, Duff G. 2004. "Whatever Happened to Family Planning and, for That Matter, Reproductive
Health?" International Family Planning Perspectives. 30 (1): 34-38
Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons”. Science. 162 (3859): 1243-1248.
Helzner, Judith F. 2002. "Transforming family planning services in the Latin American and
Caribbean region". Studies in Family Planning. 33 (1): 49-60.
-91-

International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). 1968. Ninth Report of the International Planned
Parenthood Federation 1967-68. London: International Planned Parenthood Federation.
International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). 1999. 1998 Annual Report. Available at:
http://web.archive.org/web/20000919040325/http://www.ippf.org/annualreport1999/ [13
July 2015].
International Planned Parenthood Federation, and Howell, Catherine. 1969. IPPF World Survey,
Factors affecting the work of family planning associations. London: International Planned Parenthood
Federation.
Isaacs, S. L. 1995. “Incentives, Population Policy and Reproductive Rights: Ethical Issues”. Studies in
Family Planning. 26(6): 363-367.
Lush, Louisiana. 2002. "Service Integration: An Overview of Policy Developments".International Family
Planning Perspectives. 28 (2): 71-76.
MacIntosh, C. A. and Jason Finkle. 1995. The Cairo Conference on Population and Development: A
new paradigm? Population and development review 21, (2): 223-260
Population Council. 1978. The Population Council Annual Report 1977. New York: Population Council.
Population Council. 1989. The Population Council Annual Report 1988. New York: Population Council.
Population Council. 2001. The Population Council Annual Report 2000. New York: Population Council.
Population Council. 2005. The Population Council Annual Report 2004. New York: Population Council.
Rao, Mohan. 2010. “An Entangled Skein: Neo-Malthusianisms in Neo-liberal Times,” in Markets and
Malthus: population, gender, and health in neo-liberal times, ed. Mohan Rao and Sarah Sexton. Los
Angeles: Sage.
Rao, Mohan and Sarah Sexton. 2010. “Introduction: Population, Health and Gender in Neo-liberal
Times,” in Markets and Malthus: population, gender, and health in neo-liberal times, ed. Mohan Rao and
Sarah Sexton. Los Angeles: Sage.
Richey, Lisa Ann. 2010. “Reproductive Health, Family Planning and HIV/AIDS: Dangers of (Dis)
Integration in Tanzania and Uganda,” in Markets and Malthus: population, gender, and health in
neo-liberal times, ed. Mohan Rao and Sarah Sexton. Los Angeles: Sage
Rosenberg, Martha. 2010. “A Decade After Cairo In Latin America: An Overview,” in Markets and
Malthus: population, gender, and health in neo-liberal times, ed. Mohan Rao and Sarah Sexton. Los
Angeles: Sage

-92-

Routh, Subrata, Ali Ashraf, and John Stoeckel. 2001. "Consequences of the Shift from
Domiciliary Distribution to Site-Based Family Planning Services in Bangladesh". International
Family Planning Perspectives. 27 (2): 82-89.
Seltzer, Judith R. 2002. The origins and evolution of family planning programs in developing countries. Santa
Monica, CA: Rand.
Sexton, Sarah and Sumati Nair. 2010. “A Decade and More after Cairo: Women's Health in a Free
Market Economy,” in Markets and Malthus: population, gender, and health in neo-liberal times, ed.
Mohan Rao and Sarah Sexton. Los Angeles: Sage.
Sinding, Steven W. 2008. What has happened to family planning since cairo and what are the prospects
for the future? Contraception 78, (4): S3-S6
Turshen, Meredith. 2007. “Women’s Reproductive Rights,” in Women's Health Movements: A global force
for change. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
United Nations (UN). 1984. Report of the International Conference on Population: Mexico City, 6 - 14 August
1984. New York: United Nations.
United Nations (UN). 1994. “Highlights Of NGO Forum International Conference on Population
and Development”. United Nations. Available at:
http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/newslett/94_19/icpd9419.eng/4ngos.html [15 July 2015].
United Nations (UN). (1995). Summary of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population
and Development. New York: United Nations, Dept. of Public Information.

-93-

Chapter Five16
Cuban Family Planning: Dissent and Diffusion in
Castro’s Regime
In 1959, the Cuban Revolution established a socialist regime in Cuba that challenged Western
political ideology and decried the forces of Western imperialism and neocolonialism, particularly as
propagated by the United States. Despite this dissent to dominant global norms and US doctrine,
Cuba did not disengage from the international community. Although this is true on many levels,
Cuba’s continued engagement with the international family planning movement is most relevant and
important to my research questions. For example, consider the following: Cuba continued to be an
active participant in UN conferences discussing population, development, and family planning, and
even hosted the 1983 Latin American Regional Preparatory Meeting for the International Conference on Population ;
in 1966, the Cuban National Medical Congress invited renowned obstetrician and Planned
Parenthood leader Alan Guttmacher to address their annual meeting and give advice on family
planning (Kaiser 1975); and starting in the 1970s, Cuba maintained a formal relationship with and
accepted aid from both the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the International Planned
Parenthood Federation (IPPF). However, as this chapter will detail, Cuba also frequently voiced its
dissent to prevailing international family planning frames and generally refrained from incorporating
them within their own domestic dialogues. An analysis of the balance between Cuba’s engagement and
dissent is the subject of this chapter.
Specifically, this chapter uses the Cuban case to answer the core questions posed in my
research—that is, how do international and domestic actors negotiate the tension between divergent
framing tactics in both domestic and international venues? Does the international movement shift to
The research for this chapter was supported by a fellowship from the Cuban Heritage Collection at the University of
Miami.
16
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accommodate these divergent frames, or do the dissenting regimes themselves conform? Does
prolonged engagement eventually lead to frame convergence? To answer these questions, I rely on a
wide variety of data that highlight the Cuban family planning frames employed in both international
and domestic arenas between 1960 and 2010. A description of these data sources, as well as the
methods employed for collecting and coding this data, are outlined in the following section. The
analysis portion then traces Cuban framing across this 50-year period in order to determine how
various frame strategies were employed by different actors and venues in both international and
domestic contexts. This enables us to detect patterns of diffusion and dissent developed within the
Cuban case, and to form a deeper understanding of how dissenting regimes approach advocacy and
policy programs in varying political environments.

METHODS
Although the revolution came in 1959, my analysis of Cuba begins in 1960, which aligns with
my analysis of the international movement and also captures the earliest regime activity around family
planning. As with the international movement, I give attention to frames in the public discourse, the
NGO sector, and activity at the UN. However, in order to more fully capture domestic activity, I also
add attention to state-level framing and street-level implementation. A detailed description of the
methods and sources of data collection and coding strategies for each of these venue-types follows in
the remainder of this section.

International Forum Frames: The United Nations
In order to trace the frames forwarded by Cuba in the international arena, I employ an analysis
of Cuba’s statements at the UN population conferences. 17 These include the formal written

Statements from Women’s and HIV/AIDS conferences were not considered because, with the exception of
the 1995 Beijing conference, no statements or references to statements could be located in the UN archives or
in other conference-related material. I conclude that they may not exist.
17
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statements endorsed by Cuba at the 1974, 1984, 1994, and 1999 meetings, as well as the full transcript
of the Cuban delegate’s speech at the 1974 conference.
These statements were coded using Nvivo in the same manner as the general UN conference
reports in the preceding chapter, with one important difference. Initial coding revealed that Cuba
often discusses population and development in neutral or positive terms, in much the same way that
the general UN reports employ this frame. For example, the following statement from Cuba’s 1974
speech clearly endorses attention to population and development issues:
This World Population Conference is of significant and momentous importance, since
it is the first time that representatives of governments from around the world meet to
discuss this issue, which is a serious problem in light of the international economic
situation and, particularly, the situation in developing countries, which are those with
the highest rates of population growth and the most desperate economic situations.
(Gutiérrez Muñiz 1975, 3, translated by author.)
However, it became clear that, in many instances, Cuba mentions population and development
exclusively to condemn the use of these frames.18 In the same speech, for example, the Cuban delegate
notes that, “we repudiate any attempt to impose population policies on the populace against the will of
its citizens, such as mass sterilization practiced by the colonial government of Puerto Rico at the
insistence of US imperialism” (Gutiérrez Muñiz 1975, 9, translated by author). Coding this simply as
use of the population frames would misconstrue the intent behind the language being employed in
these statements and problematically inflate the proportion of framing language dedicated to these
frames. Thus, I amended my coding categories to include a ‘population-dissent’ and
‘development-dissent’ classification that is used for text that discusses these frames in order to
challenge them; positive and neutral use19 is captured in the original ‘population’ and ‘development’
categories.
As with the general UN conference reports, I used Nvivo to calculate the total percentage of
The same is not true of the environmental frame, which is largely unused.
For example, discussion of population growth rates without any judgement of the positivity or negativety of
these trends.
18
19
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document coverage for each frame, and eliminated uncoded procedural text, so that the final measure
reflects the proportion of each frame’s percentage of coverage.
I supplement this analysis with excerpts from an interview conducted with two program
directors at the Cuban branch of the United Nations Population Fund in Havana, Cuba. A copy of the
IRB-approved interview schedule can be found in Chapter 5 Appendix 1.

Media Frames and the Public Discourse
According to the World Press Freedom Index, Cuba currently scores a 70.21, which places
Cuba in the index’s least-free category, along with other nations such as China, North Korea, and Iran.
Lugo-Ocando (2008) describes a system where the media “is managed from the very top of the
country's leadership, which decide what sort of information is available to the public, through which
channels and in which style of presentation” (121). In practice, this is accomplished not through an
official policy of censorship, but through the appointment of “politically reliable” individuals to all
management and editorial positions, and through oversight by the Ideological Department of the
Central Committee (Lugo-Ocando 2008, 123). As a result, although the frames used in the media
influence and inform the general public dialogue around family planning, they are also frames that are
first endorsed by the state. Therefore, these frames are more top-down, whereas it may be argued that
the media frames employed by the New York Times are more bottom-up. Nevertheless, these media
frames capture an important dynamic of the family planning debate, as they are reflective of the way
that family planning is discussed in informal domestic contexts and the types of frames that are
diffused in public dialogues.
To measure media framing, I collected and coded articles from four sources—Mujeres, Granma,
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Bohemia, and Somos Jovenes—as detailed below.20 Together, these cover a broad audience and range of
topics, including discussion of family planning in varying contexts.
Mujeres is a monthly women’s magazine that is produced by the feminist Cuban Women’s
Federation (FMC). Mujeres began in November 1961, but was shut down in 1993 during Cuba’s
economic crisis. The magazine resumed publication in 2001 and currently distributes about 60,000
print copies quarterly, and has an estimated readership of 130,000 (Niekamp 2012). Although other
magazines possess wider readership, Mujeres has been recognized as a primary provider of information
on reproductive health topics (Sanders 1974). Therefore, its inclusion in this study is critical.
A nearly comprehensive collection of bound volumes of Mujeres is housed in the Cuban
Heritage Collection (CHC) at the University of Miami. Using this resource, I began revision of the
magazine in 1961 and paged through every available issue through 1992, 21 searching for, and then
copying, any articles discussing family planning topics. The CHC collection does not resume until
2010. 22 However, Mujeres archives are available online starting in 2007. The online issues were
searched using the following keywords and their variants, which are translations23 of those terms used
to search the New York Times: planificación familiar, control de la natalidad, anticonceptivo/a anticoncepción,
prevención de nacimiento, reproductivo/a, prevención del embarazo, limitación de la natalidad, espaciamiento de los
nacimientos, DIU, intrauterino, condón, preservativo, profiláctico, diafragma, vasectomía. Thus, Mujeres articles are
missing from 2001-2006. Overall, the search yielded 33 articles.
Founded in 1965, Granma is the official daily newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party and is

By relying on multiple sources, I am able to increase the sample size of articles available for analysis.
Additionally, the articles in this broader sample move beyond a narrow target audience of women or youth to
encompass a more well-rounded target audience (with greater comparability to the broader audience of the New
York Times).
21 See Appendix 2 for a brief list of missing issues.
22 This gap is due to an absence of a procurement chain during these years that does not reflect a systematic bias
in material content.
23 I verified these translations with the Cuban staff at the CHC in order to confirm that I did not overlook any
alternative, commonly used term translations.
20
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Cuba’s most widely read media publication (Lugo-Ocando 2008). Given the volume of material and
time constraints, a full manual revision of this source was not possible. However, the Latin American
Network Information Center (LANIC) provides a comprehensive online index of bibliographic
references for Granma articles from 1965 to 1992. Using this index, I used the above set of keywords to
search article titles and subject indexes for articles about family planning. I then located and copied the
full text for each article from the CHC collection. Granma came online in 1997 and archived articles are
available from that year forward. Again using the set of keywords, I searched and stored Granma
articles from 1997 to 2010. Thus, the gap in Granma data is from 1993-1996, and there are 34 total
articles on family planning.
Bohemia began as a popular, weekly ‘general interest’ magazine in 1908, and covers a wide
variety of political, cultural, economic, and scientific topics. Issues from the 1960s are approximately
150 pages long, but overtime the length has gradually decreased to about 80 pages per issue. It is one of
the few media sources that did not shut down during the economic crisis of the 1990s, but continued
to publish on a biweekly basis. 24 Bohemia appeared online in 2002, and according to its website,
currently distributes about 100,000 print copies per week. The continuity of this source and its national
popularity were key factors in its selection.
The CHC houses a nearly complete collection of Bohemia from 1960 to 2010. Due to time
constraints, from 1960-1969, I search a random sample of 25% of Bohemia’s issues on microfilm.25
Between 1970 and 2005, I paged through every available print issue of Bohemia in the CHC’s bound
volume collection.26 For 2006 to 2010, I used online searches of my keywords to locate articles, saving
copies of all findings. In total, I located 102 articles covering family planning.
Finally, I include an analysis of Somos Jovenes, a monthly teen-oriented magazine whose stated
During this ‘special period’, Cuban media was reduced from 733 newspapers, magazines and journals, to 53
newspapers and magazines, and 212 semiannual scientific journals (Lugo-Ocando 2008, 129).
25 For a list of issues sampled, see Appendix 2.
26 There are some scattered missing issues. For a complete list, see Appendix 2.
24
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goal is ‘to illustrate how Cuban youth live, study, work, think, love and dream’. Given Cuba’s efforts to
intensify sex education among its youth—a topic that will be covered in later discussions—the
inclusion of a media source targeting adolescents adds a valuable perspective. Somos Jovenes opened in
1977, shut down in 1992, and reopened in 1999. In order to diversify sources, Somos Jovenes was chosen
over two other equally popular youth magazines: Muchacha, which is also published by the FMC
starting in 1980, and Juventud Rebelde, which is the CCP’s youth-oriented publication. The CHC
collection of Somos Jovenes covers 1981 to 2010, and as with other sources, I searched each issue page by
page looking for articles on family planning, which I copied and saved. This produced a collection of
27 articles.
In order to maximize comparability with international movement data, these articles were
coded following the same method as the New York Times articles. That is, I read each article and
recorded the frames that appear in each, and then record the total number of articles within each year
that used each frame. As with the NYT, the result is an annual measure of the total number of articles
that employ each frame over a 50 year period. However, as with the United Nations statements, I also
differentiate between whether population and development are being used in a positive/neutral or
negative context. To avoid double-counting population and development framing, I subtract the
number of dissenting population and development articles from the total number of population and
development articles in each year. In other words, a single article cannot be coded as both population
and population-dissent; rather, any clear dissent to the frame within the article qualifies it to be coded
as population-dissent. Although coding for each source was completed separately, I combine all
coding in the final analysis. Combining media sources gives me more continuity and a larger sample
size for analysis, and because of Cuba's media oversight, we can expect that media framing choices are
all reflective of a common political orientation.

Domestic State-level Frames
-100-

In order to examine formal state framing of family planning in domestic contexts, I examined
speeches by Fidel Castro.27 Cuba is a one party state with an elected legislative body that chooses the
nation’s president—which, until 2008, was Fidel Castro. Despite the perhaps “democratic and broadly
participatory” legislative elections, the state is still structured firmly around “one political party, and
within that party, Fidel Castro’s authority was hegemonic, total, and uncontested. Dissent was
tolerated only on a limited basis, and only within the confines of officially sanctioned institutions”
(Sweig 2009, 45). Thus, Castro’s agenda was the fundamental guiding force behind Cuban state
politics. The role of Castro’s speeches in promoting his agenda is also critical. Castro was a legendary
speaker and the “larger-than-life, impassioned Fidel Castro leaning forward to address a pulsing sea of
a million or more exuberant Cubans” has become an iconic symbol of the revolution (Guerra 2012,
37). As a political tool, however, speech rallies were more than a symbolic representation of the
people’s support. Specifically, speeches were a principal means through which Castro constructed the
revolutionary narrative, and they positioned “Castro [as] the primary protagonist in an unfolding
drama of national redemption as well as a self-appointed prophet empowered to define the process of
change” (Guerra 2012, 38). As a result, the issue frames employed in these speeches give key insights
into state-level framing strategies
Portal Cuba (www.cuba.cu) houses a complete, digitized collection of ‘all speeches and some
reflections of our Commander in Chief published from 1959 until February 22, 2008’.28 Using the
family planning keywords, I searched this collection for Castro’s speeches that mention family
planning. In all, Castro talks about family planning in eight speeches, which were all given
In addition, I reviewed the formal reports from the Cuban Communist Party Congresses. The CCP held
five conferences between 1960 and 2010, in 1975, 1980, 1986, 1991, and 1997, and I examined the full reports
from each of these conferences. However, although the reports review many women’s, health, and
development policies at length, I found no references to family planning. I also searched for public policies
dealing with family planning. However, although I found policies establishing the primary care consults that
dispense family planning services, I again found no explicit references to family planning.
28 The LANIC database also contains English translations of many of these speeches, which were employed
where available.
27
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domestically. Castro is known for his lengthy speeches that cover a wide variety of topics, and these
speeches are no exception. Therefore, I limit coding of these speeches only to the entire section or
entire paragraph(s) that deal directly with family planning. I performed this coding in Nvivo, using the
same method employed to code the UN statements, and the final measure shows the proportion of
each frame’s percentage of coverage within the section of coded speech.

NGO Framing: The FMC
To identify the frames used by domestic NGOs, I employ an analysis of FMC publications that
discuss reproductive health, family planning, and contraceptive use. The FMC has been recognized by
the International Planned Parenthood Federation (1980) as the central advocacy force for women’s
issues within Cuba. Additionally, the reach of the organization is extremely pervasive. According to a
UN survey, by 2004, FMC membership had reached 4 million women—or 86.3% of Cuba’s adult
female population—who are active in the 74,000 FMC chapters that operate throughout the nation
(UN). The FMC also runs a “nationwide network of 175 women and family counselling centres [that]
contributes to the important function of providing a discussion and advisory service for women and
families,” and has become “an essential and mandatory source of reference for the Government in the
design of policies, programmes and legislation targeted at women or having an impact on them” (UN,
14). It received consultative status at the UN in 1997. As mentioned, Mujeres is published by the FMC,
and so I employ an independent examination of this source as the more quantitative portion of my
analysis, and supplement this with a review of other FMC publications. FMC conference reports,29
bulletins, pamphlets, books, interviews, and statements vary widely in their style, audience, and
content, and only rarely mention family planning. Thus, coding in Nvivo would not produce a
consistent measure that can be meaningfully compared over time. Instead, I supplement the Mujeres
I reviewed the general reports from FMC congresses 1-6, and 8, spanning 1962 to 2009. I was unable to
locate a report for Congress 7 from any source. Although the reports discuss various development, health,
women’s, and rights achievements, only the report from Congress 6 in 1995 mentions family planning.
29
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analysis with a review of pertinent excerpts from these sources. Finally, an interview I obtained with a
former official from the FMC provides supplementary details.

Family Planning On-the-ground: Interviews
In order to gain an understanding of the frames and practices guiding the actual, street-level
delivery of family planning services I conducted voluntary, confidential, semi-structured interviews
with Cuban doctors and women in Miami, Florida.30 A network of contacts was accessed through
Jorge Perez Lopez at the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE) and through the
Cuban Heritage Collection. Using a snowball sampling strategy, I identified participants with direct
knowledge of the provision of family planning services. In total, I obtained interviews with five
doctors, with medical careers in Cuba spanning the 1970s to 2010s, and five women whose lives in
Cuba span the 1960s to the 2010s. Copies of the IBR-approved interview schedules for these
interviews can be found in Chapter 5 Appendix 1.
The insights gained from these interviews are critical to understanding family planning
program operations in Cuba, and excerpts and analysis of these participants’ experiences are included
in each section.
Together, the analysis of these sources allows me to construct a model of Cuban family
planning framing tactics that spans multiple decades and levels of analysis, and which accounts for
framing choices in both domestic and international, and formal and informal contexts.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The 1960s: Emergent Family Planning and Dissent
Although Cuban representatives attended the 1965 UN World Population Conference in

There is undoubtedly some selection bias introduced by the decision to rely on interviews with the Cuban
exile community. In depth attention to specific biases will be given in the analysis portion of this chapter.
30
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Belgrade, there is no record of a statement being offered by Cuba.31 Thus, I can conservatively suggest
that at the international level, there is participation without dissent. This suggestion is bolstered by an
account from Alan Guttmacher. In 1965, Guttmacher was the president of Planned
Parenthood-World Population, a division of the IPPF. At the conference in Belgrade, Guttmacher had
lunch with three of the Cuban delegates, including chief delegate Celestino Lajonchere (Guttmacher
1966; Kaiser 1975). Lajonchere was a Cuban obstetrician and one of the most powerful figures in the
development of Cuba’s reproductive health programs. Beginning in 1962, he served as the Ministry of
Public Health’s Director of Obstetrics and Gynecology, and later became the president of the National
Group on Sex Education (Ochoa 2006).32 In Belgrade, Lajonchere invited Guttmacher to address the
Cuban National Medical Congress, and followed up in order to secure Guttmacher a formal invitation,
which he accepted. Guttmacher positively describes an ‘overflowing’ attendance of his talk and a high
level of interest in family planning among the 3900 Cuban physicians and 180 international delegates
attending the congress (Guttmacher 1966, np). For its part, the Cuban media also gave favorable
coverage to both Guttmacher’s participation and the participation of other Western specialists. In an
issue of Bohemia that covered the congress, the magazine ran two photographs of the Guttmacher
address with captions noting that Guttmacher gave “an extraordinary report on modern contraceptive
methods” that “sparked exceptional attention” (Bohemia March 1966, 60, 70).33

In

addition,

Bohemia included remarks from Castro thanking the foreign participants for the honor of their
presence (Bohemia March 1996, 67). Thus, here we have a description of a relationship developing out
of Belgrade with little tension, and a focus on cross-national collaboration.
Concerning state-level frames, it is during the late 1960s that Castro gives the most attention to
family planning; four out of the eight of speeches that mention family planning are given in 1966 and
I searched all 4 volumes of the full conference report and the UN online database.
His name also appears frequently in the Cuban media articles I collected, and one of the doctors I interviewed
knew him personally and spoke of his influence.
33 This issue was not included in the random sample of Bohemia from the 1960s.
31
32
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1968. The coding shows that an overwhelming proportion of family planning framing revolves around
population and development, both in dissenting and positive/neutral contexts. Here, it is worth
mentioning that although the Cuban government outwardly decries population control, this should
not be mistaken for a lack of interest in or concern for population and development. However, in the
1960s, Cuba begins to differentiate itself by framing socialism and revolution as the solution to
population and development problems. As a clear example of this trend, consider the following two
statements:
Gentlemen, some countries maintain that the solution lies in birth control. This can be said
only by the capitalists, the exploiters. No one who is aware of what man can achieve with
technology and science will ever establish a limit upon the number of human beings who can
exist on this earth, and much less a country which has enough land to supply a much greater
population than ours. (Castro 1966)
Now there comes another problem relating to this increase of the population--let no one be
frightened, for we are not promoting planning or control. Those are measures being proposed
by the imperialists to the underdeveloped world. The measures that we want—the only ones
that resolve—are different. (Castro 1968, March)

In both cases, Castro is discussing challenges related to population and development, but raises the
question of family planning only to note that it is a false solution. He then goes on to describe how
Cuba will engage in a system of economic investment that will mitigate any population and
development problems. Importantly, Castro does not focus on family planning as an important health,
women’s welfare, or human rights goal in and of itself. Rather, he mentions family planning only in
speeches that are expressly centered on population and development concerns. Moreover, during this
era Castro appears to treat family planning in general with a certain level of derision or skepticism. For
example:
For children are going to be born at any rate, because I do not believe they will pay
much attention to Johnson and his colleagues when they talk of birth control and
family planning. It is ridiculous! For anyone who knows our fields and our peasants,
what kind of story are they going to give to our peasants with this kind of thing? They
are going to send the planners to the devil. [laughter] Well, that has never been
planned. [laughter]. (Castro 1968, April)
Here, more than simply dismissing family planning as a solution to population and development,
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Castro seems to be dismissing it altogether. Between the overall scarcity of speeches that mention
family planning, and a lack of attention to family planning in the CCP congresses, it is clear that the
highest levels of government are putting little emphasis on the family planning development.
Therefore, at this level of analysis, there is clear dissent to the frames being employed by the
international movement, but also a general lack of support for family planning.
From the media sources during the 1960s, only five articles from Bohemia discuss family
planning. These articles employ both first and second generation frames, and the largest proportion of
positive/neutral population and development framing is employed during this decade. The first article,
from 1966, 34 is a piece discussing family planning and population in India, and there is no
condemnation of the practice of employing contraception to slow demographic growth. However,
dissent emerges in 1967 in a lengthy article discussing a new contraceptive—an early version of the
contraceptive implant—that will be used by the United States to exterminate the world’s impoverished
societies in the name of reducing population growth. By contrast, another article the same year
mentions both the implant and population growth, but without any dissenting commentary. The
article from 1968 discusses decreasing birth rates, abortion, and contraception use in Bulgaria.
Tangentially, the paragraph about abortion notes that abortion is prohibited in Bulgaria during a
woman’s first pregnancy and that “these measures tend to protect the health of the woman and her
ability to give birth” (Bohemia 1968). There is neither objection to an abortion policy that is likely
intended to influence population growth, nor a suggestion that women have abortion rights. The
article goes on to discuss the use of contraception and, somewhat incongruously, states that there is no
doubt that women should have the ability to determine their family size. In 1969, focus shifts away
from population and development in an article discussing women’s health and the pill. Thus, even in
this small selection of articles in the 1960s, it is possible to note both the emergence of dissent to first
An article from 1961 discusses abortion rates and vaguely mentions “the problem of preventing pregnancy”
without ever mentioning contraception.
34
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generation frames and an early (albeit sometimes contradictory) use of second generation frames.
Analysis of the larger article sample size in later decades will aid in the further understanding of these
trends.
On the NGO front, there is no family planning activity in the archival data collected from the
FMC. One interviewee—an FMC officer during the era—notes that although Vilma Espin,35 the
president of the FMC, was interested in women’s health and initiated informal relations with the IPPF,
action on family planning was limited until the 1970s.
As far as actual family planning services are concerned, my interview with a Cuban sex
educator provides a few details. During the 1960s, nylon IUDs were the primary means of
contraception used in Cuba, which doctors I spoke with referred to simply as the anillo or ring. These
were a Cuban imitation of the Grafenberg IUD, but, due to resource shortage, they lacked the silver
used in Grafenberg’s design. Nurse volunteers produced these nylon rings by hand, and they were
used by ‘thousands and thousands’ of Cuban women (female participant, interviewed November
2015). Nearly every Cuban I interviewed mentioned the use of these rings. During the 1960s, the IPPF
sought to aid in the importation of contraceptives, but this was made difficult by the embargo. IPPF
workers would bring supplies—spiral and copper T IUDs and the pill—in their personal luggage via
Mexico (female participant, interviewed November 2015). From my interview, it is not clear whether
this type of clandestine aid really had a widespread effect. Also during the 1960s, Cuba imported
‘mediocre quality’ condoms from China, which Cuban men largely rejected (female participant,
interviewed November 2015). Finally, in 1968, Cuba liberalized its abortion laws and, in a theme that is
repeated across these interviews, abortion began to rise as a primary means of limiting births (female
participant, interviewed November 2015). These accounts demonstrate action on family planning in
the 1960s, but point to the lack of a comprehensive and coordinated programming. When taken
Espin was also a central leader in the revolution, and was married to Raul Castro from 1959 until her death in
2007. She is almost undoubtedly the most powerful female figure in post-Revolutionary Cuba.
35
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together, analysis from all of these venues demonstrates an emerging engagement with family planning
politics, but frames and policies are still largely in a developmental stage. Moreover, dissent to
international frames is beginning to occur in domestic venues, but international cooperation—with
the UN and the IPPF—is evident. Meanwhile, no clear alternative or uniquely Cuban framing
strategies were developed.

The 1970s: Tactful Divergence on the World Stage
After the gradual emergence of family planning dialogues in the late 1960s, and the early
development of a domestic language of dissent to international frames, Cuban family planning and
related frames progressed rapidly in the 1970s. At the UN World Population Conference at Bucharest
in 1974, the nature of Cuba’s participation contrasts starkly with the passivity employed in 1965. At
Bucharest, Cuba’s dissent to the frames prevailing in the international movement forcefully entered
the international arena. As mentioned, two statements from Cuba were coded for analysis. The first is
a joint statement issued by Cuba and ten other socialist nations, labeled 1974a in Figure 5.1. Here, the
coding reveals heavy use of first generation frames—over 90%. Within this statement, dissent to
population frames is non-existent and dissent to development framing is less than 10%. In fact, the
main focus of dissent in this statement, which was left uncoded due to its deviance from family
planning and related frames, is to the exclusion of the government of South Vietnam from the
conference. Thus, the level of dissent to family planning frames demonstrated by Cuba in the speech
made by the Cuban delegate, illustrated in 1974b, is noteworthy even when compared to other nations
in the socialist bloc. Although about 80% of the speech revolves around first generation frame use,
nearly half of this is from a dissenting perspective. Meanwhile, health and women’s welfare frames
account for less than 20% of total framing. When I compare this to the general 1974 conference
framing in Chapter 4, the coding is strikingly similar. The proportion of engagement with each frame is
nearly identical, although the international conference report dedicates a small percentage (about 5%)
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to human rights, whereas Cuba does not.
This is an important finding because it shows that, even though Cuba objects to first
generation framing and, as analysis from other venues in this decade will show, is moving away from
first generation framing in domestic contexts, Cuba is not substituting new frames in international
dialogues. Despite its differing domestic values, goals, and understanding of family planning, we do
not see a disconnect in the dialogues between Cuba and the UN. Cuba is protesting the UN framing
from within the framing strategies that the UN itself employs, and not by advancing alternative (and
internationally non- or less-resonant) frames. Although the delegate notes that access to contraception
should be “guaranteed to the whole population” (Gutiérrez Muñiz 1975, 8), Cuba is not demanding a
shift in focus to women’s, health, or rights frames. Moreover, Cuba is negotiating a balance between
engagement and dissent, which is reflected in the coding. As stated above, the split between
positive/neutral and dissenting population and development frames is about 50/50. The delegate’s
speech opens with a long statement noting the positive aspects of the conference, which concludes
with the assertion that, “we are sure that the Bucharest Conference will help us to gain depth and
understanding of population factors, which Cuba understands should be considered as an element and
an integral part of the process of economic development” (Gutiérrez Muñiz 1975, 3, translated by
author). The remainder of the speech goes on to voice both agreement with and objection to
international norms, and despite the often-used language of conciliation, the dissent is not subtle. For
example, consider the following statement:
Cuba rejects the pretension of the ideologues of imperialism who associate
underdevelopment with the population explosion, and who designate
underdevelopment as the cause of this outcome. My country believes, on the contrary,
that high rates of population growth, and therefore the population explosion, are
companions and, in a certain sense, the consequence of underdevelopment and
oppression and exploitation imposed by imperialism. The true origins of
underdevelopment are particularly linked to the colonialist and neo-colonialist policies
of the imperialist powers. (Gutiérrez Muñiz 1975, 5, translated by author)
Here, Cuba is not tentative in its criticism of Western norms, and yet, overall, dissent at the UN is far
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from absolute. This effort to maintain a certain level of agreement is also evident in Cuba’s relationship
with the UN outside of the conference. In 1971, Cuba invited UNFPA to begin work in Cuba, which
consisted mainly of offering training courses in Havana and a few other provinces (interview, male
participant, UNFPA Cuba, November 2015). At the close of the 1974 conference, Cuba negotiated a
$3.8 million grant agreement with UNFPA, which strengthen the relationship even further, and paved
the way for the establishment of regular, formal relations with the organization (IFPD 1975). An
interview with a Cuban UNFPA officer offers more detail about this collaboration and the framing
strategies employed by both parties:
First [UNFPA] organized training on population issues and family planning issues.
Really, UNFPA has an agenda that has been, I would say, that has been enriched by
conceptual advances—with gender issues, with the concepts of reproductive health,
which expanded to dimensions that do not have to do with access to contraception,
which aren’t seen only as family planning but also sexual rights, reproductive rights,
and which also extended to many types of couples. They are associated not only this
type of service, say, more associated with the 70s, the 60s, that had to do with birth
control . In Cuba, really there has always been more of a ‘rights’ connotation, although
obviously I think we also have much to improve. (Female participant, UNFPA Cuba,
November 2015, translated by author.)
The process of conceptual enrichment and the evolving focus of UNFPA described here suggests that
during the 1970s, the UN’s work in Cuba was still more motivated by birth control and population
issues, which makes sense given the dominant UN framing strategies of the decade. However, there is
also an assertion that Cuban family planning has always been rights-based. When asked about this use
of rights, the UNFPA official offered the following observation:
In Cuba, you are going to find—it’s something you have to keep in mind—you are
going to find the word “rights” very seldom used…We know that [Cuba] is a country
that has guaranteed rights like no other. A right to education, a right to health. That is
to say, Cubans feel assured. It wouldn’t occur to me to think that I don’t have a right to
health services because I have had them since I was born…But you'll find little
explicitly about that, perhaps, in the media…When I think in reality, Cuba has had its
[family planning] services based in rights since the beginning. With their limitations,
obviously. (Female participant, UNFPA Cuba, November 2015, translated by author.)
Here, the suggestion is that, although the UN was still focused on population and development, Cuban
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family planning was always implicitly understood as a rights issue. Although it is plausible that rights
frames were not explicitly used in domestic contexts because they were taken as a given, in this case,
we might still expect to see Cuba calling for the right to family planning internationally. This is
particularly true since, in the 1970s, the UN itself very occasionally uses rights frames. Thus,
mentioning rights would not be in conflict with the UN understanding. However, although the UN
delegate at Bucharest speaks of a “guarantee” to contraception, this is the closest Cuba comes to
expressing a right to family planning. Although it is a strong argument and one that will be later
incorporated at the UN, dissent to population control because it violates an individual right to
determine fertility is not employed.
Domestically, there is no activity on family planning discussed in Castro’s speeches in the
1970s, but media coverage increases sharply, with 23 articles on family planning during this decade. As
Figure 5.2 illustrates, in 1970 and 1972 there is non-dissenting use of population and development
frames; however, most use of these frames in the early 1970s, especially around the time of the 1974
conference, is focused on dissent. Between 1970 and 1975, about 50-65% of the framing language
revolves around first generation frames, but 77% is of this use is dissenting. Thus, in the early 1970s,
Cuban media is making a shift away from positive/neutral first generation framing and is also aligning
with Cuba’s international dissenting framing activity. Nevertheless, the beginning of a broader
trending in media framing can be seen in 1976, when the media drops first generation frames
altogether. In the late 1970s, the popular discourse frames are divided between women, and a slightly
heavier use of health frames. By contrast, rights framing appears only once, in 1974. Over time, this
reliance on women and health framing becomes the norm, as later sections will discuss in detail.
From the FMC, Mujeres magazine published its first article on family planning in 1972. The
articles from the 1970s are all published in the magazine’s popular “Health Debates” section, which
were specifically designed to promote health education among Cuban women (Justice Ministry 1977,
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38). The content of these early articles tends to be heavily informational, focusing on explaining
varying types of contraception, their use, and the pros and cons of various methods. As the coding for
Mujeres shows in Figure 5.4, women and health framing dominate the discussion, with health having an
edge until the late 1970s. The FMC official I interviewed discussed how participation in the 1975 UN
Global Women’s Conference in Mexico City catalyzed the FMC’s support for family
planning—leading to the organization’s initiation of a wide scale sex education campaign and greater
collaboration with UNFPA, the IPPF, and the Ministry of Health in the creation of family planning
consult centers—because the conference’s Plan of Action called for attention to ‘women’s
reproductive health and reproductive rights’ (female participant, November 2015). Although rights
frames were certainly employed at that conference, as the analysis in Chapter 4 shows, it was not a
prominent framing strategy. In addition, rights frames are not employed in the FMC’s Mujeres in the
1970s. Thus, I probed the participant’s use of the phrase “reproductive rights”, questioning whether
she thought the organization had been developing an understanding of family planning as a human
right as early as the 1970s. Similarly to the UNFPA official, she responded:
In Cuba this term "reproductive rights" was hardly used, but in addressing the issue of
family planning and women’s reproductive health, women’s rights were always
emphasized. The right to decide how many and when to have a child; the right to
receive the information required to make decisions; the right of recourse to abortion;
the right to have access to contraceptives. This does not mean, however, that these
rights have resulted in appropriate services. There were, and there are, gaps in
production and a lack of products, or the products didn’t have, or don’t have, the
required quality. (Female participant, November 2015, translated by author.)
Again, there is the assertion that a right to determine fertility was always part of the Cuban (and
FMC’s) understanding of family planning, and that this understanding was fostered by the relationship
with the UN. Nevertheless, the only evidence of rights-based language is coming from the UN itself
and not from within the FMC.
An alternative explanation for the lack of human rights frames was offered in an interview with
a Cuban doctor who began medical practice in the early 1970s. The doctor began with the following
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story:
A woman, 45 years old, came and requested a delivery with me. It was her 18th baby, so
the highest risk for delivery. We were 37 kilometers from [the city], where the maternal
hospital was. I had less obstetric experience, less knowledge of instruments, because
I’m a GP trained in internal medicine and pediatrics. I told her it was impossible. The
risk was too high for her, and the risk was too high to me. There was no ambulance. I
sent her with a note to look for sterilization after the birth, and she was sterilized. At
the time, there was a policy for the sterilization of women with a lot of babies. This was
specifically in order to reduce maternal and infant mortality. Cancer and other diseases
were ignored, but we were to reduce infant and maternal mortality at any cost. (Male
doctor, September 2015.)
When asked about this sterilization policy, we had the following exchange:
-[Officials would say that] Cuba was reducing the birth rate because the Cuban people
were developing, and [family planning] was an option that they had, and they were
doing this because they had this option, and they were more cultural and informed. But
in the practice, they were compulsorily inducing the abortions and contraception and
sterilizations.
-How was this enforced?
-The physician, talking with the women, would try to convince the woman that it was
the important thing because she was sick, or had some diseases, or was high risk, and
that she could increase the infant mortality.
-And what if the woman disagreed?
-They tried to convince the woman, they say, if you don’t use some method, you will
make some children die, and they confused the women to be subject of the method of
abortion or contraception or sterilization…Look, if you don’t understand that the
Cuban government is giving you the food on a ration card, giving you medicine in a
ration card, giving you everything because they don't let you have this in a free way, you
have to receive that from them…[the government is] the only owner that is in the
country, and the doctor is representing the only owner of the country, that is Fidel
Castro. And then they are saying that the Revolution, and Cuba, and the Ministry of
Public Health, and the problem of the reduction of the problem of infant mortality
needs that you do this, you are obliged, because you are receiving everything,
supposedly for free. … Because you will receive the health care for that baby from that
doctor, and you are obliged to cooperate with that doctor. If you don’t go, and you
have the baby, that doctor could be not very happy with your pregnancy and could be
dangerous for you. Because you don't have any other option, you don't have private
options, you have those that the state is giving you supposedly for free…And the
doctor is not free to do what he wants, he is a tool of social control. (Male doctor,
September 2015).
Chronologically speaking, this is the first of several interviews suggesting that a female right to
reproductive freedom is being compromised by a state drive to avoid or eliminate high risk
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pregnancies and thereby reduce infant and maternal mortality. However, unlike many countries where
coercive tactics were employed in the name of population control, the individuals I interviewed reject
the notion that these policies in Cuba were intended to halt population growth. Rather, the doctors
repeatedly note that a shrinking population has posed a greater challenge to the government, and that
with regard to family planning, maternal and infant mortality rates were the central element of
concern; reducing these rates was one of the most important health goals in the entire nation. Cuba’s
pervasive health framing of family planning is consistent with this analysis. However, this particular
doctor also has an alternative explanation for the motive behind these healthcare priorities:
Because of JFK’s ‘plan for progress in the Americas’ [the Alliance for Progress], which
was pushing for democracy in Latin America and giving money to governments who
pushed this US plan, Castro had to respond with his own figures. And then Lenin
mandated that “the first thing of a socialist country is health”. So it was not because
Cuba was more humane [that it cared about maternal or infant mortality]. Political
deaths abounded. There were lots of political executions without trial…[reducing
infant and maternal morality] were political goals, not humanitarian goals. (Male
doctor, September 2015)
The statement from this doctor offers one explanation for Cuba’s desire to engage the UN while
pursuing a strategy of moderated dissent and tactful divergence—namely, defending the socialist
political strategy pursued by Cuba in the face of pressure to democratize.
It is clear from each of these excerpts the doctor interviewed here is an outspoken critic of the
Castro regime, as are many (although not all) of the Miami exiles. Thus, many of the explanations
offered here should be evaluated with this knowledge in mind. This critical perspective is also useful,
however, because, for example, we can be fairly certain that if Cuba had been involved in a project of
population control, these doctors would likely be forthcoming with that information. Thus, I can
assert with some confidence that Cuba’s rejection of population and development framing in relation
to family planning is genuine. Moreover, even population control advocates would agree that Cuba did
not have a ‘population problem’. Before the revolution, private means of obtaining contraception
contributed to comparatively low fertility rates relative to the region (Díaz-Briquets and Pérez 1982,
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515). In addition, large waves of emigration——first during the Great Depression and then again after
the revolution—have had a substantial influence on limiting the island’s overall population growth
(IPPF 1980, 1). Furthermore, the island itself was not densely populated and did not suffer from
resource shortages. Thus, interest in family planning is unlikely to have resulted from a desire to reduce
fertility, but makes more sense as a strategy to boost Cuba’s healthcare reputation.
As far as the actually availability of contraception in the 1970s is concerned, this doctor and the
FMC official both affirm that the nylon ring IUDs and condoms were freely available, and that
abortions—and especially early term ‘menstrual regulations’—were also common. Thus, although
method choices remained limited, in the 1970s, the basic provision of family planning services was
being realized. One impetus driving the provision of these services seems to be a concern for health
indicators, balanced with perhaps a genuine (and perhaps an occasionally paternalistic) concern for
women’s health. Whether any meaningful conceptualization of human rights is occurring in the 1970s
is an issue that seems doubtful.

The 1980s: A Human Rights Paradox
At the 1984 UN World Population Conference in Mexico City, Cuba’s perspective is again
offered in a joint statement with other socialist nations. Thus, the 1984 proportions of frame use,
shown in Figure 5.1, are most directly comparable to the 1974a coding. Here, we see a combination of
very high first generation frame use and increased first generation frame dissent. Use of first
generation frames is similar to 1974, at about 95%—compared to about 75% in the general conference
use of first generation frames, which had begun to decline in the 1980s—and about 30% of that is
dissenting. Although the use of rights frames makes its first (very marginal) appearance, women’s
frames are still absent, and there is no push to replace first generation frames with new framing
strategies. Thus, it cannot be argued that Cuba is taking advantage of the opening space for second
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generation frames at the UN or pushing the envelope in terms of introducing new frames, but rather is
still pursuing the same strategies of tactful divergence from first generation frames.
In the domestic media, there is a heavier reliance on second generation frames in the 1980s,
and less emphasis on first generation frames, dissenting or otherwise. Overall, there is a small spike
(about 20%) of population and development framing surrounding the 1984 conference, but only
minor dissent to development frames. The rest of the decade is characterized by nearly exclusive
reliance on second generation framing, and we also see the most substantial reliance on rights framing
during this period. The articles discussing family planning as a reproductive right are largely from
Bohemia and are often contributions by various government ministry figures, including Lajonchere.
Thus, to some extent, this focus on rights is being initiated within the government and being diffused
outward through the media. However, this observation is a bit paradoxical when compared to actual
program implementation, as discussed below.
The FMC’s framing in Mujeres likewise introduces rights framing in this decade, but only briefly
in 1988, and otherwise continues its pervasive focus on women and health framing. In a 1985 FMC
publication entitled Cuban Women and Public Health, the FMC further details its understanding of its role
in family planning. The publication details how, through both Mujeres and the National Working-group
on Sexual Education (GNTES),36 the FMC seeks to “prepare new generations for relationships, love,
marriage, and family, under conditions of equality between men and women” (Martinez 1985, 8,
translated by author). The focus throughout this bulletin is on improving women’s welfare and health,
and with regard to family planning, and the FMC sees its role as establishing ‘education, orientation,
and assistance measures’ that “help the couple to plan the opportune number of desired children, as
well as the right moment of their birth” (Martinez 1985, 8, translated by author). Newspaper
interviews with FMC president Vilma Espin in both 1984 and 1987 also stress the promotion of
36

This later becomes the National Center for Sexual Education (CENESEX).
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women’s equality in conjunction with the provision of family planning services, but in these there is
also a central and explicit rights-based dialog. In the 1984 interview, Espin stresses the importance of
education, asserting that “in order for every couple to be able to exercise the fundamental human right
to decide whether or not to have a child, we are obligated to educate them, to give them guidance on
the mechanisms of human reproduction and the contraception possibilities that permit the avoidance
of an inopportune pregnancy” (Espin 1990, 57, translated by author). In this statement, the FMC’s
educational contributions to the promotion family planning are thus constructed as part of a
commitment to reproductive rights. In the 1987 interview, Espin notes that it was Cuba’s commitment
to these rights that made the nation a key contributor at both the 1974 and 1984 UN World Population
Conferences (Espin 1990, 169). This is an interesting perspective, given the lack of discussion of
human rights by Cuba in these venues, but it nevertheless demonstrates that by the mid- to late-1980s,
the head of the FMC is familiar with rights-based frames and is expressing a desire to make them a
central part of family planning dialogues. Moreover, in a 1989 analysis of Cuba’s progress on family
planning goals established at the 1984 UN women’s conference, the FMC again recognizes this
‘fundamental human right’, which, although connected to a discussion about other health programs is
not necessarily connected to the right to health care, but which is rather recognized an independent
right to determine fertility (FMC 1989, 41). However, this framing language is not generally reflected in
more far-reaching FMC debates in Mujeres, and a further example of the FMC’s inattention to
reproductive rights is discussed below. A final critical observation can be drawn from this 1989 report.
The report is structured around quotes from the UN conference resolutions, followed by measures
taken in Cuba to achieve UN goals, and the title of the report itself is “diffusion and evaluation of
Nairobi’s strategies to forward the advancement of women”. Thus, it can be concluded that the FMC
sees the UN as the international agenda setting venue, but it is also careful to point out where these
priorities align with domestic activities that Cuba has been pursuing since the 1960s. Generally, the
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goal of the publication seems to be to demonstrate Cuba’s natural alignment with UN norms
promoting women, health, and rights, while also recognizing the UN’s work in promoting and
diffusing these priorities.
Although official-level framing shifts considerably in the 1980s, Castro himself does not
employ rights frames in the discussion of family planning. Instead, as shown in Figure 5.3, his speech
in 1985 relies on health frames less than 20% of the time and otherwise focuses on population and
development framing, largely with dissent. This is in stark contrast to his 1987 speech, which closely
mirrors the UN framing a decade earlier. Here, there is no dissent to first generation frames, which
account for over 90% of the speech’s frame use. This speech marks a permanent break with dissenting
frame use; however, framing here lags behind the transitions to second generation frames being
initiated in other domestic and international venues. Overall, the shift in tone between the two
speeches is perhaps partially explained by the audience. In 1985, Castro is addressing the Latin
American and Caribbean Trade Union Conference on Foreign Debt, while the 1987 speech addresses
an international student conference. Although both speeches target a mix of domestic and
international participants in Havana, the more political trade union speech is more critical of outside
political trends than is the future-building speech to the students. In either case, however, it is clear
that Castro is not at the forefront of establishing new frame narratives on family planning.
In practice, little seems to have changed in the 1980s in terms of service availability. Both
doctors and women that I interviewed discussed the difficulty of obtaining methods other than widely
available condoms or nylon rings, which seems to be due to resource shortages. As one woman noted,
“the most used [method in the 1980s] was the ring. It was the easiest to get. Then, the T was not easy
to get. For the T, you had to have a friendship with a doctor, and if the doctor was a friend of yours,
they would find you one” (female participant, October 2015, translated by author). Because T-shaped
IUDs were made of copper, they were more effective, but also more expensive. Similarly, the pill was
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also hard to find, and one doctor suspects a discrepancy in the official versus unofficial reason for their
absence, stating: “in [about] 1979, the government said that it didn’t endorse the use of contraceptive
pills because they were suspicious of the ethics of the pills. So Cuba was not using them. Really, they
weren’t suspicious of the pills. They didn’t have them because there was no money” (male doctor,
September 2015). Ongoing accounts of reproductive rights violations support the claim that these
concerns were based more on economics than ethics. In addition to the pressures for abortions and
sterilizations, a number of stories began to surface from this period of IUDs being inserted after an
abortion, without the knowledge or consent of the female patient. One middle-class woman (an
accountant) I interviewed described her first-hand experience as follows:
I got pregnant while using the ring. What happened was, I had an abortion, and during
that abortion, they put in a ring, right there. During the same procedure, they put in a
ring. I didn’t ask for it. I don’t remember having asked for it. I didn’t think I had
anything in there, but later when they gave me an exam, they told me I had one. The
thing was, I was always someone with a very regular period, every 28 days, always,
always. And what happened was, after they put in the ring, I didn’t have a period, and
to me that signaled that I was pregnant. So I went to the doctor—a very good doctor in
Cienfuegos—and he told me that he was sure I wasn’t pregnant, because I had a ring
in, and so I wasn’t pregnant. But he was wrong! I was pregnant, and that’s the child I
had, who is now 29. (female participant, October 2015, translated by author).37
There are no official statistics on the pervasiveness of this practice, but in the course of my interviews,
similar stories were recounted by five unrelated sources. One doctor described the motives and
frequency of these practices, saying:
If I do this to a women, I don’t have to defend myself to anyone, because in Cuba there
is no right to informed consent. And these were not just a few cases, but it also wasn’t
an [officially] established policy either. It was really a way for doctors to protect
themselves, because the doctors are the ones who are responsible for infant mortality
rates. If a baby dies in its first year, the doctor involved is questioned by all levels of the
Ministry of Health, by the government, and many times they will have problems.
Serious problems, like prison or invalidation of their medical license. Anyone who
affects the maternal and infant program is questioned from head to toe, and nobody
wants that. (Male doctor, November 2015, translated by author.)
It is worth noting that this participant cites economic (rather than political) reasons for her emigration from
Cuba, and that the tone of this interview was not critical of the regime. She praised most aspects of the Cuban
healthcare system and also communicated several favorable maternal healthcare experiences.
37
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As with pressure for abortions and sterilizations, the forces driving this process appear to be a
top-down concern with lowering infant and maternal rates, but this explanation suggests that the
Cuban government does not explicitly support policies that violate reproductive rights (as has certainly
been the case in other nations). Rather, political pressure led to a system wherein support for
reproductive rights is subordinated in the pursuit of other political or health goals, and where violating
these rights is not punished. I noticed a similar lack of concern over rights violations in responses in
Mujeres to questions from women who had been sterilized without realizing (or having been informed)
that the process is permanent.38 In one, a woman hopes for another child despite having “submitted”
to sterilization after her third Cesarean birth, at age 21. Here, the magazine expresses no concern that
her right to informed consent may have been violated, but rather advises that a pregnancy in anyone
who has had three C-sections would constitute too much of a health risk anyway. Thus, once again,
maternal health indicators are prioritized.
A final development in family planning programming in the 1980s that deserves attention is
the shift in attention to condoms. As mentioned previously, condoms, although available, were
unpopular in Cuba, and “the word condom was, until the end of the 1980s, a ‘prohibited’ word, a word
that decent people did not use” (interview with a Cuban sex educator, November 2015, translated by
author). However, with the onset of the AIDS epidemic, the Ministry of Public Health recognized the
need to increase condom use, and relied on IPPF to supply new, higher quality products. Media
attention to condom use also increased. For example, in February 1988, Mujeres ran its first article
promoting condom use in order to prevent STDs. This is the beginning of turn toward emphasizing
condoms as the birth control of choice for young people because of the added benefit of STD
protection, and more generally, a norms shift making condoms a more accepted method.

The 1990s: Toward Frame Harmonization
38

See Mujeres June 1984, pp. 46; May 1989, pp. 49
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Across the 1990s, Cuban framing in both international and domestic venues continued to
shift, reaching greater harmony with, and less dissent to, international movement frames. At the UN
meeting in Cairo in 1994, shown in Figure 5.1, Cuba’s population frames drop to less than 10% of total
frame usage, and nearly all of this usage is dissenting. Here, Cuba appears ahead of the international
trend in dropping population frames, but overall, Cuba employs more first generation framing than
the UN as a whole—just under 70% compared to the UN’s 50%. Most of this is attributable to both
neutral and dissenting use of development frames, which claim the largest percentage of frame use
overall. However, we also see a marked increase in women’s framing, which reaches 15% in 1994, as
does health framing. Additionally, rights frames continue to be employed, although at a very low level.
One factor that is almost certainly driving this framing shift is Cuba’s choice of delegate for the Cairo
meeting, which is none other than the FMC’s Vilma Espin. In and of itself, the selection of Espin is
significant as the decision to send an NGO activist deviates from the selection medical doctors and
public health ministers, like Lejonchere in 1965 and Gutiérrez Muñiz in 1974, and an increase in
attention to women’s welfare would be expected from this actor. Overall, her participation is reflective
of the more inclusive nature of the Cairo conference, as discussed in Chapter 4, and framing tactics
reflect the inclusion of these new perspectives.
This trend toward less dissent continues at the 1999 UN meeting in New York in the statement
from the Vice Minister of Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation. Here, despite similar levels
of first generation frame use hovering around 65%, only about 25% of this is dissenting. Meanwhile,
rights frames increase slightly, while women’s frames decrease slightly, and health framing remains
fairly constant. Combined, however, second generation frames are still the minority at the end of the
1990s and still trailing behind the international movement in their shift.
In the media, there are two distinct spikes in first generation framing around both the 1994 and
1999 UN meetings, shown in Figure 5.2, which account for about one-third of frame use during those
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periods. Although there is a mix of neutral and dissenting framing in the early 1990s, in 1999, all use of
second generation frames is in dissent. However, this use is overshadowed by the focus on second
generation frames. As with the international movement as a whole, in the Cuban media, health framing
is becoming more clearly established as the dominant framing tactic. At the same time, rights frames
are used only sporadically, and women’s frames also decline. Some of this decline in women’s frames is
likely explained by the 1993 disappearance of Mujeres and its somewhat more woman-heavy framing;
however, women’s frames do not make a consistent comeback even once all media venues resume in
the 2000s, so this explanation is likely only accounting for part of the shift.
With the early 1990s decline of Mujeres, there are only two available FMC publications in this
decade that discuss family planning. The first is a 1995 report detailing the organization’s “realities and
challenges”. Here, the FMC includes several pages detailing progress on sexual and reproductive
health issues, and highlights the organization’s work promoting family planning education. Most of
this work is discussed in terms of promoting women’s welfare and health, and the organization states
that, “since 1959, all action inherent to family planning has been developed on a foundation of criteria
for diminishing maternal-infant risk and supporting the free exercise of women’s equality on the
principle of the free decision of the couple (or of the woman) over reproduction” (FMC 1995a, 24,
translated by author). Here, there is an unambiguous link between family planning and the specific
goal of reducing infant and maternal mortality; however, in contrast to assertions found in the
interviewee testimonies, the FMC emphasizes the goal of promoting reproductive freedom and
women’s welfare in this process. Although the overarching focus is on women and health, there is also
a nod to first generation frames in the acknowledgment of development goals and the assertion that
these health programs will “allow human development and fullness of family” (FMC 1995a, 25,
translated by author). Finally, in this report, there is also a single, explicit use of the term “reproductive
rights”, but in reference to abortion rather than contraception. The 1995 FMC congress report also
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briefly discusses family planning, and links this discussion to a broader overview of sex education
programs39 and the UN conference at Cairo. In the report, the FMC contends that, since 1962, their
organization has pursued “the establishment and promotion of family planning methods and the
legalization of abortion as a right of the family and, in first place, of the woman” (FMC 1995b, 45). Of
course, the FMC’s construction of family planning as a rights-based issue in the 1960s and 1970s is not
well supported by my analysis of those periods, and was not part of Cuba’s advocacy strategy at those
early UN population conferences, but the FMC nevertheless expresses mild concern that it has taken
the UN 30 years to come around to this way of thinking. Although this section of the report relies
mostly on second generation frames, there is also one of the clearest examples of non-dissenting use of
first generation framing in the FMC’s assertion that “it was made clear at Cairo that without the
presence of the woman [in development plans], there is no possibility of slowing the highly
preoccupying advance of planetary over-population” (FMC 1995b, 45, translated by author). Overall,
then, although the FMC focuses on second generation frame use, there is still a clear affinity for
international population and development concerns.
In the 1990s, Castro discusses family planning in 2 speeches at the end of the decade. In 1998,
his framing strategies very much resemble those used in 1987, with no dissent, and heavy use of first
generation frames. Health framing has increased to about 20% of total frame usage, but women and
rights frames are absent from this dialog. The family planning-related content in this speech is brief—2
short paragraphs—and is brought up in the context of a discussion about sustainable development
and the economic pressures related to family size. As Figure 5.3 illustrates, compared to his speeches in
the 1960s, Castro takes a different tone when discussing population and development. For example,
he asserts “the rich do not multiply, they have one child, two at most, or none, and maintain a balanced
population. The poor have not been able to go to school, and they have not been able to become
Sex education programs are discussed in other congresses, and yet these discussions fail to include references
to family planning.
39
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aware of these problems” (Castro 1998, translated by author). Thus, a poverty-driven lack of education
is cited as the source of population growth, and he similarly expresses the need to increase education
around family planning, which is large departure from his perspective three decades earlier. Here, it is
important to note that he is addressing problems that he identifies outside of Cuba. The 1999 speech
reflects an even more abrupt shift in framing tactics, where first generation frames are dropped
altogether, and health becomes the primary focus. Again, however, the theme of this speech is
education, as Castro emphasizes that individuals must have “sufficient education and social
responsibility” to protect against STDs and unwanted pregnancies (Castro 1999, translated by author).
In contrast to the previous speech, HIV/AIDS, STDs, and high abortion rates are all problems that
Castro sees as affecting Cuba domestically. Thus, within Cuba, family planning is a tool for addressing
women’s welfare and health, while outside, it may still be applied to population and development
issues.
From the perspective of women and doctors I interviewed, the economic crisis of the 1990s,
or ‘special period’, wrought changes in family planning services in Cuba. At the most basic level, there
was a shortage of contraceptive supplies, but it is hard to pinpoint exactly how grave this shortage was.
On one hand, domestic funding for family planning services and education programs may have
diminished, but in the early 1990s, UNFPA’s involvement in Cuba increased with the opening of a
formal office in Havana and renewed monetary support (female participant, UNFPA Cuba,
November 2015). In 1992, Granma reported on UNFPA’s construction of a contraceptive pill factory
in Havana that would have the capacity to produce 250 million pills per year (Granma 1992, March). In
addition, Granma reported an $800,000 grant from UNFPA for family planning in 1992, and in 1994
Bohemia reports that between 1990 and 1994, UNFPA invested $4 million in Cuba family planning
programs (Granma 1992, May; Bohemia 1994, B7). Correspondingly, two interview participants—one
woman and one doctor—noted the availability of the pills in the 1990s. However, this availability
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seems to be far from uniform, and as one would expect, areas outside of the capital were hit the
hardest. A younger doctor who practiced medicine between 2001 and 2014 in both Havana and Las
Tunas, a small landlocked city 400 miles east of Havana, describes the situation in the 1990s as follows:
There was a period in which they were trying to organize [about] 17 health programs,
and sometimes, [family planning] was not a priority…The desire, the directive to focus
on family planning—there is a political desire. The problem was the economic
situation. Some of the programs deteriorated, including this one, and they had a hard
time trying to focus resources on the whole population. [Between Las Tunas and
Havana] there are differences in resources. The capital has most of the resources and
most of the information about their access…Those that are less socially developed
have less access to services. These are the places that suffered the most. (Male doctor,
October 2015, translated by author).
Even in the capital, however, resources were not guaranteed. As a doctor who practiced in Havana in
the late 1990s noted regarding condoms, “sometimes they are there in the pharmacy, and sometimes
they aren’t. It’s like everything, sometimes it’s in the store, and sometimes it’s not” (Male doctor,
November 2015, translated by author). These observations are also reflected in the experiences of the
women I interviewed. The middle-class woman from a city in Villa Clara province who spoke of
needing connections to get a T obtained one in 1989 and kept it throughout the 1990s, and had friends
who reportedly had no issue obtaining pills. By contrast, a tobacco factory worker from a tiny village in
Villa Clara describes much greater obstacles to service access. She explained,
For a woman who wants to avoid a pregnancy in Cuba, it is very difficult in the sense
that in the pharmacy, there is a lack of appropriate medications for that end. They
don’t exist, or they exist in very little quantities. Many years ago…there were also rings
or loops…But these have been used less because they also don’t exist. Instead, the
practice that we’ve used the most in recent years is abortion…It’s the most practical
method of those that exist, the most convenient. (Female participant, October 2015,
translated by author.)
It is not a secret that Cuba has one of the highest abortion rates in the world. In 1998, Bohemia reported
that there were about 9 abortions for every 10 live births in Cuba. Doctors I interviewed cite abortion
rates that averaged from 6 to 8 per woman, and the participant above describes long lines (of mostly

-125-

adolescents) that form outside of clinics.40 A joint publication from UNFPA and the FMC reports an
abortion rate that climbed from 36 per 1000 women in 1970, to 42 in 1980, to 46 in 1990 (FMC and
UNFPA 2010, 63).41 This is the case despite Castro’s expressed concern over abortion rates and the
prevalence of media articles that affirm a woman’s right to abortion, but repeatedly note that abortion
should be a final recourse of action and never used in place of effective contraception. When I asked
doctors why abortion rates were so high, they cited a mix of reasons—most commonly poor sex
education, but also ambivalence, convenience, ‘abortion culture’,42 and pressure to abort high risk
pregnancies—but generally do not point to contraceptive access problems. From the interviews, it
seems that this may be because contraception of one type or another was almost always freely available
to anyone with the means and motivation to pursue it. However, the reality is that ease of access to
information and services varied in the 1990s, and family planning did not rank highly in the list of
health sector priorities.

The 2000s: Convergence on Health Frames
In the absence of UN population conferences and speeches from Castro on family planning in
this decade, my analysis focuses here on media treatment, FMC framing, and street-level perspectives
on family planning. In the media, the shift to second generation frames is almost absolute. Only two
articles in 2003 employ population and development framing in a discussion of UNFPA’s activities
and World Population Day, and there is no dissent in this framing. As in the New York Times, health
framing has become the most prevalent tactic, but Cuba’s near-exclusive reliance on these frames is

See also AZAM "Plenty of Romance but Too Few Babies Means a Demographic Crisis for Cuba." The New
York Times. (October 28, 2015 Wednesday ): 1441 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed:
2016/01/29.
41 For comparison, the global rate in 1995 was about 35 per 1000 women.
(https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/Sedgh-Lancet-2012-01.pdf)
42 For a recent study exploring “abortion culture” and the factors driving abortion rates in Cuba, see Bélanger,
Danièle, and Andrea Flynn. 2009. The persistence of induced abortion in Cuba: Exploring the notion of an
"abortion culture". Studies in Family Planning 40 (1): 13-26. Critically, these authors do not cite a lack of service
access as a factor and note high contraceptive prevalence rates.
40
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more dramatic than the international movement’s shift. Interestingly, women’s welfare frames are
used sporadically and infrequently, and rights frames appear only in a spike from 2003 to 2005.
Although rights framing appears in only a few articles, the topic of each article is explicitly focused on
rights, and rights framing has spread for the first time in this decade to the teen magazine Somos Jovenes,
in an article titled “We Have Sexual Rights”. Here, varied media venues are taking a more direct
approach to talking about rights, and this corresponds with the UNFPA-Cuba interview participant’s
claim that “we have to improve people’s knowledge about the rights they have, and I think this has
been changing recently—that today the Cuban population knows more about this” (Female
participant, UNFPA Cuba, November 2015, translated by author). This increase in knowledge may be
accompanied by changes in service provision, as discussed below.
Although there are few insights that can be drawn from Mujeres in this decade—only one
article, which exclusively relies on health frames, was located—there are two statements from the
FMC to the UN in the 2000s that illustrate framing strategies being forwarded by the FMC in the
international arena. Although FMC members previously participated in UN conferences, these are the
first statements from the organization itself that discuss family planning in these forums. The first, in
2004, is to the Human Rights Commission, and although the whole document is rights-focused,
reference to family planning appears in a paragraph discussing women’s health care as a human right
(FMC 2004). The second, from 2010 to the Human Rights Council, mentions the scope of the Cuban
family planning program in a section focused on more general health achievements. Thus, in its
international activism, the FMC is relying on second generation frames, and health frames in
particular. A similar trend is demonstrated in the organization’s domestic activism. Besides Mujeres, a
2010 publication by the FMC discusses contraceptive use, failure rates, and resulting abortions among
adolescents strictly through health frames. However, given the decline of Mujeres articles discussing
family planning and the fact that the FMC often discusses women’s and sexual health at length—for
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example, in its 2009 Congress—without mentioning family planning, it seems that advocacy around
this issue is less of a priority. As in the international movement as a whole, following the burst in
activity around Cairo, overall advocacy attention to family planning in Cuba appears to have decreased
somewhat in the 2000s.
A decrease in advocacy does not necessarily correspond to a decrease in service provision, and
if anything, family planning services seem to be on the rebound in Cuba. According to interviews with
doctors and women who most recently departed the island, street-level service provision has improved
since the ‘special period’. A recently departed professional from Havana described how anyone can go
to the doctor now for an IUD, or buy pills in the pharmacy (Female participant, August 2016). A
young doctor who worked in Havana in the late 2000s told me that although many social programs in
Cuba ‘don’t work’, in her experience, family planning is one of the programs that is well run and
contraception is widely available (Female doctor, October 2015). In her opinion, the current problems
result from a lack of information and the censorship of the internet in Cuba. As she observed:
The information for everything in Cuba is limited. I give the answers to you from what
I know in the medical field, but then I remember that what I know in the medical field
and in my case is not the same thing as everyone else. Because I have access, I have my
books, I had internet in Cuba. But mostly other people in Cuba don’t have access to
that information…You need to know what AIDS is, you need to know what a
pregnancy is, you need to know what is everything in order to avoid it…Because when
you have a 15 year old girl that gets to your consult having chlamydia, having
gonorrhea, and also being pregnant, and you say, Where were the parents? What does
she know? And actually when I’m questioning her, she doesn’t know anything…If
people had the information on all that they should, it would be better...There are some
days that I’ve gone to the pharmacy in Cuba with 10 Cuban pesos, that is around 50
cents, and I bought like 30 condoms and 2 packs of pills. So it’s not even expensive, it’s
not that you can’t go and find it, and the point is that there isn’t a lot of
information...It’s a good program, but what we have to do is get people informed
about it. (Female doctor, October 2015.)
Thus, despite official claims that sex education is a priority, it is not clear that this education is being
realized, even in more developed regions. Describing her high school experience with sex education in
Cienfuegos city in the early 2000s, one woman explained, “our discussions were more disease-focused
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than pregnancy-focused. A lot of focus on STDs and HIV/AIDS—how to prevent it, how it’s
transferred, and about condom use, with demonstration on how to use condoms. But it was all more
theoretical than practical--there was no information about treatment if you got an STD. Pregnancy
was not really mentioned” (Female participant, October 2015). In addition, the quality of the
information being conveyed varies depending on the interest-level of the district’s official ‘health
promoters’—the volunteers responsible for teaching sex education (Male doctor, November 2015).
Overall, it is the privileged populations who are most likely to have the information required to access
family planning services, and adolescents are particularly vulnerable to lapses in educational offerings.
However, beyond basic service provision, doctors and women also expressed interesting
sentiments about more macro-level cultural and economic conditions that affect the practice of family
planning. As the tobacco factory worker explained, “planning like what I’ve seen here—‘in two years
we’ll have a child’—that culture doesn’t exist in Cuba” (Female participant, October 2015, translated
by author). The young doctor elaborated, noting that, “from the point of view of the doctors’ office,
yeah, people have access there. It’s not like here that you have a few barriers to get to see a
doctor…But before that, and after that, people in Cuba don’t have what they need to have--I mean, it’s
not like you can plan your whole life, like you can get to have your house, or the things that you need
for raising your child. And it’s not like you can be completely responsible because you have all the
means” (Female doctor, October 2015). Another doctor, who worked in Havana in the early 2000s
echoed this sentiment, stating:
The whole family planning situation is a reaction to the socio-political-economic
situation...to the inability to plan for life, to say ‘in 5 years I’ll finish my schooling, buy
a house, and in 6 years we’ll have a baby’…Here, any couple can have a house…a car,
diapers, baby food, milk. There, no…And another important aspect is among the
youth, the most widespread desire is to leave the country. And when you are hoping to
leave the country, you aren’t thinking about giving birth. (Male doctor, November
2015, translated by author).
From these accounts, it seems clear that family planning, in the narrowest sense, is available in Cuba
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in this decade. However, what is lacking is a broader ability to effectively plan for family life, and for
that reason, all of the doctors roundly rejected Cuba’s 1994 claim at Cairo that the nation has pursued
“a comprehensive approach to development that provides for interlinking economic and social
aspects to the benefit of all people” (Espin 1994). Cubans have small families—the birth rate in the
2000s was about 1.5 children per woman—and they have the means to prevent births, but the decision
to have fewer children is stemming from a position of economic hardship, rather than a truly
“comprehensive approach to reproductive health and rights adopted in Cuba” (Espin 1994).
Finally, according to the doctors, attention to mortality rates continues to be a chief concern
motivating family planning policy and still in the 2000s they note that “what interests the government
the most is that people classified as high risk avoid pregnancy” (Male doctor, November 2015,
translated by author). As even the young doctor observed, “with pregnant [women] and with little
children under 28 days old, if you mess with that, oh my God. That’s like the worst thing that you can
do in the medical field. It’s well protected and I’m happy it happens that way” (Female doctor,
October 2015). As a result, the rights violations mentioned in previous decades continue in the 2000s,
although perhaps with less frequency (Male doctor, November 2015, translated by author). Because
the practice of inserting IUDs without consent was an ‘unofficial policy’ and not a formal state
directive, increased attention to sexual rights in the public discourse may help to continue to drive this
shift.

Tracing Family Planning Frames
Establishing empirical measures of frame use by both the international and Cuban movement
across five decades and in multiple venues lays the foundation for an examination of diffusion and
convergence of framing tactics in family planning. As discussed in chapter three, I follow Kollman
(2007) by employing a timeline to visually organize key shifts in framing tactics, shown in Figure 5.5.
From this analysis, several key conclusions can be drawn.
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First, it is clear that the promotion of family planning occurs first at the international level, and
that Cuban attention to family planning began a few years later From this, I conclude that Cuba was
not a primary agenda setter on the topic of family planning.
Second, Cuban attention to family planning in the 1960s began by adopting frames being
diffused by the international movement. At the same time, there is limited use of women and health
frames and no conception of human rights framing in any Cuban venue. Dissent to these international
frames emerges in the late 1960s only in domestic contexts—beginning with Castro and later
appearing in the media—while international activity is characterized by increased collaboration and a
lack of dissent. Specifically, international interactions during this decade were characterized by Cuba’s
quiet participation at the 1965 UN conference and the simultaneously development of a congenial
relationship with international advocates, which led to the positive reception of Alan Guttmacher in
domestic Cuban venues. In the early (non-dissenting) use of population and development frames, the
lack of dissent in international contexts, and the development of non-confrontational relationships,
there is support for my first hypothesis, which predicts that during the international movement’s
incipiency and coalescence, international recognition and support of dissenting regimes requires frame
matching by the dissenting regime. However, the second part of this hypothesis, which predicts that
no relationship of support will develop during this phase, is clearly incorrect. Instead, at the end of the
1960s, we see the beginning of a two-level game, in which Cuba balances an understanding of and
conformity with international frames with dissenting tactics. During the 1960s, when the international
movement would be most sensitive to disruptions in the formation in a cohesive frame narrative, this
balance is achieved by simply refraining from dissent in the international sphere.
Third, when dissent does emerge in international venues in the 1970s, Cuba employs a strategy
of tactful divergence by equally balancing support for and dissent to international framing tactics.
Again, there is support for my second hypothesis that as the international movement institutionalizes,
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divergent framing tactics will appear. However, there is little evidence of an effort by Cuba to ‘push the
boundaries’ of alternative frame use and introduce new (second generation) frames. Rather, this
divergence materializes in an effort to criticize existing frames, and perhaps open a space for the later
insertion of new frames. At the same time in domestic venues, Cuba utilizes the second generation
frames—women’s welfare and health—that more closely match its own political and social priorities.
Domestically, this shift in framing occurs as Cuba is increasing efforts to provide widespread access to
family planning. First generation frames do not fit the Cuban rationale for promoting family planning,
and simply dissenting to this frame use does not provide justification for supporting the development
of family planning programs. Rather, a shifting focus to women’s and health frames during this decade
seems contextually appropriate and establishes a clear motivation for the need to expand services.
Fourth, by the 1980s and into the 1990s, it appears that Cuba is actually lagging behind in the
international arena in terms of making the shift to second generation frames. Again, rather than taking
advantage of the changing climate around family planning to campaign for women’s and health
priorities, Cuba continues to pursue high first generation frame use, coupled with decreasing levels of
dissent. Therefore, once again, we can conclude that second generation frame use in the international
movement is not being diffused by Cuba. Given that the shift to second generation frames occurred
very slowly within the international movement, and was more pronounced in some venues than
others, it is possible that it takes domestic regimes some time to recognize that a shift is underway and
to adjust frame strategies accordingly. Thus, we see Cuba finding less reason for dissent, but still not
taking advantage of new opportunities for frame matching—perhaps because, as my second
hypothesis predicts, this matching is less necessary to collaboration now that the international
movement is deeply institutionalized.
Domestically, the focus on women and health becomes more institutionalized across each venue
in the 1980s and 1990s, but the record on human rights is mixed. Despite some insistence that family
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planning has always been a rights issue in Cuba, this is not born out in the frame measures or
participant statements. It is possible this insistence stems from a longstanding Cuban emphasis on a
right to health care, and a tacit assumption that family planning is part of this right. However, a right to
health care and a right to determine fertility are two interconnected but distinct rights, and
recommendations for improving health outcomes may not always align with an individual’s desired
fertility outcomes. Thus, we see the violation of reproductive rights in an effort to improve maternal
and infant health indicators. Although recognition of a right to determine fertility emerges from the
FMC in the 1980s, there is also the assertion by FMC officials and publications that this frame is being
diffused by the international movement, and therefore, it is possible that it is being given lip-service,
but is not meaningfully employed in policy due to its conflict with other domestic health and social
goals. Thus, the international diffusion of reproductive rights in this period does not permeate actual
program implementation specifically because of an overwhelming focus on health outcomes.
Finally, by the 2000s, dissent disappears and the Cuban movement makes the shift to second
generation frames in all venues in both domestic and international contexts. Clearly, a reliance on
health and women’s frames has dominated FMC and Cuban media discussions of family planning
since the 1970s. However, both state-level framing and international-level framing from Cuba were
slow to follow this trend. According to diffusion theories, NGOs and the media act as more ready
pathways for diffusion, and seeing a closer parallel in framing between the international and domestic
movement in these venues—and particularly between groups that work together, as do the FMC,
IPPF, and UNFPA—is not surprising. As far as the direction of diffusion is concerned, multiple
sources from the FMC itself note that it sees the international movement as the agenda setter on
women and health issues. 43 However, the only frames that become widely diffused in domestic

With regard to the media, it seems highly unlikely that the New York Times is picking up on framing trends
within the Cuban media. By contrast, Cuban media often cites international sources, interviews international
family planning experts, and covers international conferences and events.
43
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contexts are those that match FMC goals and ideology; that is, women and health frames. In domestic
venues, the Cuban movement selectively employs the second generation frames that match its broader
political goals, while generally omitting explicit reference to the more problematic rights frames. In
international venues, Cuba initially responds to ideological mismatch not with the promotion of
alternative, domestically salient frames, but with dissent. However, when these first generation frames
begin to disappear from international dialogues, dissent to the use of these frames becomes a less
viable tactic, and as predicted by my third hypothesis, dissent is dropped and framing strategies begin
to harmonize around the use of women’s and health frames.

CONCLUSIONS
In drawing conclusions, it is helpful to revisit the core questions posed by my dissertation and
review the answers suggested by my analysis of the Cuban movement. They are as follows:
How do international and domestic actors negotiate the tension between divergent framing
tactics in both domestic and international venues?
As the literature predicts, the Cuban movement engages in selective fitting of outside ideas, or
domestication. This is evident in the adoption of women and health frames, for example, even when
domestic priorities may differ somewhat from international goals—i.e. the reduction of maternal and
infant mortality indicators. However, I find little evidence of the reverse process, global framing, where
movements match their own goals to outside frames. Cuba is not pressing the second generation
frames that it employs domestically within the international arena. Rather, I find an effort to balance
dissent to and support for dominant frames, which I have called tactful divergence. Here, dissenting
regimes acknowledge value in existing frames that they disagree with, while also challenging their use.
From the international movement’s side, we see the slow decline of these contested frames. Challenges
to first generation frames came from many different types of groups, and the movement responds by
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slowly incorporating a new framing strategy. However, while Cuba can be counted among the
challengers to first generation frames, it does not appear to have been influential in forwarding this
new strategy.
Does the international movement shift to accommodate these divergent frames, or do the
dissenting regimes themselves conform?
Initially, there is evidence of Cuba adopting population and development frames both
domestically and internationally without dissent. However, this brief conformity is replaced with
tactful divergence to first generation frames and the domestic adoption of second generation frames as
the international movement institutionalizes. In this process, we see accommodation by both
movements. For its part, Cuba dedicates a significant proportion of its activism to finding support for
first generation frames; dissent to these frames in the international arena is never greater that 50% of
total frame engagement. In turn, the international movement moves away from contested framing
strategies to frames that are more universally appealing.
Does prolonged engagement eventually lead to frame convergence?
In short, there is clear evidence of convergence. Both Cuba and the international movement
converge around second generation framing strategies, and health frames in particular. Dissent to old
frames has disappeared as their use internationally declines. Activist collaboration on family planning
remains strong, there is more agreement over movement goals, and there is even initial evidence to
support more consistent agreement with human rights framing. Thus, after decades of dissent and
disagreement, Cuban family planning framing and international movement framing bear a close
resemblance to one another.
In addressing these questions, the analysis here contributes to an enhanced understanding of
the politics of dissent and its influence on global activism and program development. Importantly, it
shows that by moderating dissent, regimes can simultaneously contest dominant norms and build
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cooperative partnerships with the international community. Over time, through continued
engagement and accommodation by both movements, movements can converge on less contested
framing strategies that harmonize in their pursuit of common goals.
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Chapter 5 Tables
Figure 5.1

Cuba Framing at the UN
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Figure 5.3

Castro Speech Framing
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Figure 5.4

FMC (Mujeres) Framing
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Chapter 5 Appendix 1: Interview Schedules
Below are the interview schedules used in my interviews with doctors, lay women, and NGO activists,
respectively. The schedules, as well as the interview protocol, were all reviewed and granted exemption
by the West Virginia University Institutional Review Board IRB.
Doctors
Interview Questions on Cuban Family Planning
This first set of questions is designed to gather basic information about your professional experience. (Estas primeras
preguntas están formuladas para recoger unos datos básicos sobre su experiencia profesional.)
During what years did you practice medicine in Cuba?
(¿Usted ejerció medicina en Cuba durante qué época?)
In which regions did you work?
(¿En qué regiones trabajó usted?)
What is your professional specialization?
(¿Cuál es su especialización profesional?)
In which types of medical settings have you worked (hospitals, rural clinics, etc.)?
(¿En qué clase de establecimiento medical trabajó usted (hospitales, clínicas rurales, etc.)?)
When did you leave Cuba?
(¿Cuando salió de Cuba?)
The following questions ask about your experiences with and knowledge of family planning in Cuba. (Las preguntas que
sigan preguntan por sus experiencias con y su conocimiento de la planificación familiar en Cuba.)
To what extent have you been professionally involved in providing family planning services or
counseling? What are your experiences in this area?
(¿En qué medida ha estado usted involucrado profesionalmente con la provisión de servicios o
consejos de la planificación familiar? ¿Cuáles son sus experiencias en este campo?)
I would like to discuss the principles or values that guide the provision of family planning services in
Cuba. Can you talk about your perception of the principles or values forwarded by the government (or
official policy) with respect to family planning?
(Quisiera hablar de los principios o los valores que guían la provisión de los servicios de la
planificación familiar en Cuba. ¿Puede hablar de su percepción de los principios o valores transmitidos
por el gobierno (la política oficial) con respeto a la planificación familiar?)
To what extent do these official values align with the provision of services that you have witnessed in
practice? Can you give me some examples?
(¿En qué medida alinean estos valores oficiales con la provisión de servicios que usted ha presenciado
en práctica? ¿Puede darme unos ejemplos?)
Below is part of an official statement on family planning submitted by Cuba to the UN in 1994. Can
you comment on how the actual implementation of family planning programs compares to the
principles outlined in this statement?
(A continuación se incluye parte de una declaración oficial sobre la planificación familiar, que Cuba
presentó a la ONU en 1994. ¿Puede comentar sobre como la implementación de los programas de la
planificación compara a los principios resumidos en esta declaración?)
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Cuba adopto a partir de 1959 una concepción integral del desarrollo que prevé una intervinculacion de los
aspectos económicos y sociales en beneficio de toda la población, sin que haya sido necesario formular una
política de población explicita. Como parte de su estrategia general de desarrollo y, con el objetivo fundamental de
satisfacer las necesidades materiales y espirituales de nuestro pueblo, el país puso en práctica desde hace 35 años
un conjunto de políticas que, sin plantearse específicamente metas de control o limitación de la natalidad,
persigue mejorar las condiciones de vida para la población y ha logrado cifras de crecimiento poblacional
compatibles con nuestro desarrollo económico y nuevas perspectivas.
[…]
En la concepción de salud integral y derechos reproductivos adoptada en Cuba, se presta especial atención, ante
todo, a la vida y salud de la mujer, a su realización en todos los ámbitos, al desarrollo de su talento y creatividad.
Se valora a la mujer como sujeto especialmente implicado en las políticas de población y, como tal, se considera
necesaria su preparación y su decisión en este sentido.
[Translation:
After 1959, Cuba adopted a comprehensive approach to development that provides for interlinking economic and
social aspects to the benefit of all people, without it being necessary to make an explicit population policy. As part
of its overall development strategy and with the primary objective of satisfying the material and spiritual needs of
our people, for 35 years the country implemented a set of policies that, without specifically setting goals to control
or limit births, aims to improve living conditions for the population and has achieved figures of population growth
compatible with our economic development and new perspectives.
[...]
In the comprehensive approach to reproductive health and rights adopted in Cuba, special attention is given,
above all, to the life and health of women, to their realization in all areas, the development of their talent and
creativity. The woman is valued for her particular role in population policies, and as such, her preparation and her
decision in this respect is deemed necessary.]

Women
Interview Questions on Cuban Family Planning
This first set of questions is designed to gather very basic information about your life in Cuba. (Estas
primeras preguntas están formuladas para recoger unos datos muy básicos sobre su vida en Cuba.)
During what years did you live in Cuba?
(¿Usted vivió en Cuba durante qué época?)
In which regions did you live?
(¿En cuales regiones vivió usted?)
In Cuba, what kind of professional work did you (or your husband or family) engage in?
(¿En Cuba, en qué tipo de trabajo profesional estaba involucrado usted (o su esposo o su familia)?)
Why did you leave Cuba?
(¿Porque salió usted de Cuba?)
The following questions are concerned with services that support women’s health in Cuba. Overall, I
am particularly interested in the services or methods of family planning (contraception) that are
available as part of women’s health care. (Las preguntas que sigan se tratan de los servicios que
apoyan la salud de la mujer en Cuba. Sobre todo, tengo interés particular en los servicios o los
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métodos de la planificación familiar (los métodos anticonceptivos) que están disponibles como una
parte de la asistencia médica de la mujer.)
If a woman wishes to avoid or delay a pregnancy, what options are available to her in Cuba? Feel free
to answer generally or personally from your experience.
(Si una mujer desea evitar o posponer un embarazo, ¿qué opciones están disponibles para ella en Cuba?
Siéntase en libertad de responder con carácter general o personal de su experiencia.)
What differences in family planning services have you noticed occurring over time?
(¿Qué diferencias en los servicios de la planificación familiar ha notado usted que ocurren con el paso
de tiempo?)
In your opinion, does the government seek to influence childbearing decisions? If so, how?
(En su opinión, ¿el gobierno se trata de influir en las decisiones de la maternidad? ¿Si es así, cómo?)
Do you have any other experiences on this subject that you would like to share?
(¿Tiene usted algunas otras experiencias sobre este tema que le gustaría compartir?)
NGO Activists
Interview Questions on Cuban Family Planning
This first set of questions is designed to gather basic information about your professional
experience. (Estas primeras preguntas están formuladas para recoger unos datos básicos sobre su
experiencia profesional.)
How many years have you worked for this organization? (¿Durante cuantos años ha trabajado
usted en esta organización?)
What is your professional role here? (¿Cuál es su papel profesional aquí?)
The following questions ask about your experiences with and knowledge of family planning in
Cuba. (Las preguntas que siguen preguntan por sus experiencias con y su conocimiento de la
planificación familiar en Cuba.)
Currently, what is the role of this organization in providing family planning services, information,
or counseling? (En este momento, ¿Cuál es el papel de esta organización con respecto a la
provisión de servicios, información, o consejos de la planificación familiar?)
How has this role changed or evolved over time? (¿Cómo ha cambiado o evolucionado este papel
con el paso de tiempo?)
I would like to discuss the principles or values that guide the provision of family planning services.
Can you talk about your perception of the principles or values that motivate or support family
planning dialogs and services within this organization?
(Quisiera hablar de los principios o los valores que guían la provisión de los servicios de la
planificación familia. ¿Puede hablar de su percepción de los principios o valores que motivan o
apoyan los diálogos y servicios de la planificación familiar dentro de esta organización?)
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Chapter 5 Appendix 2: Sample Notes
Mujeres:
The CHC is missing the following issues of Mujeres from their collection: March and July 1967, June
and July 1972, March 1973, June and September 1979, January 1985, November and December 1989.
There is no reason to suspect systematic bias in these omissions. In 1990, presumably under financial
strain, the magazine begins publishing on a bimonthly basis. In 1992, one issue is released covering
January-March, and another from July-September.
Bohemia:
As noted in my methods section, given time constraints, I employed a random sample of 25% of
the issues of Bohemia from 1960-1969. In practice, as another time saving measure, I sampled full
months,44 or reels of microfilm, rather than individual issues. This eliminated time spent loading and
searching through individual reels for a given issue. The exception to the random sample is 1963,
where the 3 months sampled were simply the only ones available, as all of the other reels of film were
off-site for repair. There is no evidence to suggest that damage to these reels and their exclusion from
random sampling should significantly bias my results.
The list of sampled months is as follows:
Year
Sample
1960 January, November, December
1961 July, August, November
1962 May, June, November
1963 July, November December
1964 January, September, October
1965 May, June, July
1966 January, February, August
1967 February, March, Sept
1968 March, June, July
1969 October, November, December
In hardcopy, the CHC is missing a few scattered weekly issues from the following bound volumes
from the 1970s and 2001-2002:
AP63 .B7 v.62:pt.4 (Jul-Aug 1970)
AP63 .B7 v.63:pt.3 (May-Jun 1971)
AP63 .B7 v.64:pt.3 (May-Jun 1972)
AP63 .B7 v.65:pt.3 (May-Jun 1973)
AP63 .B7 v.65:pt.5 (Sep-Oct 1973)
AP63 .B7 v.67:pt.1 (Jan-Feb 1975)
AP63 .B7 v.67:pt.2 (Mar-Apr 1975)
AP63 .B7 v.67:pt.3 (May-Aug 1975)
AP63 .B7 v.67:pt.4 (Sep-Oct 1975)
AP63 .B7 v.67:pt.5 (Nov-Dec 1975)
I have no reason to believe that coverage of contraception issues would vary with systematic bias according
to calendar month.
44
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AP63 .B7 v.68:pt.3 (May-Jun 1976)
AP63 .B7 v.68:pt.5 (Sep-Oct 1976)
AP63 .B7 v.68:pt.6 (Nov-Dec 1976)
AP63 .B7 v.69:pt.3 (May-Jun 1977)
AP63 .B7 v.92-93 (2000-2001)
Overall, these missing issues represent a very small proportion of the total holdings, and again, there is
no reason to suspect that there is a systematic reason for their omission. In the future, this could be
verified by checking these issues in microfilm, as the collection in this format is complete.
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Chapter Six

45

Family Planning in Iran: Frame Convergence and
Divergence in the Islamic Regime
In the early 1960s, Iran became one of the first countries in the world to develop a national family
planning program. Although the early advocates of Iranian family planning under Mohammad Reza
Shah Pahlavi (henceforth, the Shah) worked closely with the West and received much outside NGO
advice and financial support, the 1979 revolution broke this pattern of direct outside influence and
engagement (Moore 2007). Initially, the government’s family planning division was shut down and all
foreign NGOs were expelled (Moore 2007; Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000). The new Islamist
government officially took a pronatalist stance, which in practice meant limiting family planning to a
small, exclusive private sector market and rewarding couples with many children with land and
stipends (Afary 2009). Although contraceptive use is not prohibited in the Muslim faith, the regime
viewed the use of contraceptives as an un-Islamic, Western imperialist practice (Hoodfar and
Assadpour 2000).
By 1988, some government ministers and private intellectuals were beginning to question the
wisdom of policies that led to rapid population growth. Thus, the regime began to reexamine family
planning as a means for strengthening an independent, Islamic state, and became determined to build
a program that reflected the nation’s distinct religious and political values. However, despite this
nationalist vantage point, by the mid-1990s, the Iranian government had developed a strong program
that collaborated closely with the Western advocates. This chapter examines the rationales behind
post-revolutionary family planning in Iran, and gives particular attention the pattern of international
engagement that balances a commitment to independence and Islamic values with strategies to
45
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facilitate collaborative partnerships.
Through an analysis of the Iranian case, I return to the key questions driving this dissertation:
how do international and domestic actors negotiate the tension between divergent framing tactics in
both domestic and international venues? Does the international movement shift to accommodate
these divergent frames, or do the dissenting regimes themselves conform?

Does prolonged

engagement eventually lead to frame convergence? In this case, I examine data that illustrates the
frames employed by Iran in both international and domestic venues between 1988 and 2010. The
following section details these data sources and describes the methods employed for collecting and
coding this data. Then, in the analysis section, I trace the framing tactics used by Iran in order to
understand how dissent and collaboration were balanced in this context.

METHODS
For Iran, I coded all instances of the 6 original frames—that is, population, development,
environment, women, health and rights. However, historical accounts of the Iranian family planning
program suggest the need to be attentive to the use of two additional frames: Islam and nationalism.
The Islamic frame coding captures instances of family planning being promoted as a tool for
strengthening Muslim values. The literature notes that through Islamic frames, Iran promoted the idea
that concentrating parental and societal resources on a smaller number of children would help to
develop a society of “healthy, well-trained, and moral Muslims” (Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000, 28). In
practice, this frame also sometimes manifests itself in reference to an Islamic society’s obligation to
provide family planning services, as in the following statement: “it suffices for us to know that Islam,
for example, makes it the duty of every Muslim to satisfy the essential needs of the community” (UN
1995a, np). With regard to the nationalism frame, coding captures references to family planning as a
means for increasing Iran’s independence, or freedom from reliance on outside support. The
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following statement that explicitly links population control to self-sufficiency is a good example of
this: “having agricultural self-sufficiency as its major objective in the country’s first five-year social and
economic plan as well as other long term projects, implementing population control plans will become
a must for Iran” (FBIS-NES-89-223, 66). Throughout the coding process, I was conscious of the
possible need to include population-dissent or development-dissent frame coding, like those
employed in the Cuban case; however, for reasons that will be explained, these frames are less relevant
to the Iranian context.

International Forum Frames: The United Nations
As with the Cuban case, I measure Iranian frames in the international arena through analysis of
Iran’s statements to UN population and development conferences. Although it attended the
International Population Conference in Mexico City, Iran did not make a statement to the UN in 1984.
This is not surprising when one considers the lack of domestic family planning development at that
time. Thus, the coding includes statements only from 1994 and 1999. These are coded using NVivo in
the same manner as the UN reports and Cuba statements, where the output is a measure of the
proportion of each frame’s total percentage of coverage in each statement.
In addition to these statements, I include one additional resource from the 1994 ICPD. The
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) 46 published a special supplementary digest with
extensive coverage of the 1994 ICPD. This digest includes several transcripts of interviews with and
statements by Mohammad Ali Taskhiri, an Iranian health minister and the chief delegate to the 1994
conference. These were published or broadcast in international forums for an international audience
and are thus representative of the messages the Iran delegation wished to convey in the international
arena. All direct statements from delegate Taskhiri were collapsed into a single document and coded
according to the same procedures used to code the other UN statements. The result is a supplementary
46
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measure of Iran’s frame use at the 1994 ICPD.

State-level Frames: Domestic Family Planning Policy
In Iran, the government’s explicit policies regarding family planning are incorporated into the Five
Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plans, which begin in 1989. However, detailed
policies are only included in the first two plans, while later plans merely note that there is no change to
family planning policy. Thus, I code only the 1989 and 1995 plans. Relying on the same method used
to code the UN statements, I employ Nvivo to complete the coding, and the result is a measure of the
proportion of each frame’s percentage of coverage in each policy.

State-level Frames: Ministry Reports and Dialogues
The Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MOHME) published two lengthy reports on family
planning programs—one in 1994 and the second in 1998. These reports provide two snapshots of
state-level framing of family planning during a period of rapid program development. In addition, in
2000, Iran hosted an international workshop on family planning issues. Segments of the workshop
report, which record speeches by state officials, also give insight into how various state family planning
leaders were constructing family planning at this later date. With the exclusion of sections detailing
demographic data, I coded the entirety of both MOHME reports in NVivo. For the Integrated Approach
to Reproductive Health and Family Planning in Iran workshop report, I coded the introduction, opening
statement, and welcoming remarks, but omitted the topical reports from workshop sections. As with
other documents coded in NVivo, the final measure reports the proportion of each document
dedicated to the use of each frame.

Frames in the Public Discourse: Tehran Times and FBIS
Founded in 1979, the Tehran Times is Iran’s leading English-language newspaper. In this phase of
the analysis, I used the list of family planning keywords to search the online archives for articles about
family planning, which is available beginning in 1998. This search, from 1998 to 2010, yielded 36
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articles. These were then coded according to the same method as the news articles in the two
preceding cases, so that the final result is an annual measure of total articles that employ each frame.
To capture earlier instances of frame use, I employed a search of the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS) archives. FBIS was a federal agency, founded in 1941 and run by the
Central Intelligence Agency until 2004, with a mission to “to monitor, record, transcribe and translate
intercepted radio broadcasts from foreign governments, official news services, and clandestine
broadcasts from occupied territories” (FBIS 2012). In 2005, the CIA’s Open Source Center absorbed
the FBIS, and continued to publish similar reports. The archives contain a range of domestic news
articles published in various venues, which are translated directly into English on a daily basis. Access
to the FBIS collection was made available by West Virginia University in various formats, described
below.
From 1941 to 1996, the FBIS archives are cataloged on microfiche, first by region and then by
day, month, and year. For the Near East and South Asia region, which contains the articles from Iran,
I first manually searched each monthly table of contents fiche for article titles that mention family
planning.47 I then located the identified articles within the archives and copied them for future coding.
For months where the table of contents fiche was unavailable, I searched the headlines for each day
individually. I began this search in 1988, when histories note that family planning dialogs first emerged
in the public discourse, and ended in 1996, when the archives move to a digital format. From 1996
until July 2004, the FBIS collection is available on CD-ROM in a text-searchable format. For these
years, I used the family planning keywords to locate articles in the Iran sub-section.48 After 2005,
Open Source Center archives are available on the World News Connection database, and I again used
the family planning keywords to locate articles. Importantly, for the years captured on microfiche, my
Because Iran officially includes family planning within population policy, I also included references to population policy
within this search.
48 The following months are missing from the CD-ROM archives: July-September 1998; March-June and
September-October 2002.
47
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search strategy only enabled me to locate articles that explicitly mentioned family planning in the
article title, while the CD-ROM and World News Connection queries searched the full text as well.
The FBIS searches yielded a sample of about 90 articles. All articles were coded using the same
method employed for the Tehran Times, and the final measure shows an annual count of articles
employing each frame.
As with the Cuban case, I merged the FBIS and Tehran Times data into a single measure of media
framing, which increases continuity and provides a larger sample size for analysis.

Frames Employed by Religious Leaders: the Friday Prayer
Histories of Iranian family planning repeatedly note the importance of Iranian imams in family
planning advocacy efforts. Thus, including a measure that reflects how these leaders framed family
planning is critical. One advocacy tool used by the imams is the Friday Prayer, which is given every
week in various venues, and which is broadcast on the radio (and more recently via television and
webcast) and is published in domestic newspapers and magazines. These prayers routinely include a
mix of political and religious messages, are considered a critical component of religious leadership in
Iran, and have been documented as a tool of “indoctrination and mobilization” (Laursen 1996, 650).
Former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani described the importance of these prayers,
stating “if someone, without any excuse and reason, shuns three Friday prayers…this is the state of a
hypocrite; a hypocrite does that…Therefore Muslims, revolutionaries, believers, especially civil
servants, government managers and heads, personalities, prominent people and religious scholars,
should feel obliged to take part in Friday prayers in such a way that all the people realize that they give
importance to Friday prayers. This is a duty” (FBIS-NES-93-141, cited by Laursen 1996, 651). Thus,
Friday Prayers are widely observed and the discussion of family planning in this venue serves as an
important resource for understanding the framing tactics employed by religious leadership. FBIS
publishes translations of the Friday Prayer, and using the method employed for FBIS news articles, I
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searched the table of contents of each month, and located and copied each Friday Prayer from 1988 to
1996. I then skimmed each prayer for references to family planning. Although 12 prayers mentioned
population issues, only 3 explicitly discussed family planning and birth control. In the text-searchable
archives, I found one additional prayer that mentioned family planning in 2000. I coded each of these
4 using NVivo, and as with the UN statements, the result is a measure of the proportion of the
percentage of each frame’s use.

Street-level Perspectives: Interviews
As with the Cuban case, I rely on voluntary, semi-structured interviews with Iranian doctors and
laywomen to gain insight into the program rationales that manifest themselves in the day-to-day
functioning of family planning services. In total, I obtained 3 interviews with doctors whose career
activity in Iran ranged from 1988 to present, and 10 interviews with women whose lives in Iran
spanned 1949 to 2014. In the case of the doctor interviews, I was fortunate to have participation from
two individuals who entered family planning work in the early days of the program, before rising
through the ranks to the highest levels of program leadership. These provide invaluable perspectives
on programming; however, unlike the Cuban participants, these doctors very much represent officially
sanctioned voices in family planning. Interview participants were drawn from a snowball sample that
tapped into diverse networks. Specifically, professors at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of
Public Health and the Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine provided
contact information for the doctor interviews.
Many individuals and organizations with professional interests in Iran and/or family planning
were contacted to generate the sample of laywomen, but recruitment of this population was more
difficult. Often, my inquiries were met with non-response, or women declined to participate.
Ultimately, participants were identified through the University of Virginia ESL community, the West
Virginia University Iranian Student Organization, and a few personal contacts. As a result, the sample
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is skewed somewhat toward greater inclusion of younger, university-educated women. The mean age
in my sample is 38.7 (with a standard deviation of 12.9). Thus, these women largely came of age in the
1990s and 2000s, which is a good fit for gauging family planning patient perspectives during some of
the family planning program’s most active years, but an ideal sample would include a few more women
with experiences in the late 1980s. All of the women in my sample had at least some university
education, although several did not complete their studies. It should be noted that female university
attendance rates are high in Iran. In 2014, 66% of high schoolers continued their education in a tertiary
education program, and 64% of those enrolled were women.49 Thus, the higher level of education in
my sample is not wholly unreflective of population dynamics. Finally, these women represent a mix of
regional backgrounds, with participants with experiences from small villages in more remote regions,
mid-size cities, and the capital.
Copies of the IBR-approved interview schedules for these interviews can be found in Chapter 6
Appendix 1

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The 1980s: Delayed Action on Family Planning
The Islamic regime that came to power in 1979 explicitly outlined a right to health care in
the new constitution and began the construction of an elaborate, multi-tiered health network. In the
most rural areas, health houses staffed with public health workers provide the most basic services.
Above the health houses, rural health centers run by medical workers, including at least one doctor,
provide higher level medical care. Each rural health house is linked to an urban health center or
hospital, where patients with more serious medical conditions have access to services. These centers

;

49 See “Gross Enrolment Ratio, Tertiary, Both Sexes (%) | Data.” 2016. Accessed November 21. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR?locations=IR and
“School Enrollment, Tertiary, Female (% Gross) | Data.” 2016. Accessed November 21. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR.FE?locations=IR.
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report to the medical university located in the capital of each province, which falls directly under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health and Medical Education. Thus, the system is designed to give
patients easy, coordinated access to the level of services they require. However, family planning was
not initially included in these services. The rebounding total fertility rate (TFR), which had begun to
decline under the previous regime, reflects this absence of services. See Figure 6.7.
Histories of the modern family planning program in Iran generally point to both the 1986
census—which revealed an increase in population size from 33.7 million to almost 50 million in a ten
year period—and economic pressure the war with Iraq placed on the government’s stated
commitment to providing a growing population with social services as the catalysts for rethinking
pronatalist policies (Moore 2007, 55). As a result, we see the emergence of family planning that is
explicitly embedded within national population policy. However, at the same time, family planning
services themselves were integrated into and governed by existing health programs. One of the
doctors I interviewed, who eventually rose to the highest ranks of family planning program
management, described the dual focus of the program saying,
So they encouraged people to decrease the number of children through different ways and one
of them was expansion of health services to the people. There was no obligation for use of the
services, for use of the health services or use of the family planning services. Just providing
information to the people and making the services accessible through the expansion of the
health system network. (Interview, male doctor, May 2016).

Another doctor, also a leader in family planning programming, suggested an even more central
concern for health in program development. In particular, he described the entrepreneurial role of a
particular minister, whom he described as:
A religious man, but at the same time a visionary leader who understood the importance of
public health. He approached family planning programs and approached the religious leaders
from a different angle—from the health angle. So basically, he justified the sanctity of marriage
and life and saying that we need to save the lives of women, and save their dignity, and as a
result the health is the cornerstone of all our programs…And this includes family planning.
(Interview, male doctor, April 2016).

Finally, changes in the religious framing of family planning during this time—and particularly the
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delivery of a fatwa by Ayatollah Khomeini that declared that contraceptive use was not
prohibited—was also critical.50 Essentially, this decree from the highest level of Islamic authority in
Iran overrode arguments that framed family planning as a hindrance to good Islamic practice and,
practically speaking, eased the implementation of family planning programs. As the same doctor
describes, “so the founder of the revolution issued a fatwa. And he was an awesome power in terms of
religious authority, and he issued a fatwa nobody else could…So the fatwa was there, and the minister
advised the senior people that from now on, we have the fatwa, you don’t need to talk to one of us,
move on it “ (Interview, male doctor, April 2016). Also as a result, frames that linked family planning
use to Islamic values could grow. Given these competing interpretations of the most important frames
driving the expansion of family planning, the analysis below will help to determine the extent to which
early programming was motivated by population, religious, health, or other concerns.
In the First Five Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan, which was developed in the late
1980s and ratified by the legislature on January 31, 1990, family planning policy is first formulated
within a section entitled “1. Population 1-1. National Birth Control Policy Outline”. As would be
expected from this categorization, Figure 6.2 shows that at this time, family planning was
overwhelmingly framed as a tool to halt population growth, with population frames accounting for
nearly 70% of frame usage. At slightly over 10%, development frames are the second most prevalent
frame. Thus, at a time when international framing tactics are beginning to shift slowly away from first
generation frame use, we see the emergence of an Iranian policy that is firmly grounded in these
frames. As suggested by the program leaders above, health frames do factor into this policy; however,
their use accounts for only about 10% of total frame content. Thus, a larger role for health rationales is
not confirmed by this policy analysis, nor is the role of Islamic frames, which do not appear in this
policy. Finally, attention to women’s welfare accounts for the remainder of frame use, albeit at a low
50

I have searched extensively for the original text of this widely cited fatwa, but cannot locate it.
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level (less than 10%).
The attention of religious leaders as captured in the Friday Prayers is similarly focused on first
generation frames, and primarily population. In June 1989, Ayatollah Khamenei himself gave a Friday
Sermon on the subject of birth control, in which he notes that he will “not reject or insist on birth
control to slow down the population boom” (FBIS-NES-89-110, 43). Nevertheless, he goes on to
detail the problems of a growing population, to stress the compatibility of Islam with the promotion of
family planning and small family sizes, and to lament the impact of population growth on the
destruction of the environment. In total, first generation frames account for over 75% of the frame
usage, as shown in Figure 6.5. Given the venue and actor, it is not surprising that Islamic framing
accounts for the remaining portion; however, the discussion of family planning is mostly constructed
as an issue of population control, development, and environmental preservation.
Given the lack of a statement to the 1984 ICPD and the absence of other state documents in this
period, media sources provide the only other archival record of frame use during this period. In the
FBIS collection, I found just one article discussing family planning in 1989. The subject of this article
is a meeting between the UNFPA executive director and Iran’s foreign minister, in which they discuss
plans for beginning collaboration “on the planning of population control in Iran” (FBIS-NES-89-223,
66). The article is largely focused on population issues, but as shown in Figure 6.3, also employs
development frames. Thus, this article provides evidence of the early development of a relationship
with Western collaborators—initiated “at the invitation of the [Iranian] Health Ministry”—where
action on family planning according to the first generation rationale is the central priority. Although
first generation frame use is beginning the decline in the international movement, we see the initiation
of a relationship with Iran constructed around these frames.

The 1990s Family Planning Booms
After initial efforts to reinstate family planning programs at the end of the 1980s, family planning
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efforts were increased significantly in the 1990s. On May 23, 1993, the government passed a law
“pertaining to population and family planning” that revoked many social security privileges for a
family’s fourth (or subsequent) child and increased public education programs related to family
planning, child and maternal health, and population (MOHME 1994). In addition to incorporating
education on these topics into formal school curricula, the law instructs the Ministry of Islamic Culture
and Guidance to seek the “active and effective participation of journalists, film makers and other
artists” as well as the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) system, to develop efforts “to
increase the general awareness of people regarding the population and family planning programs”
(MOHME 1994, 21). Several women, from both rural and urban areas, recalled the prevalence of these
messages in the media and other advertisements. As one woman who grew up in a small village in the
late 1980s and 1990s noted, “I remember when I was a kid, there were a lot of signs about having one
or two children would be enough. If you have less kids, you’ll have a better life, and this kind of stuff”
(Interview, female participant, November 2016). Thus, in these educational outreach efforts, it is clear
that state action on family planning is tightly linked to population concerns.
With regard to the actual provision of family planning services, dissemination through existing
health care networks became the central strategy. By 1993, as one doctor describes:
The situation of the whole health regime was that the whole chain was working…So when the
fatwa was issued, all the Ministry of Health, managers, middle level, higher level, all there was
was to simply add the family planning program to the ongoing program, which was working
perfectly. So I didn’t have a problem at the district level. I simply, simply trained my public
health workers on family planning and the provision of services. Simple. And they added at the
central level, when I was there, just to add contraceptives to the flow of the supply chain, as
simple as it is. Easy, easy, piece of cake. And the family planning program applied, overnight,
all over the country. So that is the first reason for the success of that family planning program.
The functioning health system absorbed easily family planning. (Interview, male doctor, April
2016)

Clearly, it is very generous to claim that an entire health system is working “perfectly”. Nevertheless,
with regard to family planning, there is a lack of evidence suggesting that services were not widely
available. Iran’s dramatic decrease in fertility in the 1990s—from a TFR of 4.8 children per woman in
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1990 to 2.2 in 2000—is well-documented and widely cited in demographic literature (World Bank,
illustrated in Figure 6.7). Beyond this data, women I interviewed from all regions routinely described
the availability of a wide range of methods—including pills, IUDs, condoms, sterilization for both
men and women, and even legal abortion in the first trimester—and the ease of accessing these
services, especially for married couples.51 A woman from southern Iran, who left the country in 1987
when she was in her late 20s and returned in 1997, gave a particularly insightful description of the
changes in programming that had occurred in the intervening decade:
When we went back in 1997, I had my 3 babies and I didn’t want any more, so I noticed we
have clinics which was free. They give you birth control or condoms, or even IUDs, do you
know? They used to give IUDs and the privilege to close up their tubes, like the surgery they
do. But different methods and all were for free. They even used to give you gifts if you go to do
the surgery because the population was so much at that time. But before 87 when [my
husband, child, and I] came [to the US], it was religious prohibited to do those things. You
could go and buy things but they just give the privileged to use, and let’s have babies. Because
of the war many people died, and they want population to raise up. So at that time it was
prohibited, but later when we went back home, I noticed it was okay…And everything was
free, you can visit whenever you want. It was very nice at that time…All of them were
available, whatever you decide. IUD didn’t work for me. It was making me bleeding, things like
that. But everything was available and anyone want to do anything, they can do it. I didn’t like
to do the surgery even though I didn’t want any more babies, I wasn’t agreed to do that. Also,
I think they do it even for men, I don’t know actually the term, to close up the tube. Many
people, they did it…I think maybe the pills [were most popular], it’s easier, convenient. I think
they use mostly that. It’s different. Some people, they really like IUDs, they put it up, they just
go for checkups, and no problems, it was easy. But for some people, it was not working, even
though they have it from different brands, from different countries, whatever you want…At
that time, everything was available. At the beginning, I didn’t know because I was [in the US].
I thought I would have to go to a private doctor and ask permission to get these things. But
they came to my door, gave us the address of the clinic, they do these services, they introduce
what they do, and they do everything. (Interview, female participant, November 2016).

In this account, the participant describes a clear reversal in policy and the resulting changes in broad
service availability, which in her understanding is directly connected to population concerns. However,
unlike various other countries with intensive population programs, there is also a lack of evidence for
coercion in family planning. As a young doctor who practiced in a conservative, rural area noted, “I
never experienced any pressure to use a certain method. I never experienced any pressure, like, even
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Difficulties encountered by unmarried couples are discussed in more detail below.
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I’ve never heard of anything like that. Using any method or even putting pressure to use methods. So,
everybody was free to use it or not to use it” (Interview, male doctor, August 2016). Similarly, although
the women quoted above describes incentives for sterilization programs and the practice of sending
health workers door-to-door to spread information about available services, she also captures the
interviewees’ prevailing sense that women are free to do ‘whatever they decide’. Across the board, female
interview participants agreed that the government seeks to influence childbearing decisions—mostly
with the goal of reaching population targets—but none of these women described direct patient
pressure. Rather, they commonly describe the financial and social incentives and types of
government-sponsored media campaigns outlined here, or the discussion of population concerns in
required university courses on ‘family management’ and mandatory premarital counseling sessions on
family planning. In general, women agree that individuals ultimately make childbearing decisions based
on their own preferences, not government policy, but that incentive structures, family size norms
promoted by the government, and the overall economic condition of the country have an impact on
this decision. Therefore, street-level perceptions of family planning services highlight the importance
of population concerns in motivating government action, but also confirm that these concerns have
resulted in widely accessible, comprehensive, and voluntary family planning services.
Beyond the measures described above, understanding government success in implementing
family planning programs requires mention of one additional development. Although the government
took responsibility for establishing family planning programs, the provision of services was aided by
collaborative efforts with international partners. In 1993, Iran partnered with the World Bank in a
$294 million project—where half of the money was provided by Iran and the other half was loaned by
the World Bank—to provide family planning supplies and training (World Bank 1993). This program
ran until 2001, and was specifically intended to “(i) improve health conditions in rural areas where
health conditions were particularly poor and existing health services relatively inadequate, and (ii)
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reduce population growth in the country. To support these general objectives the project would
contribute by improving the quality and coverage of health care and family planning services” (World
Bank 2002). Thus, we see a relationship forged with the international community dually grounded in
population and health concerns. Similarly, in 1994, UNFPA distributed $10.4 million to Iran for “(a)
carrying out maternal and child health and family planning (MCH/FP) activities in peri-urban and
hard-to-reach areas; (b) enhancing population awareness through incorporation of population
education into formal and informal education systems; (c) strengthening the institutional capacity of
government agencies by developing human resources; and (d) integrating women's concerns into all
population and development policies and programmes” (UNFPA 1998). Here, we see a greater
diversity of priorities, which include a population and health focus, but also explicitly includes concern
for development and women’s welfare. Finally, in 1995, Iran developed a relationship with the IPPF
and set up the Family Health Association (FHA) as an IPPF affiliate designed to “complement
well-established services provided by the government.” 52 A former FHA manager described the
political climate around the creation of the organization and its early functions, stating:
What happened, the space was a bit more open in Iran [in the 1990s]. It was now 15-20 years
after the revolution and a reformer president is in place, so civil society started to grow. And
the most innocent area for civil society to start to grow and mushroom around is health. So, a
group of like-minded people came together and established the Family Planning Association
of Iran [the FHA], which is affiliated or associated with the IPPF. This was to address issues
around family planning and sexual, reproductive health that are not covered by the public
sector, and at the same time the idea was to link Iran to the international community
through—including the family planning sector—through the health sector. So that’s how it
started…I worked for the Family Planning Association and our role was mainly focusing on
elements that are not focused on in the public sector, such as adolescent sexual and
reproductive health, STD and HIV, which was very much a sensitive area. So what we did—in
addition to the policy briefs and dialogs and annual conferences and committees and things
like that—we also started something that picked up very rapidly and was welcome and very
popular, actually we reached the 14th or 15th edition, we developed self-learning material. And
this picked up very fast after a couple years of sexuality education. It was basic information for
different age groups, so we planned something for primary school and middle school, and
something for parents, something for young adults, and different age groups’ self-learning
material. The initiatives were to get youth participation and engagement. It was an innocent
topic for expanding the use of participation and youth involvement within the policy setting.
52

See http://www.ippf.org/about-us/member-associations/iran.
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We arranged meetings with the youth and policymakers to exchange ideas on family planning,
and usually it goes beyond that. (Interview, male doctor, April 2016).

Here, the doctor is describing a partnership that was strategically built around health issues, both
because these issues were a ready area for international collaboration and because domestically, these
issues were less politically sensitive. As a result, the activities described here have a broad health focus
and tie into the IPPF’s shifting strategy that is more focused on health than population at the end of
the 1990s (see Chapter 4). Greater insight into Iran’s particular priorities as reflected in the framing of
family planning—and how those priorities are articulated in Iran’s collaboration with the international
movement—is established through the coding and analysis of archival material below.
Although the government’s official family planning policy changed to reflect the needs of a more
advanced family planning structure, we see very little difference in framing tactics between 1989 and
1995. As Figure 6.2 shows, first generation framing still accounts for about 85% of total frame use,
which is a slight increase from 1989. Here, development framing accounts for this increase, while
women’s, health, and population framing all decrease very slightly. However, overall framing change in
the Second Development Plan is minimal and suggests that population and development concerns
continue to motivate the government’s commitment to family planning.
The 1994 MOHME report on the status of family planning shows a similarly high reliance on first
generation frames, with these accounting for about 75% of total frame use. However, as illustrated in
Figure 6.6, the report also employs a more diverse selection of frames, including use of environmental,
Islamic, and nationalist frames. By contrast, use of first generation frames in the 1998 MOHME report
is sharply reduced, with first generation frames accounting for less than half of total frame usage. Here,
health has become the most widely used frame, accounting for nearly 40% of total framing, and
women’s and rights frames increase slightly. Thus, it appears that MOHME framing is slowly
following the same trend as the international movement, although at a noticeably delayed rate. In the
early 1990s, when the international movement’s shift to second generation frames is more fully
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underway, Iran’s commitment to these framing strategies is still high; however, by the end of the
1990s, more harmonization—and a decrease in nationalist frames—is evident within the government
health sector. Moreover, as the account above details, this greater harmonization coincides with the
post-1994 increase in collaboration with the international community.
With regard to the domestic media, coverage of family planning issues increases in the 1990s, with
about 40 articles appearing in the FBIS or Tehran Times between 1990 and 1999. Importantly, Iran’s
participation in the 1994 ICPD was also widely covered in the domestic media, with 14 stories
dedicated to the topic; however, the majority of these stories do not directly mention family planning
and are therefore not included in the media analysis. Rather, they are discussed separately within the
broader discussion of the decade’s ICPDs below. As Figure 6.3 shows, the early 1990s are marked by
a downward trend in the use of first generation frames. The highest peak in second generation frame
use, which reaches about 80% in 1994, reflects coding of only 2 articles. Nevertheless, these articles are
distinct in their use of broader framing strategies, an omission of development frames, a more
pervasive focus on health framing, and greater reliance on Iran’s more unique framing tactics. Closer
examination of these articles reveals that they are more overt in their inclusion of the framing language
being promoted by the international movement, while also retaining a distinctive perspective. For
example, consider the following excerpt:
Ever since the conference was inaugurated, Iran and some other Islamic countries have sought
to advocate the profound Islamic viewpoint with regard to family planning, individual rights,
and women’s rights in particular, based on an international, wise, effective, and judicious
perspective in supporting the family and women. (FBIS-NES-94-177, 82).

Here, very direct inclusion of second generation framing—including the first rights frames identified
in this venue—is combined with a clear effort to show both that Iranian and Islamic stakeholders have
been at the forefront of promoting these values and that there is an explicit desire harmonize domestic
priorities with international ones. However, after the 1994 ICPD, first generation framing increases
again. Although these frames do not dominate the dialogue to the same extent that they did in the late
-164-

1980s and early 1990s, they hover between about 30% to 60% of total frame use. Thus, first generation
framing in the media clearly decreases from the program’s earliest days, but does not become
insignificant.
In the Friday Prayers during the early 1990s, family planning is mentioned twice. Both of these
occasions occur in 1994, around the time of the ICPD, which is also referenced in the sermons. In the
first sermon, given in August, the focus is entirely on population, with the imam asserting that
“sociologists deem the current situation and the world conditions to be dangerous. They believe the
rate of population growth is catastrophic and the future is bleak. In view of this, the problem of birth
control must be pursued with greater care” (FBIS-NES-94-167, 58). In the second sermon in
December, population is again a central frame, accounting for just over half of total frame use.
However, in this sermon, the difference is that population problems and birth control are discussed as
an important issue for imams to address, and thus includes more Islamic framing. Nevertheless, in this
venue, the primary frame motivating family planning dialogues is population.
At the UN in 1994, the statement from Iran is brief—just under 200 words—and is focused on
designating a role for Islam in the management of health and development concerns. Thus, although
with 45% coverage development frames are the most prominent, the short statement is fairly balanced
between health, Islamic, and development frames. The effort to demonstrate the importance of the
Islamic perspective in family planning is even more evident in ICPD chief delegate Taskhiri’s
international statements. As the coding represented in Figure 6.1 shows, the statements incorporate a
wide range of framing strategies. Moreover, if we eliminate Islamic and nationalist frames, the framing
distribution looks fairly similar to that of the general UN report in 1994, albeit with a somewhat higher
reliance on first generation frames—about 70% versus about 50%. Nevertheless, when all frames are
included, Islamic frames account for about half of all frames employed. Therefore, the importance of
engaging with internationally salient frames while simultaneously stressing the Islamic perspective in
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Iran’s international advocacy is clearly demonstrated here. By comparison, domestic Iranian coverage
of the 1994 ICPD, illustrated in Figure 6.4, shows a slightly different framing strategy. Again, without
the nationalist and Islamic frames, the framing distribution of ICPD domestic coverage looks quite
similar to the international distribution. However, there is a significant increase in the use of nationalist
frames, from less than 10% in the internationally disseminated statements to about 25% in the
domestic coverage. On one hand, the domestic media is highly critical of the West’s perceived agenda
and communicates the need to mount opposition to international incursions. For example, the
Tehran-based Jomhouri-e Eslami newspaper noted that,
In a surprising move, the United States has threatened that every country which opposes the
proposed ICPD resolution and the proposals incorporated in it based on unbridled sexual
freedom, freedom to abort fetuses, and freedom to indulge in homosexual behavior will be
deprived of U.S. economic assistance. This U.S. threat is precisely aimed at the Islamic and
Third World countries, who will probably display the most serious and principled opposition
in this regard. (FBIS-NES-94-168, 56).

At the same time, coverage emphasizes the importance of outward engagement, with sentiments like
the following: “In some international gatherings many issues would be figured out for many countries
of the world, President Rafsanjani said and stressed Iran’s failure in having an active presence in such
meetings would be to its disadvantage” (FBIS-NES-94-178, 34). Thus, we see a clear distinction
between media framing strategies depending on venue. In domestic coverage, participation in the
ICPD is largely framed as a way to assert Iran’s views in the international arena and to help ensure that
the national interests are protected from outside forces. In international statements, however, most of
this nationalist rhetoric is replaced with a more conciliatory approach that emphasizes the
compatibility and importance of the Islamic perspective. Although the majority of the framing
distribution stays the same, the most controversial nationalist framing language is visibly moderated in
the international context.
At the 1999 UN meeting, Iran issued a much longer (1816 words) and more detailed statement.
Although by 1999 first generation framing is much diminished in UN reports, the Iranian statement
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still relies heavily on these frames, with nearly 70% of frame coverage split between population and
development. Thus, at the end of the 1990s, first generation frames remain an important part of
Iranian activity on the world stage, and although the level of second generation frame use is not
insignificant, Iran is clearly not making a shift to reliance on these frames as the same rate as the
international community.
Overall, although decreases in some venues can be detected, for example in some media coverage
and in the MOHME reports, population and development continue to be a central component of
framing strategies, and these frames generally appear with more frequency than they do in the
international movement.

Equilibrium in Family Planning in the 2000s
While the 1990s were characterized by increased advocacy and rapid service expansion, family
planning programming in the 2000s reached an equilibrium point in terms of policy and program
development. Programs continued to run under the direction of MOHME and policymakers did not
incorporate changes to the existing policy into subsequent Five Year Development Plans. In general,
interview participants suggest that increases in the method mix and emphasis on education were the
primary changes of the decade. A current MOHME program director described the government’s
more recent priorities as follows:
So actually one of our programs was for increasing the quality of the service provision to the
client through the improvement of the counseling, so we worked on it for about 13 years in the
counseling area…And also in the program development, of course, [we have worked on]
service development in the different categories you can think about, for example: providing
guidelines, developing guidelines and tools and forums, service provision and increasing the
availability of the contraceptives—working on the quality of the contraceptives inside the
country and outside of the country. (Interview, male doctor, May 2016).

As far as actual services go, participants confirm efforts to increase contraceptive options, noting that
“when time passes we have more options, because there were more options available scientifically”
(Interview, female participant, November 2016). In addition, an interview with a doctor who practiced
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from 2006 to 2009 in one of Iran’s poorest regions highlights the functioning of MOHME’s outreach
and education program even in remote, less-developed, and religiously conservative areas. As he
asserted,
One of the very important, at that period of time—I should insist I don’t know if it’s like that
anymore—one of the very important programs was the family planning program…Each of
the women of reproductive age has a profile in the health house. So they know everybody, they
have a list. They should go to them, like practically, they should go to them and talk to them.
And ask them if they want more children or not, and if they have a newborn, they should
consult and tell them that you have to space and use the methods. And they give them a proper
contraceptive method. And most of the time, there’s no complication, but if they have a
problem they should consult the midwife of the health center or the doctor. So this is how it
works there. So the doctor and midwife usually supervise the health workers to see how many
women they have, how many are using contraceptive methods, how many are not using, is
there any reason for those who are not using, are they going to have more kids, or like, these
things…[The methods women choose are] really different from area to area, from province to
province. So in the place I used to work it was a majority of Sunni Muslim. Sunni imams and
Sunni religious leaders comply with family planning as long as it is not really permanent, like
sterilization. And also so long as it is not really long acting…However, in that area, injection
was one of the most popular ones. Condoms. And IUD and sterilization were not so
popular…Supplies are free. The government provides supplies and they are free for
everybody. And they provide even the same brands everywhere. (Interview, male doctor,
August 2016).

Thus, evidence points to the government’s continued commitment to broad service provision and
suggests that by the 2010, family planning services and counseling are easily available in even very
remote areas.
However, as coverage and options continue to increase in the early 2000s, it is important to note
an important population left out of public family planning programming—that is, unmarried men and
women, and adolescents in particular. Premarital sex is not permitted in Iran, which, domestically,
leads to an official policy that reserves services only for married couples. In the international arena,
Iran challenges the international movement’s understanding that service access should not depend on
marital status. For example, in its 1994 ICPD statement, Iran notes that, “there are some expressions
that could be interpreted as applying to sexual relations outside the framework of marriage, and this is
totally unacceptable. The use of the expression ‘individuals and couples’ and the contents of principle
8 demonstrate this point. We have reservations regarding all such references in the document” (UN
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1995a, np). Nevertheless, this position does not inhibit Iran’s ratification of the ICPD agenda, nor its
continued collaboration with the international community. For its part, the international community
does not change its stated programmatic focus; however, there is some evidence of accommodation in
the international community’s work in Iran. In a follow-up email to the doctor who worked with the
IPPF in the 1990s and 2000s, I asked how international NGOs negotiated the boundaries between
marriage and service provision in Iran. Although his recollection was not precise, he noted that “if I
am not mistaken, the provision of services was only limited to married women in the past” (Email
from male doctor, January 2017). Thus, disagreement on this point may have been overcome by the
international community’s willingness to tailor its usual focus and work within Iran’s parameters in
domestic program development.
Of course, an official focus on marriage and the limitation on domestic programming does not
mean that unmarried couples are not obtaining contraception. One interview participant noted the
availability of black market contraceptives. Another described a more nuanced situation, stating:
If you are not married, it would be very hard to—so you can always buy pills or condoms in the
pharmacy, you don’t even need a prescription,53 because these kinds of things are really cheap
in Iran. But if, let’s say you get pregnant or whatever, having an abortion if you are not married
would be really difficult. And if a doctor does that, it’s actually against the law, so there are
some doctors that do that but it would cost you a lot of money… A lot of people actually [start
contraception] by themselves, so they don’t even go to the doctor…not most people maybe,
but in Tehran, a lot of people are having premarital sex. So a lot of doctors are I think trying to
provide them with whatever they need, even if they aren’t married. Unless they’re pregnant,
there is nothing against the law to provide those services. I think it’s getting better, more
information out there. But with the internet, a lot of people can do a lot of searches by
themselves even if they don’t want to go to a doctor. (Interview, female participant, October
2016).

Several women described similar increases in the social permissibility of premarital sex and the
patchwork means that these couples use to prevent pregnancy. However, individuals who are unable
to overcome the social, educational, or logistical barriers to contraceptive access fall through the
53

Birth control pills are available for purchase without prescription in Iranian pharmacies. In rural
areas without pharmacies, they are obtained instead through public health clinics, where access is free.
See below for more detail.
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cracks. This situation is exacerbated by a public sex education system that focuses on universalizing
family planning education in premarital counseling sessions and university-level course requirements,
but that overlooks adolescent populations. As a result, one woman noted “there have been many cases
where unmarried pregnant girls have committed suicide, usually by throwing themselves off a
building” (interview, female participant, October 2016). Therefore, there are actually two different
systems for obtaining family planning operating during this decade—one, a comprehensive,
well-funded, and wide-reaching public system for married couples, and the other, an under-the-table
and disjointed selection of services for unmarried couples.
With regard to the framing of these programs, less policy activity and innovation leads to the
production of few documents available for analysis. However, insights can be drawn from discussion
of family planning that continued in the media, sermons, and state official activities.
As shown in Figure 6.3, media coverage in the 2000s varies in terms of the proportion of first and
second generation frame use. In the first half of the decade, first generation frame use rises slowly
from about 45% in 2000 to about 65% of total frame use in 2006.54 Overt connections between
family planning and population growth are easy to identify in this period; for example, in one article’s
report that “the representative of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in Iran, Mohammad
Mosleheddin, said, ‘The baby boom is endangering Iran since Iran is a young country.’ He noted that
Iran's family planning program has been successful in reducing the birthrate, adding that Iran is a
model for other developing countries” (Tehran Times 2002, July 13). Although in the 2000s the
international movement continues to move away from population frames, this example shows
continued emphasis on the frame by an Iranian official who works closely with the international

The anomalous data point in 2004 reflects a lack of data availability, rather than a radical departure from normal framing
activity. As mentioned, FBIS articles are unavailable from July to December 2004. Thus, the sample size for this year is 1
article. Unlike the majority of news articles, which focus on the status of Iranian family planning, this article is an interview
with a religious scholar, who mentions family planning only in passing as part of a discussion about sovereignty and
religious norms.
54
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community. The peak in first generation frame use in 2006 is the highest since the early 1990s, and
demonstrates that, despite periodic declines, population and development continue to be durable and
salient framing strategies in the popular discourse. Although there is a fairly sharp increase in second
generation frames in 2010 as women’s and health frames increase, it is difficult to predict whether this
is the beginning of a decreasing commitment to population and development frames in the media, or
whether this represents just another temporary oscillation toward increased second generation frame
use. Thus, although they are on the decline at the end of the decade, first generation frame use is still
very present in the media analyzed here.
Similarly, the statements from governmental officials analyzed in the IRPD report, shown in Figure
6.6, also demonstrates a continued commitment to population and development frames, which fall
just below 50% of total frame usage. Here, health is the single most-used frame, accounting for about
30% of frame use. Thus, state actors are certainly not ignoring this rationale in support of family
planning, yet first generation frames still occupy a prominent place in the dialogue. However, this
report also ties these frames to international goals. For example, the document states:
ICPD achieved unprecedented consensus on population and development principles,
objectives and actions. Among other things, it stressed the importance of individual welfare
and the need to invest in people as a basis for improved human welfare and sustainable
development. The Islamic Republic of Iran has had signiﬁcant success in achieving the goals
of ICPD Program of Action. Impressive achievements in some worth mentioning indicators
are the reductions in the population growth rate, infant and maternal mortality rates, total
fertility rate and increase in the contraceptive prevalence rate, primary school enrolment rate
and literacy rate. (IRPD and Mehryar 2001).

So despite a heavy reliance on frames that are decreasing in the international movement, the officials
quoted here are also clearly signaling their cooperation with international movement objectives.
With regard to the Friday Prayers, like sermons in previous decades, the sermon issued in 2000
omits any use of second generation frames. Rather, as the coding in Figure 6.5 illustrates, the imam ties
use of birth control to population size and national strength. Although reference to family planning in
the Friday Prayers is found briefly in only one sermon at the beginning of the decade, this reference
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gives some evidence that conceptualization of family planning in this venue is not moving toward
advocacy grounded in women, health, or rights framing.
Finally, an additional argument in support of the continued linking of family planning with
population initiatives comes from policy changes implemented after 2010, beyond the time frame
analyzed throughout this dissertation. Although full extension of the analysis of family planning
frames into the next decade is beyond the scope of this project, these dynamics warrant some brief
attention here.
In 2014, Ayatollah Khamenei issued a new policy position on population, which promoted several
initiatives “with the purpose of making up for population decreases in recent years” (Khamenei 2014).
Indeed, in the 2000s, Iran’s TFR slowly dropped below replacement-level, or about 2.3 children per
woman, which could lead to negative population growth in future decades (See Figure 6.7). As a result,
Khamenei’s position statement focuses on initiatives to support families with more children.
However, there is no mention of changes to family planning programs. Nevertheless, this position
followed several years of governmental concern over the problems commonly faced by nations with
aging, contracting populations, which the government does connect to family planning. This linkage is
evident even by the end of 2010; for example, one article captured in the media analysis notes that:
Ahmadinejad had previously spoken against the family planning and called for an increase in
Iran’s population from 70 to 120 million. ‘I am against saying that two children are enough.
Our country has a lot of capacity for many children to grow in it. Westerners have problems.
Because their population growth is negative, they are worried and fear that if our population
increases, we will triumph over them,’ he said. (Tehran Times 2010, December 30).

Here, we see the revitalization of nationalist frames in conjunction with changing ideas about the role
of family planning and the need for population control. As a result, there have been changes to family
planning services since 2010. In a piece published in The Lancet, a MOHME official explicitly makes
the connection between low population growth and changes to family planning services:
Despite Iran's successful family planning and population control policies, serious concerns
now exist that Iran has overshot the target, which has led to a total fertility rate of 1.92—less
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than the replacement fertility level 2.3. Such a low population growth rate and demographic
transition, and their potential socioeconomic consequences have driven the shift in policies.
Moreover, access to contraception and permanent sterilisation is not banned completely. Most
contraceptive methods are still available in pharmacies, and condoms are sold in supermarkets.
Access to all contraceptives remains free for vulnerable populations through service-providing
centers (eg, drop-in centers). The main restriction and penalty is on surgical sterilisation, which
is still accessible under some circumstances. (Karamouzian and Haghdoost 2015).

A MOHME official I interviewed gave a more nuanced description of the changes in policy and
stressed that although the government is easing away from the universal provision of free
contraception, commitment to family planning, health, and women’s welfare is still high, and access
will not be compromised. In general, he stressed that achieving improved health outcomes will still be
prioritized within the new policy, even as the government seeks to nudge the total fertility rate (TFR)
a bit higher. As he describes:
You know that in the last 3 to 4 years we had a change in our population policy. But it is very
important to look at, even in the new population policy, it is said that we should improve
reproductive health and childbearing situations in the country. And we also have another 5
items in the population policy which address the health issues. So I think, to the population
policy, there are a lot of principals that help to improve the health of all of the people,
especially mother and child. So, right now, the reducing of the births of children in the country
is not a priority, because the total fertility rate in the country is about 1.9, it is below
replacement level. So the first principle in the population policy is to achieve 2.1—we should
achieve the replacement level for our TFR. But that doesn’t mean that we should not provide
services to the people who in the case of pregnancy, their health, or the children’s health, is in
danger. We are continuing to provide the free services of contraceptives to the people whose
pregnancy could be at risk for them or for their children or for their newborn. So the free
services will continue for them and it is established completely in the last 2 or 3 years. Or even
if we have tubal ligation for the people who will in the case of pregnancy will be very high risk;
it is again free of charge. For the other people, they have access to the information and they
have access to different types of contraceptives. The price of the contraceptives is too low
[sic].55 For example, the price for one pack of low dose pills is about 16 cents. It is cheaper
than 1 bread. So, it affordable for the people to pay for the contraceptives because they are too
cheap. And also they have access to the information. So, we don’t continue the free services of
the contraceptives to all people, as I mentioned, we continued free services for the people that
are at risk, but for the other people the services are affordable and accessible. The counseling is
again, free, they shouldn’t pay for the counseling, but if they want the contraceptives, they
should pay and it is cheap and affordable. It is very important, I want to emphasize, that the
new population policy in Iran is not to push people to have more children. (Interview, male
doctor, May 2016)

Thus, it is clear that population concerns are behind the new shift, but that the health rationale for
55

The verbal tone in this statement suggests that the participant wishes to stress that prices are ‘very
low’, not that he believes that prices are lower than they should be.
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family planning is also important. This official perspective that the new population policy and resulting
changes in services provision do not affect access is supported by the testimonies of the women I
interviewed. When asked directly about changes to family planning services over time, women do not
mention problems with access. Of these women, 8 came to the US after 2010, and although there are
some differences in how they describe the provision of services—those from rural areas talk about
free clinics while those from urban areas talk about the ease of purchasing pills at the pharmacy, for
example—there is no sense that contraception is difficult to obtain. Instead, the answer to this
question almost always involves a discussion of changes in government promotion of population
growth. As one woman from a small city commented,
In our country, our government at first they announced you have to have 2 kids. Like China,
you know? And if you have 4 kids they stop the benefits, or something like that. But now when
the government change, they encourage people to have more kids. I don’t know what
happened with that, but they announced that you don’t prevent pregnancy, or something like
that, and encourage people to have babies on advertisements. It’s changed during the time, but
before, yeah, the government announced that for the 4th child, you don’t get insurance or
something like that. But now it’s changed. (Interview, female participant, November 2016).

Government advertising of ideal family sizes is a recurrent theme, and the association of family
planning with population policy is evident these women’s statements. Overall, population is still very
important to the regime, and its original connection with family planning has never been erased either
in state decision making or in public perceptions. Although family planning is a key component of the
larger health system, and the connection to women’s empowerment is also recognized, these frames
have not become fully entrenched, and family planning policy is still influenced by fluctuations in the
desire for population control. Whether this connection will ultimately affect future service access
remains to be seen.

Tracing Family Planning Frames
Although the use of second generation frames is not insignificant in Iranian family planning, and
has grown since the earliest days of the program, it is clear that this movement has been built primarily
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around population framing strategies. With regard to how this frame dominance influences
interactions with the international movement, it is important to remember that population and
development frames were once the most salient frames in this arena as well. Although they have been
slowly replaced with women’s, health, and rights frames, population and development framing
strategies still appear in the media and NGO sector until at least 2010. Thus, although these are not the
international movement’s preferred frames, they are frames that the international movement still
recognizes. This recognition may help explain both why international collaboration with Iran has
found common ground on population issues and why Iran has not shifted to second generation
frames. Moreover, this finding is in keeping with my theoretical predictions, articulated in my second
hypothesis, that an institutionalized movement—like the international family planning movement in
the 1990s and 2000s—will tolerate divergent framing strategies in dissenting regimes. Given both the
international movement’s institutionalization and familiarity with these frames, Iran has not been
forced to change its framing language in order to obtain support. The following section builds on the
foundation laid in the preceding frame analysis in order to parse the dynamics of the relationship built
with the international movement and to gain a fuller understanding of the process of frame
convergence, as it can be applied to this case. Figure 6.8 provides a visualization of the broader trends
evident in this relationship.
When attention to family planning emerges in Iran in the 1980s as a response to population
concerns, the international movement is still often constructing family planning as means for
addressing population growth as well. Thus, although sectors within the international movement are
beginning shift to second generation frames, there is little tension with regard to the heavy use of first
generation frames in this decade. As a result, it is not surprising that Iran’s 1989 meeting with UNFPA
centers on population problems, and the relationship grows from this common concern. The analysis
shows that relationships with international organizations continue to have a strong population
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component in the 1990s, but that health and women’s welfare framing is also incorporated into
program charters. Here, it is important to recognize that although population and development are the
dominant frames used in policy and advocacy to support family planning in Iran, there is no objection
to the use of second generation frames. Population is the primary motivation behind the development
of family planning, but Iran is also comfortable with the understanding of family planning as a health,
women’s, and rights-based issue, as long as it occurs within the context of marriage. Therefore, even as
the international movement begins to shift toward more second generation frame use and to
incorporate this into program language, there is still little tension in framing strategies.
Rather, the more intricate strategizing occurs in Iran’s use of Islamic and nationalist frames.
Domestically, religious leaders, MOHME, and the media employ Islamic frames to promote family
planning, but use of these frames tends to be low across venues. As the previously cited doctor
suggests, this may be because, after the fatwa, public controversy about the ability of family planning
to support Islamic values is low. Moreover, in terms of actually promoting family planning use (or
non-use), development planners recognize that religious values are a weak motivator. As that same
doctor notes:
In my current work, I emphasize that in any part of the world, no matter what the religion is,
they don’t make the fertility decisions based on faith. We know that. If you look at the whole
context, the reason for not using contraceptives, when we ask them, the last one is the religious
aspect…Religion has nothing to do in the bedroom of the people, they make their decisions
based on something else. It was the case in Iran” (interview, male doctor, April 2016).

Thus, recognizing that family planning is compatible with Islam is important for the legitimacy of the
program, but domestic advocacy tends to stress other concerns more heavily. However, at the
international level, this frame becomes more politicized as Iran seeks a niche area for leadership in the
international area. At the 1994 ICPD, emphasizing the ability of the Islamic perspective to enhance
commitment to other internationally salient goals—such as the promotion of health, reproductive
rights, and women’s welfare—is a central component of Iran’s advocacy strategy. Here, the chief
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delegate notes that “the Iranian delegation insisted on participating in the ICPD to defend Islam”,
while at the same time advancing areas of agreement, such as the “the emphasis on women’s role in
political and social decisionmaking” (FBIS-NES-94-181-S, 25; 38). Thus, we see more use of the
Islamic frame here than in any other venue, where it is employed to demonstrate the validity and
compatibility of Islamic values in family planning. In addition, conference reporting provides evidence
of how Iran politicizes this frame in order to build a more influential coalition. For example, one
report relays that “Shayk Taskhiri noted that there is cooperation with the various humanity-loving
nations, Islamic states, including Egypt, and the Vatican to bridge the points of weakness in the [Plan
of Action] document” (FBIS-NES-94-181-S, 38). Indeed, the Vatican is the only other participant that
voices a shared concern over marital status, and there are multiple references in the data to Iran’s
interest in working with this important ally to shape the ICPD. Thus, a commitment to promoting
religious values serves both as a key reason for participation in the conference and as a means of
building a more powerful advocacy coalition. At the same time, as evidenced by a heavy reliance on the
other internationally salient frames, Iran is placing the use of this frame within a broader language that
the international movement recognizes and accepts. As previously noted, without Islam or nationalist
frames, the frame distribution in chief delegate Taskhiri’s advocacy is very similar to the framing
employed by the international movement. Thus, by engaging in the global framing of the Islamic frame,
Iran is not seeking to radically alter the dialogue. Instead, the strategy employed is clearly a balancing of
the Islam frame with frames that resonate in the international community.
With regard to nationalist frames, there is much less evidence of efforts at global framing. In the
international arena, nationalist frames appear in Taskhiri’s statements, but they account for less than
10% of frame use. Internationally, Iran asserts its intention to remain free from outside domination,
but this is not a primary focus. Thus, Iran relies more on promoting Islam and integrating this frame
into existing international frame narratives than it does on condemning encroachments on Iranian
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independence. By contrast, in domestic coverage of the 1994 ICPD, the nationalist frame is much
more prevalent and is employed by 25% of articles. Here, the media describes how both Iran’s
international leadership efforts and its responsible demographic policies will help to ensure that Iran is
neither marginalized on the world stage nor dependent on the West for aid. Although, ordinarily,
media coverage of family planning only sporadically contains nationalist frames, these frames are
particularly high in the general 1994 media coverage as well. Thus, concerns about independence are
clearly heightened by the events surrounding the ICPD. However, Iran’s activities at the ICPD are
positively framed in the domestic media and include many of the same references to Islamic leadership
on family planning issues that are present in Taskhiri’s international statements. Therefore,
domestically, nationalist frames are widely used to promote a domestic narrative that links family
planning to strong leadership and independence, while internationally Iran strategically limits their use
in favor of less confrontational frames.
As the Iranian family planning movement develops in the late 1990s and 2000s, subtle shifts to
second generation frames are evident, but the program maintains a close link to population. However,
collaboration continues with an institutionalized international movement that is still willing to work on
family planning within the context of population and development frames. In Chapter 4 it was evident,
for example, that although the international movement has come to rely on second generation frames,
first generation frames persist in most venues. In particular, there is evidence that not all
internationally focused NGOs have moved decisively away from these framing tactics. Thus, rather
than Iran shifting significantly to match with dominant trends in the international movement, we see
more accommodation by international players that are still comfortable framing family planning as a
population and development issue. Moreover, there is some minor evidence of accommodation on
religious and independence issues as well. For example, the official 1994 ICPD Plan of Action states
that “implementation of the recommendations contained in the Programme of Action is the sovereign
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right of each country, consistent with its national laws and development priorities, with full respect for
the various religious and ethical values and cultural backgrounds of its people” (UN 1995b, np). In the
conference reporting, Taskhiri comments that this is an inclusion that he and other nations in his
coalition were pleased to see as a result of their advocacy (FBIS-NES-94-181-S, 44); however, while it
is clear that the UN is expressing the importance of religious values and domestic sovereignty, it
cannot be determined how much Iran’s advocacy truly impacted the final statement. Overall, the
ICPD final report and Plan of Action stop short of mentioning any special role for Islam. Therefore,
we see that the institutionalized international movement is willing to accept and incorporate some
divergent frames proposed by Iran in the international area, but that this incorporation results only in
minor levels of convergence over time in the frames used by each movement. Despite a willingness to
tolerate Iran’s divergent strategies, higher degrees of harmonization have not been observed to date.

CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, I again revisit the central questions that motivate this dissertation and review the
answers that can be applied from the Iran case. These are as follows:
How do international and domestic actors negotiate the tension between divergent framing
tactics in both domestic and international venues?
Generally, there is no direct tension in the way Iran and the international movement utilize first
and second generation frames. Despite varying levels of commitment to each set of frames over time,
both sets are recognized as legitimate framing strategies by both parties, and there is no objection from
either party over the other party’s use of these frames. With regard to Iran’s more unique
frames—nationalism and Islam—tension is mitigated by strategic use of these frames. Specifically,
although domestically Iran employs nationalist frames more heavily during periods of increased
collaboration (i.e. during the 1994 ICPD), it restricts their use in the international arena. Instead,
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internationally, Iran focuses on balancing use of internationally salient frames with the promotion of
Islamic frames. In this way, Iran is able to appeal to international norms, while also promoting its
national ideology and building a religion-based advocacy coalition. For its part, the international
movement shows some minimal accommodation of Islamic frames in the international area by
including a nod to the importance of respecting religious values in the ICPD Plan of Action.
Does the international movement shift to accommodate these divergent frames, or do the
dissenting regimes themselves conform?
In addition to accommodation of religious frames, the institutionalized international movement
accommodates Iran’s predominant focus on first generation frames by explicitly addressing
population concerns in domestic-level programing within the country. In turn, Iran is willing to build
more health-centric partnerships with the international community, as in the relationship with the
IPPF, when politically expedient. However, overall, we see only minor shifts made by Iran toward the
broader use of second generation frames, as in recent years, family planning programming remains
closely tied to population issues.
Does prolonged engagement eventually lead to frame convergence?
In short, this case presents less evidence of frame convergence. As the international movement
continues to move more firmly to the (often exclusive) use of second generation frames, Iran has
reaffirmed its commitment to population frames. Within the time period analyzed here, this
divergence has not impeded engagement. A strong legacy of population and development framing
within the international movement has perhaps prolonged the movement’s willingness to continue to
recognize these frames within varying domestic contexts, as has the ability of a firmly-established
institutionalized movement to absorb divergent perspectives. In Iran, family planning is recognized as
an important means for improving health and promoting women’s welfare, even if health policy
decisions are altered depending on population goals. Thus, there has still been room for meaningful
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collaboration between these movements. However, it is possible to imagine a future where the
international movement no long prioritizes work on population-focused family planning programs,
particularly in a country that is decreasing its commitment to the goal of providing free, universal access
to family planning. In this case, we would expect to see either Iran increasing reliance on second
generation frames—and greater frame convergence—or decreased collaboration in family planning.
Thus, looking forward, prospects for continued engagement may depend on how polarized each
movement becomes in their use of first and second generation frames, and how Iran works to
prioritize the provision of services.
The answers the analysis of the Iran case provides for these questions give a distinct view of the
nature of the relationship between international advocates and dissenting regimes. Again, the regime’s
work to balance unique or contested frames with internationally salient frames proves key to
developing international partnerships. At the same time, a willingness of the international movement
to create space for domestic framing strategies is also critical. The mutual accommodation that helps
to overcome diverging perspectives does not, however, necessarily lead to high levels of overall frame
convergence, at least in the time period studied here. Future work should continue to examine the
extent to which these cases move toward greater convergence and how this process influences
inter-movement collaboration
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Chapter 6 Tables
Figure 6.1
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Figure 6.3

Framing in the Iranian Media
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Figure 6.4

1994 ICPD Domestic News Framing
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Figure 6.5

Framing in the Friday Prayers
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Figure 6.6

MOHME and Domestic Conference Reports
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Figure 6.8:

Diffusion Model
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Chapter 6 Appendix 1: Interview Schedules
Below are the interview schedules used in my interviews with doctors and laywomen, respectively. The
schedules, as well as the interview protocol, were all reviewed and granted exemption by the West
Virginia University Institutional Review Board IRB.
Doctors
Interview Questions on Iranian Family Planning
This first set of questions is designed to gather basic information about your professional
experience.
During what years did you practice medicine in Iran?
In which regions did you work?
What is your professional specialization?
In which types of medical settings have you worked (hospitals, rural clinics, etc.)?
When did you leave Iran?
The following questions ask about your experiences with and knowledge of family planning in
Iran.
To what extent have you been professionally involved in providing family planning services,
counseling, or program development? What are your experiences in this area?
I would like to discuss the principles, values and rationales that have guided the provision of
family planning services in Iran. Can you talk about your perception of the principles or values
forwarded by the government leaders (or official policy) with respect to family planning? Over
time, have you noted any changes in the rationale for supporting family planning?
How do these official values align with the provision of services that you have witnessed in
practice? Can you give me some examples?
Below is part of an official statement on family planning submitted by Iran to the UN in 1999.
Can you comment on how the actual implementation of family planning programs reflects the
principles outlined in this statement?
Relying on the three bases of Islam, nationality and republicanism, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic
of Iran while respecting the rights and dignity of the individual, considers family as the basic unit of society
and social life, in which the respective rights, functions and roles of both parents and children are defined.
The formulation and implementation of population policy, including family planning, in the Islamic Republic
of Iran has been based on such a definition and with due regard for the socio-cultural characteristics as well
as development needs and requirements of the society.

Women
Interview Questions on Iranian Family Planning
This first set of questions is designed to gather very basic information about your life in Iran.
During what years did you live in Iran?
In which regions did you live?
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In Iran, what kind of professional work did you (or your husband or family) engage in?
Why did you leave Iran?

The following questions are concerned with services that support women’s health in Iran. Overall, I
am particularly interested in the services or methods of family planning (contraception) that are
available as part of women’s health care.
If a woman wishes to avoid or delay a pregnancy, what options are available to her in Iran? In what
ways are family planning services provided?
Feel free to answer generally or personally from your experience.
What differences in family planning services have you noticed occurring over time?
In your opinion, does the government seek to influence childbearing decisions? If so, how?
Do you have any other experiences on this subject that you would like to share?
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion: Dissent and Diffusion in Policy and
Advocacy
Through this project, I examine the shifting advocacy and policy framing tactics of regimes that espouse
non-Western ideologies, but which are nevertheless active in the global community. I then compare these shifts to
trends in international advocacy in order to generate a fuller understanding of the relationship between
international social movements and the policy and advocacy trajectories of dissenting regimes.
Because existing theory suggests that the development of productive and cooperative partnerships
between international and domestic actors requires the use of similar framing tactics, advancing an
explanation

for

dissenting

regimes’

ability

to

retain

their

distinct—and

sometimes

confrontational—frame narratives while simultaneously building international relationships is critical
to more clearly understanding policy and advocacy processes in diverse political contexts. In the effort
to develop such an explanation, the findings of this research, broadly outlined below, provide a more
nuanced account of the importance of frame matching and the implications of divergence and dissent
in international contexts.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
In the case of family planning, Iran and Cuba share many similarities. Both nations worked to
develop strong family planning programs that extend services to a broad population base, and both
nations engaged with actors from the international movement, who provided financial and technical
support for these programs. At the same time, both Cuba and Iran openly rejected certain
international movement norms and pursued domestic framing strategies that suited their own specific
domestic values and goals. However, despite these similarities, Cuban and Iran differ somewhat in
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both the types of framing strategies pursued and in how they negotiated these frames in the
international arena. As Chapter Five details, the Cuban movement was first initiated around
non-dissenting use of population and development frames, but soon began to challenge the
dominance of first generation frames in the international movement. At the same time, reliance on
women and health frames became increasingly common in domestic contexts. The study of Iranian
family planning in Chapter Six also highlights an early reliance on population and development frames
and domestic actors retain use of first generation frames even as these increasingly lose salience in the
international movement. In addition, Iran demonstrates a commitment to the use of Islamic frames
and nationalist frames that challenge Western intervention in non-Western family planning programs.
Therefore, as existing theory predicts, each nation pursued a unique set of framing tactics that
were best suited for promoting family planning in their own unique socio-political contexts. The
finding of greater interest, however, is that both Cuba and Iran were able to generate international
support for these domestic narratives (and resulting programs) by strategically balancing divergent
frame use and dissent with the uncontested use of internationally salient frames. In the case of Cuba,
advocates in international forums condemned first generation frames and affirmed the importance of
population and development in equal measure, and employed these frames in international dialogues
both with and without dissent. This process of tactful divergence allowed Cuba to voice its criticism of
international norms while simultaneously developing relationships with international partners.
Similarly, Iran balanced dissent and frame divergence, but accomplished this through somewhat
different strategies. Specifically, Iran did not reject first generation frames, but rather used these as an
early point of common ground with the international movement. At the same time, Iran limited their
international use of confrontational nationalist frames—which were more popular in domestic
contexts—while favoring the heavier use of Islamic frames. In this case, Islamic frames were used as a
more gentle signal of Iran’s divergence from Western norms, as well as to help build a broader
-192-

advocacy coalition that challenged dominant trends in international movement frames and objectives.
In sum, although there are nuanced differences in the tactics of dissent, which reflect each nation’s
particular socio-political context, both Iran and Cuba strategically balanced their open challenges to
international movement frames with frames that allowed them to affirm and uphold the values and
norms of the international movement. As a result, both nations were able to simultaneously challenge
and draw support from the international movement. Nevertheless, this strategic balancing was only
observed during periods of international movement institutionalization, the implications of which are
reviewed in the next section.

REVIEW OF HYPOTHESES AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
In the effort to reconcile the behavior of dissenting regimes with existing work on the importance
of international and domestic movement frame matching, I have incorporated the well-established
literature on social movement lifecycles and proposed that the importance of frame matching varies
according to the particular stage of a social movement’s development. Existing theory assumes that, in
order to receive recognition and support, domestic movements must employ frames that resonate
with the international community. Similarly, in order for international movement goals to be realized
in domestic contexts, the framing of those goals must resonate with local values. Thus, for productive
collaboration between movements to occur, frame matching between movements is critical. However,
given that dissenting regimes often directly challenge international frames and forward their own
particular mix of framing strategies while securing international support, some revision to existing
theory seems necessary. In this project, I have therefore examined the possibility that frame matching
is more important when a movement is in its incipiency or coalescence than it is when a movement has
become broadly institutionalized. In accordance with this theory, Figure 7.1 recapitulates the
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stage-dependent dynamics that are expected in the interactions between international and domestic
movements.
Figure 7.1

In Chapter Three, I outlined three specific hypotheses resulting from my theoretical
propositions, and these have each been tested through analysis of the international movement, Cuban,
and Iranian case studies. Below, I revisit each hypothesis and review the outcomes of my analysis.
H1: During the international movement’s incipiency and coalescence, when the movement is working
to focus, coordinate, and develop its messages and strategies, dissenting framing tactics will not be
recognized or supported by the international movement. Funding and technical support will not be
granted and collaborative partnerships will not develop. Thus, any international recognition and
support of dissenting regimes that does occur during this phase requires frame matching by the
dissenting regime. However, given the need for dissenting regimes to market themselves through
ideologically inconsistent frames to draw international support, it is more likely that no relationship of
support will develop during this phase.

In the international movement, we see the transition through incipiency and coalescence during the
1960s, when the movement was heavily dominated by population and development framing. Although
-194-

I predicted that an absence of dissenting regime engagement with international actors would be the
more likely outcome during this stage, this did not hold true in the case of Cuba. Rather, the first
scenario—frame matching and a lack of dissent—were observed. In this decade, Cuba was slow to
challenge population and development frames and widely employed these frames domestically
without dissent. In its international interactions, Cuba also refrained from dissent and worked to
develop partnerships with international family planning activists that were built on praise for and
acceptance of international movement strategies. Thus, I find support for hypothesis 1 in the
interactions between Cuba and the international movement in the 1960s. However, because Iran’s
Islamic family planning movement 56 did not begin until after the international movement’s
institutionalization was complete, the Iranian case cannot provide evidence to confirm or reject this
hypothesis.
H2: As the international movement institutionalizes, support will be extended to dissenting regimes
despite divergent framing tactics. This is both because the institutionalized movement—having
achieved high levels of support, resources, and legitimacy—is less threatened by dissenting framing
tactics, and because domestic adherence to domestically salient (and ideologically divergent) frames is
critical as the dissenting regimes themselves move through movement incipiency and coalescence.

Existing literature demonstrates that the international family planning movement began
institutionalization in the 1970s and had become fully institutionalized by the end of the 1980s (Blanc
and Tsui 2005). In the 1970s and 1980s, we see behavior from Cuba and the international movement
that support hypothesis 2. Specifically, we see the emergence of tactful divergence from international
movement frames that does not impact the international movement’s extension of support to the
Cuban domestic movement. Thus, as the international movement institutionalizes, pointed but
moderated dissent is tolerated. In the case of Iran, frame mismatch is more prevalent than outright
dissent in the 1980s, as Iran placed heavy reliance on the first generation frames that were increasingly

Narrative accounts of Iranian family planning in the 1960s suggest that levels of both frame matching and
non-dissenting collaboration were high during this decade. However, because pre-revolutionary Iran cannot be
considered a dissenting regime, this matching and collaboration do not signal support for hypothesis 1.
56
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losing salience internationally. In the 1990s, this mismatch continued to grow, as did Iran’s use of
internationally marginal Islamic frames. However, again in support of hypothesis 2, I find that this
divergence in framing tactics during the period of institutionalization does not impede Iran’s ability to
build strong partnerships with the international movement during this decade. Rather, strategic
balancing leads to the formation of a durable relationship with the international movement. Thus,
both cases demonstrate that a well-institutionalized movement may readily extend support to
movements that express objections to its framing tactics, particularly when these objections are
balanced with support for internationally salient frames.
H3: As dissenting regimes continue to interact with the international movement and its related
organizations, and their own movements become institutionalized, both activist and policy frames will
converge with those employed by the international community.

Looking at the most recent developments in family planning activism, I find support for hypothesis 3
in the case of Cuba, but less so in the case of Iran. In Cuba in the 2000s, we see continued high levels
of collaboration, the disappearance of dissent, and convergence around second generation frame use.
By contrast, despite a strong relationship with the international movement, Iran has retained more of
its early focus on family planning as a tool of population control and economic development.
Although Iran does not dissent to second generation frame use and has incorporated more of these
frames over time, in the 2000s, these frames are not clearly dominant. I have suggested that this may be
due, in part, to the institutionalized international movement’s willingness to continue to work on
population and development issues. Whether the slow increase in second generation framing is the
beginning of a longer trend in Iran is a question that future research will need to address.
Overall, these findings support the theory that the stage of social movement development impacts
the importance of frame matching in the development of inter-movement collaboration and aid.
During international movement incipiency and coalescence, I find higher levels of frame matching and
an absence of dissent, but as the movement lifecycle progresses through institutionalization,
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divergence and dissent emerge without threatening the ability to build inter-movement relationships.
Beyond support for my theoretical proposition, my analyses also show that even during periods of
institutionalization, dissenting regimes never fully oppose dominant trends in international frame
narratives. Rather, as dissenting regimes express their clear objection to international movement
norms and frames during institutionalization, they still strategically balance this dissent with support
for international framing tactics.

ADVOCACY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A better understanding of the relationship between international movements and dissenting
regimes can enable activists, aid donors, and political leaders to develop advocacy strategies and policy
programs that more consciously and judiciously account for the effects of their underlying differences.
Moreover, by deepening awareness of where and when collaboration between groups with seemingly
incompatible ideologies results in desirable policy outcomes, this work can assist in the often difficult
process of identifying areas where transnational partnerships will be most welcome and effective.
Specifically, looking toward the practical application of theory, this work suggests several concrete
insights.
First, significant divergence in ideological orientations (and related frames) need not represent
an intractable problem for groups that seek to develop a productive working relationship. Rather, this
research suggests that grave differences in values and perspectives can be overcome when 1.) dissent
to opposing frames is balanced a willingness to engage with those frames in a non-dissenting manner,
and 2.) institutionalized movements provide a tolerant space for dissenting views. Although
compromise is a hallmark of transnational collaboration, the observations from these cases do not fit
into a traditional model of give-and-take. For example, in the 1970s, we do not observe compromising
shifts in Cuba’s domestic approach to family planning to accommodate population and development
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dynamics, nor do we observe an international movement that concedes to arguments regarding
neocolonial subjugation. In place of compromise, these cases are characterized by a willingness to
offer space for the development of opposing viewpoints and ultimately to affirm the validity of varying
approaches to common goals.
Second, although ‘hijacking’ of domestic activist or policy agendas by powerful international
actors certainly occurs—and has occurred frequently within the history of family planning—the
external imposition of international norms is not the inevitable result of extensive collaboration. In
both Cuba and Iran, domestic actors remain firmly in control of their internationally-supported family
planning programs and the frame narratives used to develop them. In these cases, the provision of
international support coupled with the freedom to run programs that are consistent with domestic
values has resulted in some of the strongest examples of family planning success in both Latin America
and Western Asia. Thus, it is possible for regimes with the political will to develop and administer their
own programs to do so even while relying on significant international aid.
Third, although these cases provide positive examples of collaboration, there is some evidence
that timing matters. Dissent may not be tolerated by movements that have not yet institutionalized,
and regimes that express diverging perspectives may be excluded from international partnerships.
Thus, we should not expect that the forging of productive relationships is always a viable possibility,
and it may be necessary to wait until an advocacy campaign is securely established before attempting to
engage dissenting regimes.
Overall, these cases suggest that tolerance of dissent during movement institutionalization, tactful
divergence by dissenting regimes, and the freedom to retain control of domestic narratives are
important determinants of the ability build diverse coalitions and develop sound policies and programs
that benefit individual citizens. In judging how universally these lessons may be applied, it is important
to first recognize that while the strength of qualitative analysis and ‘explaining-outcome’ process
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tracing rests in their ability to provide nuanced explanations of puzzling outcomes, the limit lies in
their generalizability. Nevertheless, while the more detailed analysis of events is specific to these
particular cases, these general conclusions have much greater potential to be more widely applied.
Thus, we may not find other cases where the sequence of events exactly mirrors the strategies
employed by Iran in Cuba in the case of family planning, but there is nothing about ‘tolerance of
dissent during movement institutionalization, tactful divergence by dissenting regimes, and the
freedom to retain control of domestic narratives’ that suggests that these factors must be unique to
these cases. Rather, we might first look for evidence of their broader applicability in cases that share
features of a strong international movement and clashing domestic perspectives, but where activist
goals are quite similar. Strong international coordination that sets the tone for global action is a
prominent feature in the theory described here, and thus, cases that exhibit this
coordination—whether from a Western or alternative perspective—are most likely to fit within my
theoretical framework. Additionally, recognition from both international and domestic actors that the
ultimate goals of the movement are valid or important is likely needed in order to motivate any action
on the issue, even if the rationales and motives for pursuing those goals might be quite different. For
example, analysis of the international women’s movement or climate change advocacy—where
Western transnational actors (and particularly the UN) have taken lead in guiding activist activity and
setting global norms, but where there are many conflicting domestic interpretations about how to
frame and interpret movement goals and incorporate them into policy—could provide a fruitful
starting point for additional tests of the trends identified here. Several additional avenues for future
research are explored in the conclusion.
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Although prior research has suggested that domestic groups entering the international arena must
frame their claims in a way that is compatible with international norms, this conceptualization leaves
little space for challenges by regimes that seek to collaborate with the international community, but
that object to the activist and policy ideas that dominate international venues. By demonstrating that,
in the effort to build inter-movement partnerships, domestic actors can balance their objections with
support for movement norms, and that institutionalized movements offer more flexibility in the
degree to which outside actors must match existing frame narratives, this dissertation outlines a path
through which dissenting regimes can retain their distinctive, divergent perspectives while not
compromising outside recognition and support. These findings show that dissenting regimes do not
need to abandon their criticism of international trends in order to collaborate with international actors.
Instead, this work highlights the potential for dissenting regimes to criticize existing frames, to open
space for new frame narratives, and to insert domestic frames into international dialogues. As existing
literature predicts, over time this process may lead to frame convergence; however, in these cases,
convergence is the outcome of accommodation by both international and domestic actors, and not
simply a product of divergent movements conforming to international norms.
Further research investigating the impact of social movement lifecycles and reliance on tactful
divergence would help to strengthen our understanding of how actors with diverse perspectives
develop positive and productive inter-movement relationships. In particular, beyond broader testing
to determine generalizability, future research should focus on testing this theory across additional
cases in order to verify that additional explanations for the dynamics of dissent observed here have not
been omitted.
With regard to testing additional cases, an examination of different social movements, a wider
selection of dissenting regimes, and other time frames could help to strengthen support for the theory
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proposed here. The international family planning movement was undoubtedly a powerful movement
that radically transformed family planning norms and practices across the world. However, it was also
a fairly tame movement that was characterized by relatively low levels of contention and an absence of
collective violence. Although its impact was revolutionary in terms of demographic influence and
women’s health and welfare improvements, the repertoires employed to achieve this change were not
particularly unconventional. Testing this theory across a range of cases with varying levels of
contention and different movement repertoires would help to determine how universally the theory
might be extended. Similarly, examining whether the behavior of a wider selection of regimes fits the
pattern of strategic balancing and expressions of dissent that are linked to movement stage would be
beneficial. Although both Iran and Cuba fit the definition of dissenting regime in the context of family
planning activism and programming, these regimes are ideologically and culturally disparate. Thus,
their selection as test cases helps to demonstrate that the trends identified in this work are not
particular to a very narrow set of regime characteristics. Nevertheless, extending the sample size could
help to bolster this claim. Finally, the theory presented here should be tested among movements that
progressed through the social movement stages during a wider range of decades. Literature on frame
matching does not suggest that the importance of matching is decreasing over time; rather, as claimant
access to and competition for international support increases over time, the importance of strategic
frame marketing increases. Nevertheless, it seems marginally plausible that general tolerance of
deviant frame tactics is increasing over time, across all movements. Thus, the general decade of
movement activity, rather than the particular social movement stage, would be the greater predictor of
tolerance of frame mismatch. A test of movements that progressed through the social movement
stages in a wider range of time periods would help to determine whether this is the case.
More generally, additional research would help to address the possibility of additional or
alternative explanations for the ability of dissenting regimes to draw support and build partnerships,
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and would help to offset the qualitative approach’s tradeoff between context-rich explanations and
pinpointing the generalizability of the theory proposed. For example, although the outcome of this
research supports the importance of movement stages, it is possible that my findings regarding the
balancing of dissent hold higher explanatory power. Documenting the appearance (or absence) of this
strategy across other cases would help to determine the impact of such tactics. Moreover, the regime
test cases employed here are highly instructive, but have clear limitations. In particular, because
pre-revolutionary Iran was not a dissenting regime and the Islamic Iranian movement did not begin
until the late 1980s, testing of hypothesis 1 was not possible within this case. In addition, my evaluation
of this case was impacted by language barriers and the more diffuse nature of the Iranian expatriate
population in the US. Specifically, securing interviews with English-speaking Iranian women, whose
lives in Iran spanned the 1980s-2010s, proved more challenging than obtaining interviews with
Cubans. In part, the dense Cuban social networks in Miami and my ability to conduct native-language
interviews certainly facilitated the interview process for this case.57 However, although family planning
and family size is a matter of widespread public discussion in Iran and activism on health issues is
viewed as relatively harmless, Cubans also have a more open approach to discussions of sexual activity
and reproductive health in general. Given that I was ultimately able to generate a sizeable sample for
Iran—albeit of comparatively young and well-educated women—it is possible that the extent to which
this cultural difference influenced my findings is negligible. Nevertheless, the evaluation of additional
cases could help to offset limitations posed by individual cases and increase confidence in my theory.
Overall, this work provides a firm foundation for understanding the relationship between
dissenting regimes and international activists and suggests various opportunities to extend research on
the complex relationship between these actors. Importantly, the analysis of the three cases presented
in this dissertation advances our understanding of how international and domestic actors negotiate the
In Miami, the central challenge to gathering interviews was time-related, as my two month fellowship
required a full-time commitment to archival research.
57
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tension between divergent framing tactics in both domestic and international venues, how and where
accommodation of these divergent frames occurs, and how prolonged engagement impacts frame
convergence. As a result, this dissertation highlights the pathways through which activists and
policymakers may negotiate a relationship that bridges divergent values and norms, and collaborate to
develop sound, context-appropriate policies and programs that benefit individual citizens.
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